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Introduction
Dear Colleagues and Friends,
This is the volume of papers, delivered during the international 
conference on the “Role of Human Capital in International Competi-
tiveness. Transatlantic Comparison of Experience with Migration in 
the US and the EU”. The event took place on January 26, 2007 in Soﬁa.
It was organized by the Economic Policy Institute in cooperation with 
the Council on Social Work Education, Alexandria, VA; Katherine A. 
Kendall Institute, the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest, the Romanian Center for Economic 
Policies, Bucharest and thanks to the ﬁnancial support of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington. 
The project’s main goal was to provide a closer look to the current 
state of the researched tendencies and through a transatlantic confer-
ence to create a forum for discussions and policy dialogue on the role 
of human capital in international competitiveness, with a special focus 
on migration. In order to identify policy recommendations and implica-
tions during the ﬁnal event were presented several country case studies
of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and USA, the EU perspective was also 
included. Conference speakers presented papers prepared in advance, 
which treated their country experiences and delivered information on 
national future policy actions.
You can ﬁnd out more abut the international conference (Program,
List of Participants, etc.) on www.epi-bg.org. 
The present volume contains contributions structured within the 
following main thematic panels and topics: 
● Presentation of Case Studies on Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania;
- Human Capital as a Key-Factor for the Competitiveness 
of Bulgaria. The Role of the International Migration
- Vocational Training – An Essential Element for the De-
velopment of Human Resources
- Economic Impact of Migration in Hungary  
- Security, Legal and Human Aspects of Migration – Expe-
rience and Policies (Hungary)
- The Role of Human Capital in the International Competi-
tiveness. The Romanian Policy Approach
- Assessing the Human Capital in Romania - Current State 
of Understanding and Expectations
● Presentation of Case Studies on the Experience of European 
Union and U.S.A.;
- Human Capital: An EC Perspective
- United States’ Migration Policies and Their Implications 
We are aware of the limits of this effort to make you a part of the 
successful the international conference on the “Role of Human Capital 
in International Competitiveness. Transatlantic Comparison of Experi-
ence with Migration in the US and the EU”. Nonetheless, it is in EPI’s 
major goals proﬁle and line of activity to publish and disseminate, and
thus actively contribute to the widening of beneﬁciaries’ circles of
those ones believing in and working for the future of Europe. 
With this broader interdisciplinary “project”, going beyond the 
narrow research focus of the competitiveness and migration issue only, 
we hope to have provided some new insights on the researched topics. 
We would like also to contribute to the networking and international 
cooperation and thank to all the colleagues, friends and actors who 
have inspired, trusted and supported us. We thank once again our do-
nor the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Ivanka Petkova   Plamena Spassova
Chairperson & Chief Executive Ofﬁcer Executive Director  
Economic Policy Institute    Economic Policy Institute
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Welcoming Address
by Georgi Pirinski,
Chairman of the 40th National Assembly 
of the Republic of Bulgaria, Soﬁa
TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Please, allow me to congratulate you and to wish successful 
work to the participants in the Conference on the Project “The Role 
of Human Capital in International Competitiveness. Transatlantic 
Comparison of Experience with Migration in the United States and 
the European Union”.
I am convinced that the fruitful discussions will be beneﬁcial
both for the participants themselves and the migration policies of 
their countries. I hope that the balanced scientiﬁc conclusions of
the Conference will help the efforts of the institutions to solve the 
practical issues in this ﬁeld.
The subject of the Conference is undoubtedly of particular 
present interest for Bulgaria because of its accession to the Euro-
pean Union and the tasks that Bulgaria has to deal with as part of 
the external border of the Union with regard to the migration proc-
esses on the Continent.
Wishing you fruitful discussions,
Yours truly,
Georgi Pirinski 
26 January 2007
STATEMENT BY NINA RADEVA,
DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND ENERGY 
   TO THE PARTICIPANTS
   IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
Dear Ladies and Gentleman,
It is a pleasure and honor for me to attend the conference and on 
behalf of the Ministry of economy and energy to welcome all partici-
pants in the international conference on „The Role of Human Capital 
in International Competitiveness. Transatlantic Comparison of Experi-
ence with Migration in the United States and the European Union”.
On 1 January 2007 Bulgaria became a full-ﬂedged member of the
European Union. It is said to be one of the biggest achievements of the 
Bulgarian policy and Bulgarian society as a whole. It is an evidence of 
the positive development of the country in the last few years and also of 
the acknowledgement of the European partners for the attained objec-
tives and fulﬁlment of all criteria for EU membership.
Bulgaria has walked a complicated and a very hard way of reforms 
in the process of its EU-accession. The harmonization of legislation, 
adoption and implementation of the European requirements even before 
the date of membership has given an opportunity of the Bulgarian in-
dustry to adjust to the high requirements of the European Single Market 
in order face successfully the internal competitive pressure. 
The process of EU-accession found expression in the implementa-
tion of some positive tendencies in the development of the Bulgarian 
economy. It has been recognized as a functioning market economy. In 
the last few years Bulgaria has been achieving a high economic growth 
– 5.5% in 2005 and 6.7% in the third quarter of 2006.
It turned out that the positive development of the economy is pos-
sible only due to the fact that the business environment in Bulgaria is 
predictable as a result of the sustained ﬁnancial and macroeconomic
stability. The accumulated inﬂation in 2005 in Bulgaria amounted to
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6.5% no matter the drastic jump in the fuels prices (over 60% in the last 
year). The inﬂation in the end of November 2006 added up to 5.3%.
The overall improvement of the business environment and the 
growth of the FDI have reﬂected also in reduction of the unemploy-
ment rates which decreased from 18% in 2000 to 10.13% in the end 
of 2005. Thus, unemployment in 2006 has amounted to 9.61% which 
levels have approached the average rates in EU (8%). 
In 2005 the investments, not based on privatization have reached 
2.3 billion Euro. The amount of FDI within the period January-October 
2006 is 3.2 billion Euro. The competitiveness of the Bulgarian business 
as a whole has improved due to these investments. The Bulgarian export 
for the mentioned period January-October has reached 9.96 billion Euro 
recording in this way a growth rate of 29.1%, compared to the same 
period in 2005. It is worth noting also the new tendency presenting that 
the export has been growing with bigger rates than the import, which in 
itself has increased with 25.6% for the ﬁrst ten months of 2006.
The measures for competitiveness increasing of the Bulgarian 
business and for improvement of the business environment in Bulgaria 
are said to be in the spirit of the renewed Lisbon strategy achieving a 
higher growth and employment. The priority areas to be inﬂuenced
include activities as building of attractive investment environment, 
growth based on knowledge and innovations development, creation of 
more and better jobs by the business.
The huge investment volume stands for an increased demand of 
qualiﬁed specialists on behalf of the business. The daily contacts to
Bulgarian and foreign investors are showing that it is getting harder 
and harder for Bulgaria to reply to this increased demand. A long-last-
ing shortage of high skilled labour force has been outlined in a number 
of key economic sectors of the country. Except highly qualiﬁed spe-
cialists in the ﬁeld of the IT and communications and engineers with
different professional and educational backgrounds, on the labour mar-
ket are also lacking specialists obtaining vocational secondary educa-
tion and qualiﬁed workers for a lot of branches of the manufacturing
industry, building sector, tourism, etc.
The practice of EU member countries shows that even those of them, 
which have imposed strong restrictions for entering of foreign citizens 
into their labour markets pursue a policy of attracting of professionals, 
lacking in their domestic economies. The above mentioned necessitates 
a new meaning to be given to the current state policy towards migration 
of human capital towards the European countries and USA.
There are some reasons to be mentioned in this context: 
First, it is said to be the emigration of qualiﬁed specialists in the
90s and the beginning of 21st century. Although, the dimensions of the 
emigration processes have been recently decreasing and the structure 
of the Bulgarian emigration has been changing towards low skilled 
workers, the big difference in remuneration does not create enough 
prerequisites for the qualiﬁed specialists to return back to the country.
Second, these are the unfavourable demographic processes – low 
birth rates and the rabid population ageing.
Third, the pool of unemployed people in Bulgaria preset a reserve 
of not sufﬁciently skilled labor force. In the last few years the unem-
ployment in Bulgaria decreased rapidly, but unfortunately 60,1 % o of 
the unemployed obtain diploma in primary education and 64,2 % are 
without any qualiﬁcation and professional specialty.  
Fourth, the already planned big investments for production exten-
sion in many key economic sectors will cause even acuter shortage of 
qualiﬁed employees in variety of professional specialties.
Fifth, the only one source of qualiﬁed specialist for the Bulgarian
labour market remains the education system. Unfortunately, it is not 
oriented towards the needs of the labour market. The state admission to 
the vocational schools and universities is not appropriate to the labour 
market demands, because it has been planned with the aim to keep the 
schools and universities existing and the personnel there employed.   
As a conclusion I would like to draw your attention to the actuality 
of this international conference’s topic. I hope that the information pro-
vided by the lecturers’ presentations and shared during the discussions 
and informal conversations would be of great use for all participants. 
Thus, the objective of this conference will be achieved.    
I wish you successful and useful work!
Thank you for your attention!
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STATEMENT BY FERNANDO PONZ
FIRST SECRETARY, REPRESENTATION 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN BULGARIA, 
SOFIA 
Ms. Petkova, 
Ms. Watkins
Dear Ambassadors,
Distinguished guests,
It is a privilege for me to welcome you on behalf of the Representa-
tion of the European Commission in Soﬁa and also to congratulate the
Economic Policy Institute - the organisers of this event, our friends form 
the German Marshall Fund and certainly also the Bulgarian authorities. 
I think this is a particularly timely and intellectually provoking event. 
Let me explain you brieﬂy why I think that it is timely and why I think
that it is intellectually provoking. This is not an empty courtesy for-
mula. It is intellectually provoking, because migration is most probably, 
at least in my view, the most signiﬁcant social phenomenon of the 20th
and the 21st century. It is full of promises; it is full of opportunities to 
improve competitiveness, but it is full of dangers as well. In that sense it 
is also irreversible and in that sense it is particularly important to reﬂect
about it when we still have some time and now we have some time be-
cause Bulgaria and Romania, you are now countries of emigrants, you 
are both countries which have seen a part of the population going away, 
perhaps for lack of a better future within the country, not just because 
they wanted to. The situation has also evolved in other countries and it is 
important to start thinking about it from the beginning in order to man-
age migration as it has to be managed properly. But also I think, this is 
intellectually provoking, because of the transatlantic dimension of this 
conference. The European Union was created itself under the inspiration 
of the United States to a very large extent and I think that from day 1 the 
European Union has been looking at the United States for examples of 
things to do, but also to avoid some mistakes, why not. In that sense we 
can also look at the United States for examples of the migration policy 
to copy what they have done well and to avoid what they have done not 
so well and perhaps database as well, because migration is a long-time 
phenomenon here in Europe, so I think, that this exchange of exper-
tise will be mutually beneﬁcent for both sides of the Atlantic. But also
there is a last main reason, why I think this is particularly intellectually 
provoking, and that reason is the existence of a European Union citi-
zenship, which sometimes is forgotten, but which exists. As you know 
from the time of the Maastricht treaty the European Union decided to 
give its citizens the citizenship of the Union. This involves rights for the 
EU-citizens and now also for the Bulgarians and for the Romanians, 
but also involves obligations and it also involves a dimension that has 
to be taken in into account when we discuss migration: to what extent 
do we want to have common migration policies in the European Union. 
Also it is important to what extent it is interesting and important for our 
partners and in particular for the United States, that we have a common 
migration policy. I want to throw to you the question, if is it better or 
worse for the United States to deal with individual member states on 
migration issues or is it better for them with the European Union speak-
ing with a single voice. From the way I ask this question you can already 
see what my response to this is, but this is not what is important. What 
is important is what your response is because you are the experts and I 
know that in the audience we have some of the most prominent authori-
ties about this, so I wanted to launch this question to you. I am so glad 
this is going to be discussed during the panels.
Secondly, why do I think, that this is so timely. As I said it is not 
a courtesy formula. I think this event is very timely because from the 
1 January 2007 everything has changed in Bulgaria and in Romania. I 
think that to some extent this is a little bit like saying that the interna-
tional situation is intensifying. It doesn’t really mean anything and in 
fact things have not changed overnight in Bulgaria and Romania, it is a 
process. But there is one thing that has changed in both countries. From 
1 January 2007 both Bulgaria and Romania are fully bound by all the ob-
ligations of the European Union and they have also become full-ﬂedged
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member states. The obligations they are obliged now by, include the so-
cial acquis which is in general the lows and the body of legislation that 
the European Union has also on social affairs, so that is one of the rea-
sons why this is also timely. As I said one moment ago if the future is as 
bright as we wish for Bulgaria and Romania, both countries will evolve 
from countries of emigrants to countries of immigrants. Right now it is 
a little bit difﬁcult to envisage that, but it has happened. It has happened
in the country that I know best, which is Spain, the country I come from, 
and it has happened very quickly. Then we went from a situation of hav-
ing two million people or more abroad, to a situation, where between 5 
to 10 percent of the population in Spain is of foreign origin. Bulgaria and 
Romania may be quicker than us, because the globalization is now more 
advanced. The migration cannot be stopped by physical barriers that we 
all have learnt. So better to prepare when we have the time
In conclusion, I would like to say, that when I read the remarkably 
long title of this conference it took me few minutes to think for my self 
what will be for me the ultimate objective of this conference. Of course, 
it is for the organizers to say, but for me one of the ultimate objectives, 
could be to make a useful contribution so that Bulgaria and Romania 
can prepare things in a way that makes it possible for those who want to 
stay, to stay and to have a decent, prosperous life in their countries and 
it also makes it possible for those who want to leave and to work abroad, 
to work abroad and to have a decent, prosperous life in another member 
state of the European Union or even in the United States. 
I don’t want to be any longer than this. Let me once again con-
gratulate the Economic Policy Institute, the German Marshall Fund 
and the Bulgarian authorities for this timely and provoking initiative. I 
wish you all possible success for your conference.
PANEL: PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES ON 
BULGARIA, HUNGARY, ROMANIA
________________________________
THE CASE OF BULGARIA
Human Capital as a Key-factor for the Competitiveness 
of Bulgaria.  The Role of the International Migration
Yasen Georgiev
Research Fellow, Economic Policy Institute, Soﬁa
I. Introduction:
The Balkans and the SEE as a whole are said to be a migrant area. 
Traditionally, for economic and political reasons, outward migration is 
an option for most people in this region. Similarly after the collapse of 
the socialist system and the fall of the iron curtain, outward migration 
has become quite important. To this, the effects of civil and other 
conﬂicts should be added that have led to the large ﬂow of refugees and
internally displaced people, some of whom have ended up as migrants 
within and outside the region.
In this research, post conﬂict migration will be set aside, as fortu-
nately Bulgaria was among the few Balkan countries, which underwent 
a peaceful transition. Examining the case of migration it is often difﬁcult
empirically to distinguish economic from political migration, theoretically 
and conceptually those are distinct phenomena. Liberalization as well as 
restructuring of production has opened up opportunities and released 
labour from their previous employment, thus increased labour mobility 
has been more or less expected. In addition, prolonged adverse economic 
circumstances, as the ones that can be found in SEE and particularly in 
Bulgaria, have made outward migration more attractive. 
The above mentioned explains why the recent decades have seen far 
more research on immigration than on emigration. The quantitative study 
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of migration with a source country focus is aggravated by the paucity of 
internationally comparable or even national data beyond the census re-
sults: national authorities can keep track of only part of the people who 
move abroad, be it permanently or temporarily. Temporary migrants in 
particular are often unrecorded in their host countries where they tend 
to perform illegal work. However, existing researchs have revealed that 
causes and effects of emigration are highly context speciﬁc.
Thus, outward migration itself is crucial for the countries’ overall 
competitiveness, domestic labour supply, for income generation and 
for public ﬁnances. Across the SEE region, migrant workers’ remit-
tances have become an important source of income. In some countries 
of Southeast Europe, ofﬁcially recorded remittances make up for a sub-
stantial share of GDP. 
However, the knowledge of determinants and effects of Southeast 
European and in particular Bulgarian migration is still insufﬁcient to
date. For instance, little is known about the effects of emigration on the 
public provision of services and social security. The capability of the 
state to provide services and social security may deteriorate as a result 
of a diminishing tax base due to emigration, or it may increase as remit-
tances and self-employment of returning migrants promote economic ac-
tivity. On the other hand, migration itself may be a reaction to a transient 
economic crisis against which the state fails to provide protection. The 
provision of public goods, notably infrastructure, may also be critical for 
investment from saved income abroad as a complement that enhances 
the returns from such investment. Turning to inequality, e.g. household 
income inequality may be increased or decreased by migration ﬂows,
depending on the draw of migrants from the total income distribution 
of the population, on different capabilities of migrants from households 
with higher or lower domestic income to remit, and on labour market and 
household adjustments to earnings abroad. 
In the following research will be investigated some of these 
and other connections, presenting the Bulgarian perspective within 
the topic of role of human capital in international competitiveness. 
II. Bulgaria - General Information and Trends:
Over the last few years Bulgaria has achieved considerable progress 
towards lasting stability and sustainable growth. The dynamic develop-
ment of Bulgarian economy continues – in 2005 the real GDP growth 
rate was about 5.5 % and in the ﬁrst half of 2006 reached 6.1%. More
than 68% of GDP is produced by the private sector. The service sector 
also recorded a signiﬁcant growth by 6.6% on annual basis in 2005 and
by 5.3% on annual basis in the ﬁrst half of 2006.
Table 1. Data and Statistics for Bulgaria (20051)
Population, total (millions) 7.7
Population growth (annual %) -0.3
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 76.0
Life expectancy at birth, male (years) 68.9
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) 6.4
GDP (current US$) (billions) 26.65
GDP growth (annual %) 5.5
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 3450
Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %) 5.0
Foreign direct investment, net inﬂows (% of GDP) 8.3
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 13.7
Time required to start a business (days) 32
Source: World Bank 2 
In 2005 the labour productivity3 has accelerated its growth to 3.9% 
compared to the previous year and in the ﬁrst half of 2006 this indica-
tor increased by nearly 2%4 in real terms on annual basis. Labour efﬁ-
ciency in Bulgaria increases much faster compared to EU-25 (1.8% for 
2004)5. At the same time, labour productivity measured by purchase 
power parity is approximately 33% or nearly three times lower com-
1 World Bank data for Bulgaria from 2005 or most recent year (2002-2005)
2 http://www.worldbank.bg/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/BULGARIAEXTN/0,,
menuPK:305464~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSitePK:305439,00.html 
3 Calculated with the data for the GVA and the number of employed from the LFS.
4 This indicator has been calculated as ratio of the real GDP to the number of employed from the LFS.
5 Source: Economic Forecasts, Spring of 2006, European Commission
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pared to the average for the countries in EU-25. For the period January 
– June 2006 average nominal wage marked an increase by almost 10%, 
thus this indicator reached its highest value for the last years. For the 
period in question the wages in the private sector displayed consider-
able growth of 3.7%, while the wages in the public sector registered a 
decline of 0.8% calculated on annual basis.
Despite the fact that income from employment in the country has 
increased in the last few years, the link between its growth and the rate 
of economic growth is weak. As a result, the share of compensations for 
the employed in GDP marks a decline from 38.8% in 1998 to 34.5% in 
2005. This share is still much lower than the value of this indicator in the 
EU-25 Member States, which ﬂuctuates around 51% in the last years.
Therefore is to be considered the role and the amount of the remittances, 
ﬂowing into the country’s economy, sent by Bulgarians living abroad.   
Main macroeconomic indicators 
(%)
Years
2003 2004 2005
Real GDP growth on annual basis 4.5 5.6 5.5
Inﬂation by the year end 5.6 4.0 6.5
Average annual inﬂation 2.3 6.2 5.0
Average nominal wages (growth) 3.7 0.8 4.0
Labour productivity growth6 -2.0 3.5 3.5
Source: Operational Programme “Human Resources Development” 2007-2013
Table 2. Bulgaria and EU-25, selected economic indicators (2005), in %
 Bulgaria EU-25 countries
GDP per capita (BG/EU) 32.1 100
Real GDP growth rate (%) 5.5 1.6
Inﬂation (%) 5.0 2.9 
Labour productivity per person (BG/EU) 32.9 100
Employment rate (15-64) 55.8 63.8
Activity rate (15-64) 62.1 70.2
Unemployment rate 10.1 8.7
Source: NSI, BNB, MoF, Eurostat 
6 The labour productivity is calculated as ratio of the GVA at ﬁxed prices to the average annual number
of employed
III. Migration - Historical Background:
Southeast European migration is signiﬁcant, diverse, and complex.
In particular, the Balkans is a migrant area. In these countries, three 
types of economic migrations can be identiﬁed. One is the shock type
of migration that happens when a basically autarchic country opens 
up to international relations. This was the case with Yugoslavia in the 
mid-sixties and also with Albania at the beginning of the nineties of 
the last century. The other type is endemic or habitual outward migra-
tion that has probably been characteristic of the region as a whole for 
quite a long time. These ﬂows may reﬂect economic developments in
the sending and receiving countries and can be treated as a relatively 
normal market phenomenon. The third type is that of outward migra-
tion that is mostly temporary and reﬂects an instrument of income gen-
eration that may reﬂect seasonal or other ﬂuctuations in the market
demand for labour.
In former Yugoslavia, guestworker emigration has already been 
established in the 1960s in order to alleviate labour market imbalances, 
so that extensive expatriate networks exist. For Albania, estimates sug-
gest that up to one ﬁfth of the population have left the country between
1989 and 2001. In Romania and Bulgaria, emigration escalated after 
1989, substantially adding to declining demographics.
Migration processes in Bulgaria 
After 40 years of free movement restrictions, the opening up of the 
borders in 1989 caused an enormous emigration wave on a political and 
ethnical base. Although, in the following years the emigration has been 
determined by economic circumstances and factors. The administra-
tive pressure and ethnic tension have been replaced by social-economic 
stimulators, motivating the decision of young people to leave the coun-
try. The deep economic problems have fostered the outward migration 
as well. Furthermore, the opening up of the borders offered new oppor-
tunities for another group of active and progressive minded people. 
In general, having data on the size of the population, and on live 
births and deaths it is possible to calculate net migration from and to 
Bulgaria. By this reckoning net migration was negative in almost all 
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years since 1960, i.e. there was more emigration than immigration. Two 
periods, exhibiting particularly negative migration were from 1968 to 
1984 and from 1988 to 1993.
During the ﬁrst of those two periods, total net emigration from
Bulgaria was 188,000, or 11,000 per year. Almost all of this was emi-
gration of Turkish speaking Bulgarian nationals to Turkey based on 
a bilateral agreement. This was especially intense between 1974 and 
1979, with a highpoint in 1978 when net emigration from Bulgaria 
reached 33,000. Nevertheless, over the whole period from 1960 until 
1987, the population of Bulgaria increased every year, but the trend 
was for the increases to get ever smaller.7
From 1988, Bulgaria’s population went into an increasingly rapid 
decline. After peaking at almost 9 million in 1988, it was only 8.5 
million by 1993. In 1994 the reduction in population was only about 
36,000, but the annual reduction increased to about 50,000 by 1997 and 
1998. By then the total reduction since 1988 was more than 740,000 or 
8% of the 1987 population.8
This decline was partly homemade. The fertility rate underwent a 
much commented dramatic decline from 13.1 births per 1,000 popula-
tion in 1988 to only 7.7 births in 1997 from where it has since risen 
to 8.05 births per thousand population in 1999.9 There were 116,672 
live births in 1988 but only 72,743 in 1996 with a further decline since 
then. At the same time, aggravated living conditions contributed to an 
increase in mortality. As a result, the difference between births and 
deaths has been getting increasingly negative since 1990. In total, be-
tween 1990 and 1998, the demographic imbalance reduced the resident 
population by about 283,000.10 
7 SOPEMI 1994:113; Beleva/Kotzeva 2001
8 Gächter, August, The Ambiguities of Emigration: Bulgaria since 1988
9 World Bank 2001
10 Gächter, August, The Ambiguities of Emigration: Bulgaria since 1988
Table 1. Annual population change during the year, annual 
balance between births and deaths, and annual net migration, 
weighted period averages, thousands per year.
Data source: See table 3.
That was different between 1988 and 1993. During this six-year-
period net emigration reduced the population of Bulgaria by 474,000 
or 79,000 per year. Natural increase was also negative, but at only 
8,100 per year it only contributed a negative balance of 49,000 to the 
population decrease of the period.
A very large part of the 1988-1993 emigration, net or gross, was of 
Turkish-speaking Bulgarians to Turkey: Following the liberalisation of 
passport regulations in 1989, over 500,000 Bulgarians have emigrated. 
... According to the 1992 Census, some 345,000 Bulgarian citizens of 
Turkish origin emigrated to Turkey between 1989 and 1992. (SOPEMI 
1997:81). The census identiﬁed persons who had left Bulgaria in a
given year with the intention of residing abroad for more than one year. 
This can obviously only be done if at least one member of the original 
household remained in Bulgaria [or returned before the census]. The 
counts therefore represent a lower bound for out-migration. 11
The very rapid decline in the emigration of Turkish-speakers after 
1989 was thought to be due to “.... the restoration of the right for Turks and 
Pomaks to use their native names, the introduction of Turkish language 
in schools and freedom of religious expression. Another important reason 
behind the decline in outﬂows to Turkey has been the introduction of
restrictive visa regulations by the Turkish authorities.12. As is often the 
case, Turkey not only made entry harder but also passed legislation 
conducive to the integration of the immigrants already in the country. 
Due to these legal changes the return of the Turkish-speaking Bulgarian 
emigrants has become even less likely than it was (SOPEMI 1999:114).
13 SOPEMI 1995:134
12 SOPEMI 1995:135
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Figure 1: Components of population change in Bulgaria, 1982 to 1999, thousands 13
Data source: World Bank 2001; Statesman.s Yearbook; Beleva/Kotzeva 2001. Author’s 
calculations and estimates.
13 Gächter, August, The Ambiguities of Emigration: Bulgaria since 1988
Table 2. Demographic change in Bulgaria, 1980-1999, thousands
Total net emigration from 1960 to 1998 was 665,000. The largest 
part of it, a net emigration of 479,000, occurred between 1988 and 
1995. Between 1996 and 1998 Bulgaria gained about 5,000 people 
from migration. 
A ﬁgure 1 is based on the data reported in table 3. Net emigration was 
estimated from available demographic data. If the difference between 
births and deaths during a year is subtracted from the population change 
during the year, whatever remains has to be net migration. Since the 
population ﬁgures accord to the periodic censuses, the procedure leads to 
an estimate of total net migration, regardless of the legal status Bulgarian 
emigrants had or sought in the receiving country. There are two sources 
of error. One is an element of subjective misperception in census answers. 
Persons in fact no longer resident in Bulgaria may be claimed to still be 
resident by their relatives. A second source of error is that undocumented 
immigrants in Bulgaria may not appear in the census.
Assuming that net emigration between 1952 and 1959 was 2,000 
to 3,000 annually, to be estimated are about 880,000 net emigrants 
from Bulgaria between 1947 and 1998. About 680,000 or 700,000 
of them seem to have belonged to the Turkish minority - those that 
left between 1947 and 1951, about 170,000 or 180,000 between 1968 
and 1984, and at least 350,000 between 1989 and 1992.14 They have 
probably all assumed Turkish nationality since then or will do so soon. 
This leaves the reserach with an estimated 180,000 or, at most, 200,000 
emigrants who went to other countries than Turkey. 
Gross emigration  
Table 3 also contains a column of gross emigration ﬁgures. The
source is the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (NSI) which, 
in accordance with UN standards, “deﬁnes emigrants as all those
who leave the country for more than one year (this group includes 
students, employees under ﬁxed term contracts abroad, Bulgarian 
diplomats, etc.)”15. The deﬁnition clearly leaves margin for error. It is 
not usually possible to determine accurately at the time of emigration 
how long the stay abroad will end up being. Error could be both 
14 SOPEMI (1995) 135
15 SOPEMI (1998) 87
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ways: People planning to return in a few months but not doing so, 
and people planning to stay abroad for several years or for good but 
in fact returning within months. The NSI estimate conforms to some 
degree with the net migration ﬁgures estimated from the population
data, but there are years where the data clearly do not match. Both, 
in 1990 and 1991 the gross emigration estimates are less negative 
than the net migration, which in reality cannot be true. The much 
more important point is that the gap between the gross and the net 
estimates gets wider as time passes. In other words, immigration and 
return migration have become more important over the years. As it is 
shown below, an important share of this is in fact return migration. 
The other important point about the gross emigration estimates is 
that it is believed that a high proportion of these emigrants are highly 
skilled.16 This belief seems to be at the heart of the alarm in Bulgaria 
about losing development potential. 
First some more information on the gross emigration ﬂows of
Bulgarian nationals will be revealed. It is to be compared the estimated 
emigration to gross inﬂows recorded elsewhere. In the table below
the known data are assembled. The blanks indicate missing data. The 
entry for Greece in 1990 is a guess, and the other entries for Greece 
involve some double counting. The asylum column is the world-
wide number of asylum applications outside Germany by Bulgarian 
nationals. They are included in the table because the inclusion of 
asylum applicants in the destination countries’ immigration ﬁgures,
except Germany, is, if at all, partial and delayed. The “Other” column 
contains the difference between the “Bulgaria” column and the other 
seven columns. This column is to be paid attention at.
16 SOPEMI (1998) 87
Table 3. Gross emigration of Bulgarian nationals by destination country
Data source: Tables 2, 3, 22 to 24, 26; SOPEMI 1995:91, 2000:193; UNHCR.
A positive value in the “Other” column indicates it is not identiﬁed
sufﬁcient immigration in destination countries to accommodate all the 
estimated emigration from Bulgaria, and a negative value means the 
immigration recorded in destination countries can only be satisﬁed if
Bulgarians emigrated not from Bulgaria alone but from at least one 
other, unidentiﬁed country as well. In practice a negative value means 
that either the immigration in destination countries is exaggerated or the 
emigration from Bulgaria is underestimated. In 1989, for instance, the 
immigration to Turkey is probably exaggerated by at least 9,000, while the 
1991 emigration from Bulgaria was probably underestimated by about 
15,000. The 1990 emigration also appears to be underestimated but by 
only 10 percent. The lack of Austrian and U.S. immigration data before 
1996 does not make much difference, but the lack of data relating to 
Turkey does. For the period 1993 to 1998 the “Other” column adds up to 
around 220,000 emigrants not accounted for by our patchy immigration 
data. The difference may quite possibly result from migration to Turkey. 
A second option is substantial unauthorised migration of Bulgarians for 
periods longer than one year. Of course, there is a third option, which is 
to declare the NSI estimates since 1993 exaggerated. Which of these is 
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true will not be known until more complete data have appeared.
The National Statistical Institute’s estimates and guesses suggest 
a gross outmigration of about 747,000 Bulgarians between 1989 and 
1998. Since net emigration during the same period was only 470,000, 
gross immigration must have been about 276 000, more than 80% of 
which took place after 1993.
Figure 2. Emigration and immigration Bulgaria, 1989 to 1998 
Table 6. Estimated migration ﬂows from and to Bulgaria
Data source: See table 3.
As ﬁgure 2 and table 5 reveal, the difference between emigration
and immigration was large between 1989 and 1993 but practically nil 
between 1994 and 1998. 
VI. Human Capital -Current Demographic Tendencies. Im-
plications on the Labour Market.
For the last years a steady trend has been observed of a decrease 
in the country’s population number. The impact that social and eco-
nomic factors exerted on living conditions resulted in considerable 
changes in the demographic behaviour of the population which led to 
negative natural growth.
The decrease in the population number and deterioration of popu-
lation’s age proﬁle are the main problems with regard to the demo-
graphic development of the country. In the end of 2005 Bulgaria’s per-
manent population was calculated to be 7 718 750 people17. For a period 
of only one year the population has decreased by 42 299 people or 0.5% 
compared to 2004 since the mortality rates exceeded the birth rates. 
For the period 2000-2005 the population number decreased by 5.3% or 
by 430 718 people. This negative trend is determined by factors such as 
negative natural growth and external migration.
Summarizing the available data on external migration it is necessary 
to apply some statistics from reliable sources as the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences (BAS) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. According 
to BAS the negative migration balance for the whole period 1989-2001 
amounts to 670 000. More comprehensive but more serious records as well 
are provided by Emilia Maslarova, Minister of Labour and Social Policy. 
“For the last 14 years the country’s population decreased by more than 
1.2 million people, 868 000 of them have left the country mainly due to 
economic and social reasons”, said Maslarova on January 9, 2006 during 
a presentation of a report within a meeting of the Consultative Council for 
National Security to the President of Republic of Bulgaria, entitled “Elabo-
rating of a strategy for demographic development of Republic of Bulgaria”. 
This ofﬁcial, but not very widespread statement is adopted in the current
paper as comparatively reliable conclusion for the period till 2003, which is 
used as a starting point in the whole document. Furthermore, the number 
of emigrants for the years after 2003 is only to be evaluated by approxi-
mate estimates. At the same time the number of illegal emigrants from 
Bulgaria for the same period is indeﬁnable, which let us conclude that the
real number of Bulgarian outside the country is even much higher.
17 Source: NSI.
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Another important aspect of the outward migration is the educa-
tional status of the migrants. The restrictions some Western countries 
imposed in the 90’s led to selective functions of the migration, which 
let many young and high qualiﬁed people left the country (brain-drain).
Naturally it is not always the case, as Spain for example needed for its 
labour market mainly workers in the agriculture and the serving sector.
In the period 2000-2005 the number of working-age population18 
(age group 15-64 years) declined by 263.2 thousand. As it may be 
supposed, this negative trend is primarily due to the low birth rate, 
population ageing and migration processes. The observed downward 
trends for the population number in the last years determine the need 
for implementation of a policy aimed at increasing the population’s 
economic activity. Increased economic activity will supply the labour 
force needed for development of the economy.
The economic activity rate for the population aged between 
15 and 64 years has increased from 60.7% in 2000 up to 62.1% in 
2005. Regardless of the observed growth in the activity rate, there are 
37.9% of the population, which remain out of the labour force. About 
25% of these persons are willing to work, but do not seek jobs for 
various reasons, including: personal and family obligations; illness or 
disability; lack of appropriate education, qualiﬁcation, skills or labour
experience, etc.
The activity rates for young people (aged 15-24) – 27.9% and for 
older-aged employed (aged 55-64) – 38% are low, compared to those 
in EU-25.19 An alarming tendency on the Bulgarian labour market 
is the downward tendency for the share of active youth. Since 2001, 
the core of economically active population tends to be in the groups 
of the middle- and late middle-aged (between 35 and 54 years). The 
steady trend towards ageing of the labour force clearly calls for lifelong 
learning measures to develop the intellectual potential and professional 
competence of the labour force.
In terms of educational level of the workforce, in 2005, the share of 
well educated persons is relatively high (secondary education – 55.9%, 
higher education – 24.1%). The share of persons with basic, primary 
18 Source: NSI (Labour Force Survey).
19 Activity rate (% of population aged 15-24) – 45.2%, activity rate (% of population aged 55-64) 
– 45.5%. Source: Eurostat.
and lower education in the labour force is 20%. Economic activity rates 
correlate strongly with educational levels. In 2005 72.4% of those with 
higher education, 64.3% of those with secondary education, 27.7% 
with basic education and 15.9% with primary or lower than primary 
education have been economically active.
In the last few years a sustainable trend of growth in the number 
of employed persons in the country is observed. In 2005, the average 
number of employed aged 15-64 (2 947 thousand) has increased with 
6.5% compared to that in 2000.
In 2005 the employment rate was 55.8%, which was with 5.4% 
more compared to that in 2000. There is stability in the trend shown 
in the past few years of smooth increase of the employment rate but, 
nevertheless, it is much lower compared to the one in the EU-25 – 
63.8% for 2005.
In 2005 employment rate among young people (aged 15-24) was 
21.6% and, in spite of the sustained positive trend from the past few years, 
the growth in youth employment, compared to 2000, is just with 2%. 
Major increase is observed in the employment among older population 
(aged 55-64). During the reported period employment rate has increased 
by 13.9 percentage points from 20.8% in 2000 to 34.7% in 2005.
According to National Statistical Institute in 2005 there were 
334.2 thousand unemployed and the unemployment rate was 10.1%. 
Over the same period, according to the Employment Agency data, 
there were 424 381 registered unemployed at registered unemployment 
rate of 11.5%. Despite the signiﬁcant decrease, unemployment rate in 
Bulgaria remains higher than the EU average, which has been reported 
equal to 8.8% in 2005.
Unemployment rates have been going down for all monitored age 
groups but the situation of some groups on the labour market remains 
disturbing. A rather unfavourable feature of the labour market is the 
high unemployment rate for youth aged 15-24. In 2005 it was 22.3%, 
but despite the signiﬁcant decrease compared to 2000 (33.7%), its value
still remains higher than the EU–25 average for 2004 – 18.7%. 
In 2005 the proﬁle of unemployed by educational levels displays the 
largest share of persons with secondary education – 51.1%, followed by 
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the share of those with basic education – 28.2%. The share of those with 
primary and lower than primary education – 10.4% and those with higher 
education – 10.3% is the lowest. Unemployment correlates strongly 
with the educational level. In 2005 the unemployment rates for those 
with primary and lower than primary education was 32.6%, with basic 
education – 16.9%, with secondary education – 9.2%. The unemployment 
rates among university graduates – 4.3% were the lowest. 
There is sustainable trend on Bulgarian labour market – long-term 
unemployment. In 2005 the long-term unemployed persons account 
for 6% of the labour force, where their number has decreased almost 
twice compared to 2001. In 2005 long-term unemployment (persons 
unemployed for more than 2 years) was 4.3% of the labour force, while 
in 2001 this ﬁgure has been 8.3%. The average long-term unemployment 
rate in the EU for 2005 has been 3.9%.
V. SWOT Analysis - Human resources (1)20
Strengths Weaknesses
• Stability, growth and the social 
protection system in Bulgaria have 
contributed to substantial overall 
reduction of poverty in the past six 
years
• Low inﬂation and sustained economic 
growth over the last years have resulted 
in increase of per capita income and 
in overall improvement of the living 
standard
• Successful recent reforms of the 
social protection system (including 
raising the retirement age) and better 
coordination of the employment and 
social protection policies
• Decreasing unemployment and 
undeclared employment
• Good educational level of the 
population
• Negative natural growth rate of population, 
emigration and large number of people out of 
the labour market
• Increasing levels of dependence on social 
assistance beneﬁts driven by demographic 
trends, high number of social assistance 
beneﬁciaries and low participation rates in 
the formal economy
• Active employment policies do not reach all 
vulnerable groups 
• Signiﬁcant regional disparities in terms of 
unemployment, employment and economic 
development
• Underdeveloped entrepreneurship and life-
long learning culture 
• Insufﬁcient social and healthcare services 
quality as well as poor quality of educational 
and vocational training services
• Underdeveloped economic sectors 
employing qualiﬁed labour force/ the 
employment structure is oriented towards 
sectors requiring unqualiﬁed labour force 
• The reform in the education system has not 
been completed
• Substantial drop in the educational and 
social levels among the Roma, compared to 
the rest of the population
20 Based on Operational Programme “Human Resources Development” (2007-2013) - Draft
Opportunities Threats
• Improvement of productivity on the 
labour market and of the economy as a 
whole is necessary for improvement of 
the living standard
• Strengthening the links between the 
skills
acquired in the educational system and 
those required on the labour market 
(including ICT skills)
• Continuation of the reforms in the 
social
protection system
• Enhancing the coverage and access to 
education
• Enhancing the intercultural education
• Restructuring, facilitating the 
provision and improving the quality 
and diversity of community-based 
social services for various risk groups
• Evolving culture of entrepreneurship, 
lifelong learning and equal 
opportunities
• Promoting the “brain retaining” and 
“brain inﬂux” in the country
• Enhanced participation of 
social partners in shaping up and 
implementing the policy in the ﬁeld of
human resources
• Consistent targeting of inclusive 
measures to the most vulnerable groups 
and to the regions in need
• Low economic development rate and 
insufﬁcient income and labour productivity 
growth in addition to accelerated decrease of 
the population
• Aggravation of the imbalance between
supply and demand at the labour market
• Intensifying the gap between the skills of the 
labour force and the labour market needs
• Creation of large number of unproductive 
low-paid jobs as a result of targeting inclusive 
and employment-related measures to the 
vulnerable groups (including new kind of 
social beneﬁts dependence culture)
• Accelerated social exclusion among the most 
vulnerable population groups
• Increased emigration of young and highly 
qualiﬁed workforce (i.e. the so called “brain-
drain effect”)
• Insufﬁcient private and individual 
investments in human resources development
• Insufﬁcient institutional capacity at central, 
regional and local levels for absorbing EU funds
The socio-economic analysis prepared for the purposes of this Op-
erational Programme “Human Resources Development presents the key 
challenges for the human resources in Bulgaria in order to contribute 
to the national aspirations of high living standards and sustainable 
development. The strategy addresses labour market issues, such as low 
levels of participation and employment, low labour productivity, labour 
supply and demand imbalance, sustained high levels of unemployment 
among disadvantaged groups, low corporate investments in human 
resources, slow pace of job creation, non-competitive working 
conditions, and economic structure not responding to the objectives of 
the knowledge-based economy.
The picture of major disparities is being complemented with the ones 
in the training and education ﬁeld such as comparatively low levels of
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quality of educational and training services not meeting the requirements 
of the Common European Market, schools and universities using ICT 
and foreign languages at insufﬁcient level far away from requirements
of the knowledge-based society, underdeveloped research and 
development activities, growing numbers of school dropouts, existence 
of marginalized groups – illiterate, without skills and profession.
Effectively performing educational institutions are important 
prerequisite for provision of highquality educational services tailored 
to the needs of society and economy. Modernization for Bulgarian 
educational institutions requires introduction of management 
information systems and electronic documentation at schools, setting 
up effective mechanisms for education quality assessment and control, 
and optimization of the school network. Bulgaria still does not have a 
well-established and properly functioning national system for internal 
and external assessment of the quality of education, although, recently 
there are some steps towards its achieving. Furthermore, unfortunate-
ly, educational services in Bulgaria are still not preparing qualiﬁed
specialists capable of meeting the labour market demands.
Analyzing the provided information on the shortages on the Bul-
garian labour market, some important branches are to be mentioned – 
construction, tourism, IT, healthcare services etc. Healthcare services 
is said to be observed closely due to its overall signiﬁcance for the
population’s health status and its future development. 
The most outlining tendency refers to the number of medics in 
practice not only in the big towns, but to a great extent in the less 
populated regions. In this regard the number of nurses is declining 
drastically – by 47% from 1990 to 2004.21 The resource of nurses in 
2004 is two times lower compared to the same indicator in EU. The 
ratio between nurses and doctors given in number of nurses per one 
doctor in Bulgaria in 2004 was 1.00:1.00. The same indicator in EU 
is higher 2.26:1.00. There is a serious decrease in the number of the 
practitioners working in the following areas: anaesthesiology, intensive 
treatment, paediatrics, nephrology, gynaecology, otorhinolaryngology, 
psychiatry, x-rays, clinic laboratory, emergency and infection illnesses. 
Bilateral labour agreements facilitate the process of outﬂow of medical
21 Operational Programme “Human Resources Development” (2007-2013)
personnel towards the “old” member states of the EU and in particular 
UK. There they may practice their profession with some restrictions, 
which is preferred by them rather to change it. 
At the same time the number of college graduate medical 
personnel is decreasing. There is a ﬂuctuation of medical personnel 
in emergency wards. In the recent years the enrolment of students in 
subject “Medicine” drops, which along with the continued emigration 
may bring the situation to serious shortage of medical experts. It is 
expected also that the number of nurses will be insufﬁcient, same as
the trend in EU. The existing uneven territorial allocation of medical 
professionals in Bulgaria and the imbalance in the ratio of practitioners 
and that of nurses entail the need for improvement of the system for 
planning and regulating the medical personnel and also the introduction 
of mechanisms for keeping the Bulgarian nationals who have gained 
their medical education and vocational training in Bulgaria (this is 
relevant to the medical nurses and other supporting staff), in particular 
those who have gained such education and training at costs for the 
state, to practice in the country. 
The loss of human potential by emigration of high-skilled labour 
force or labour market inefﬁciencies result in decrease in productivity, 
respectively in one of the lowest GDP per capita in Europe. At the same 
time more and more labour gaps are emerging and often they are to be 
ﬁlled with employees not disposing with the appropriate vocational ed-
ucation which by itself has a decrease in the productivity as a result. 
A possible solution to the situation with reduced number of labour 
resources in the country and their age composition with particularly 
rising percentage of old people and to the problems with reproduction 
of the working-age population due to the decreased number of people 
below working age consists in “importing” foreign labour force in near 
future in some of the above mentioned spheres. First steps towards ﬁll-
ing labour gaps through these measures have been already initiated in 
some of these branches as construction and tourism, where salaries are 
much higher than the average remuneration in Bulgaria.
In the era of globalization and easy movement of people the com-
petition among the countries for attracting well-qualiﬁed people is
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steadily increasing. In this competition Bulgaria proved to be the los-
ing countries, suffering under serious brain-drain.
The emigration of well-skilled people, causing a lack of specialists 
on the local labour market, may be observed as obstacle to foreign in-
vestors. “You export “brains”and this turns as a problem for the foreign 
companies, coming to Bulgaria”, Saab chairman Anders Scharp said in 
an interview for the leading Bulgarian weekly “Capital”.22 
Another gravely aspects of the emigration are the difﬁculties it
causes to the proper functioning of the social system. Since the number 
of the working people decreases rapidly the insurance burden to be 
carried by them will sooner or later reach bigger percentage of their 
incomes. Nevertheless, the outward migration has served as a mean, 
which let off the social tension, caused be the high unemployment rate 
in Bulgaria in the 90’s.  
Although, the amount of remittances ﬂowing into the Bulgarian
economy is not to be compared with their signiﬁcance for example
with the countries in Latin America, this serious amount has not to be 
undervalued. These transfers of money by Bulgarians to their home 
country are playing an increasingly larger role in the economy. Remit-
tances contribute to economic growth and to the livelihoods of needy 
people. A World Bank report suggests the transfers from migrants re-
duce the poverty and contribute to increase in purchasing power and 
economic growth. This can explain to a certain extent the catch-up 
growth in the sphere of trade, compared to the relatively slight growth 
in the production sector.
Applying the data on migrant ﬁnancial power we could refer to the
ofﬁcial data of Bulgarian National Bank for the period January – Septem-
ber 2004, when the ﬁnancial transfers amounted to 592.3 million Euro. It
is said, that these transfers are to a large extent ﬁnancial resources, sent
by Bulgarians, studying or/and working abroad. A particularly interest-
ing point is that this amount exceeds the incomings from the European 
pre-accession funds for the same period (155.9 million Euro). 
However, the mentioned amounts reﬂect only the ﬁnancial resourc-
es transferred via banks or other legal ﬁnancial services companies like
22 “Capital” Weekly , 24/2006
for instance MoneyGram, Western Union etc. It is said nowadays main 
destination of the Bulgarian labour migration are Greece and some oth-
er South-European countries and it is to be expected, that the emigrants 
prefer to transfer a considerable part of their savings by themselves, 
which seriously distorts the data on the size of the remittances.
The remittances might have some negative effects since the foreign 
ﬁnancial transfers do not stimulate the population’s activity within the
country and encaurage other groups to leave the country. Furthermore, 
the remittances may lead to a kind of a social disproportion paticulary 
in small towns, where there is no enough chances for career develop-
ment and ﬁnding better jobs and since a part of the population will
count on transfers from family member living aboad, which will in-
crease the social differences on local level.
Nevertheless, besides the ﬁnancial assistance, there some other ben-
eﬁts the Bulgarian migrants may bring. This depends to a large extend
on the capability of the Bulgarian state in the place of the Bulgarian 
policy makers to create circumstances, attracting talented immigrants 
who have studied and/or worked abroad to return to their home country, 
so that they can transfer not only technology and capital, but also 
managerial and institutional know-how, they have gained abroad, which 
actually means to replace the “brain drain” by “brain circulation”.
An important task before Bulgaria is to create appropriate cir-
cumstances not only for well educated and high-skilled persons to 
come back to the country, but for all the others as well as a driving 
force for supporting of the positive economic development in Bul-
garia in the last few years. Recently a negative tendency has been 
outlining, which reveals that most of the emigrated Bulgarians have 
already adapted to their new life abroad and living in the host coun-
tries they are beginning to bring their wives and children to live with 
them abroad. In this way, Bulgaria is injured not only by the loss of 
relatively young human capital, but also by reducing or stopping the 
fresh ﬁnancial inﬂows.
Another very important opportunity to be used consists in the role 
of the Bulgarian emigrants. Executing the example of Ireland, the ofﬁcial
state policy is to strengthen the ties to the Bulgarian communities abroad 
40 41
(e.g. through building of Bulgarian culture representation ofﬁces and ap-
pointment of labour attaches). Appropriate steps towards achieving these 
goals, is the organizing in 2006 the third annual world meeting of the Bul-
garian media abroad, which has to canalize the common initiatives and to 
contribute to the process of elaboration of networks among them.
 Actually, not only the role of the policy makers in the process 
of building of a Bulgarian “lobby” abroad has to be examined, but the 
role of the emigrants has to be underlined as well. Fortunately, there 
some positive tendencies to be observed like the steadily increasing 
number of Bulgarian student associations in Germany, Bulgarian asso-
ciations in UK and USA (City Club - London, Wall Street Club – New 
York, etc), which have been recently contributed to populating the case 
with the ﬁve Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, who were sen-
tenced wrongful to death by a Libyan court. 
Finally, the return of some successful Bulgarians and their entering 
into the active policy is said to be only the ﬁrst step towards incorpo-
rating of the Bulgarian Diaspora to Bulgaria and its current economic 
problems. It is more important now for the decision makers to make 
as soon as possible the next steps. In this regard geographical proﬁle
of the Bulgarian emigrants has to be elaborated in order to develop a 
methodology for reporting of its effects on the country. The removing 
of the bureaucratic hindrances, the providing of more information on 
the business opportunities within the country and on the improvement 
of the investment climate will increase the engagement of the Bulgar-
ian emigrants in the processes in the country.
VI. Conclusion
Future development
Despite accelerated economic recovery in 1998 and the slight 
increase in the number of employed persons, real economy is still 
having hard time opening new jobs. The rise of GDP by over 1/5 since 
1997 has led to the opening of relatively few new working places, both 
labour activity and employment continued declining until 2000 and 
2001. That was the result of the newly privatised enterprises and other 
companies laying off unnecessary labour force, as they were hard 
put to curb their ﬁscal practices. Due mostly to the macroeconomic
discipline and the profound structural reforms, in 2002 the number of 
newly employed people started rising. The average annual growth of 
the employment rate in Bulgaria, which has been about 3% since 2000, 
has helped reduce unemployment, but its reduction is also affected 
to a large extent by emigration, lower workforce participation and 
interventions on the labour market. This analysis shows that Bulgaria 
is facing a serious challenge in view of the sectoral restructuring 
necessary to redirect investment and labour force to more productive 
knowledge-based and highly skilled activities.
In the context of the above analysis it is clear that the future meas-
ures have to focus on enhancing employment and productivity. This, not 
only of Bulgaria, but of EU as a whole as seen in the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy, will step up on economic growth via achieving higher 
employment and productivity. Besides, the Lisbon Strategy has identiﬁed
as its objective by 2010 to increase the level of work participation to 
70%, which implies increased labour market participation and lower 
unemployment rate. The challenge before Bulgaria, is great as, along 
with the demographic decline and the fact that in comparison with EU-
25 the country lags signiﬁcantly behind in income and productivity
levels, it also has to cope with poor labour market parameters, like 
activity rate of 62.1% and employment rate of 55.8%. 
The convergence Bulgaria is striving at requires increased labour 
productivity and participation of the population in the Bulgarian labour 
market. On the whole, labour productivity, measured by the value added 
per employed person, has been unable to catch up with employment 
growth with only few exceptions over the years. Evaluations show that in 
order to double the per-capita income in the course of 20 years so that it 
reaches the level of two thirds of EU-25, GDP per employed person will 
have to grow by at least 5.5% every year. The trend towards reducing 
the number of working-age population implies that, only to balance the 
impact of reduced labour-force numbers on the percapita income, labour 
productivity will have to increase by about 1 percentage point annually. 
Unfortunately, productivity growth is still unstable – for 2002-
2004 it ﬂuctuated between above 4% to below -2%. Moreover, the 
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increase will have to be even greater if labour market participation 
remains low, although the productivity rate will hardly manage to 
balance off low participation rates.
In this regard special attention has to be paid to mobilization of 
employment potential among vulnerable persons on the labour market, 
as well as to efﬁcient integration of ethnic minority groups for more
and better jobs. If labour market participation does not increase to 70% 
until 2015 – even if there is a rise of labour productivity – the per-capita 
income in Bulgaria will remain lower than one third that of EU-25.
For the purpose of achieving maximum effect of the labour 
market interventions, additional efforts are needed towards improving 
the legislative environment with regard to increasing labour market 
ﬂexibility. Last, but not least, in terms of increasing of county’s competi-
tiveness it is necessity to be created conditions, which facilitate the proc-
ess of brain circulation i. e. attracting back talented emmigrants, who 
have studied and worked abroad, to return to their home country. Coun-
tervailing the demographic decline and increasing labour productivity, 
they can ﬁll these gaps in the labour market, which demand high-skilled
working force with good command of foreign languages. Furthermore, 
they will transfer not only technology and capital, but also managerial 
and institutional know-how, playing a signiﬁcant role in order to keep
the positive tendencies of the Bulgarian economy. Time will show, if the 
initial steps towards these objectives will be sufﬁcient in the years to
come and will they be followed by real governmental measures.
Vocational Training 
– An Essential Element for the Development
of Human Resources
Stefka Limanska
Head of Department “Vocational Qualiﬁcation”,
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Soﬁa
The Vocational training policies and actions aim to increase the 
supply of high quality labour force, to improve the adaptability of the 
labour force towards the changing economic conditions and to increase 
the labour productivity trough more investments in human capital and 
life-long learning activation. The success of this policy requires the 
joint efforts of all stakeholders.
The legal framework (laws, strategies, plans and programs) provides 
opportunities for targeted actions aimed at improving human capital.
The Vocational Education and Training Act (VETA) provides 
the normative organization of the vocational training with a main goal 
to guarantee the quality of the vocational education and training in 
conformity with the needs of the labour market and in compliance with 
the trends in the European Union. The Act determines the functions of 
the system of vocational education and training to prepare people for 
realization in the economy and society, providing conditions for acqui-
sition and permanent rising of the vocational skills.
The Employment Promotion Act (EPA) provides opportunities for 
active measures of the labour market in order to increase the employ-
ment and raise the qualiﬁcation of the labour force. The EPA introduces
stimuli for employers to train employed for updating and raising their 
qualiﬁcation and to train unemployed, in the context of life-long learning
and also regulates the types of continuing vocational training organised 
by the Employment Agency and the conditions for its accomplishment. 
The Employment Promotion Act stipulates the functions of the 
National Advisory Council on Vocational Qualiﬁcations of the La-
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bour Force. The Council carries out activities on coordination of the 
national policy and strategies for vocational training of the labour force 
and coordination of social dialogue.
The National Strategy for continuing vocational training 2005-
2010 outlines the national priorities for development of continuing vo-
cational education and training in the context of the life-long learning. 
The Strategy aims to create and improve the conditions for acquisi-
tion, expansion and development of the vocational qualiﬁcation of the
labour force with a view to increase its adaptability for employment, 
professional career and individual development.
The recent economic and technology development require the im-
provement of knowledge and skills of employed. In order to increase 
the labour force quality vocational training is provided. 
In June 2005 the National Statistical Institute (NSI) conducted a 
survey about the provided vocational training for employed at enter-
prises. More then 53 000 enterprises were included in the scope of the 
continuing training survey. Only 26.8% of all enterprises have provided 
vocational training for their employees. Besides, this percentage varies 
considerably according to the size of the enterprise and the number of 
staff. The highest percentage – 70.0% of enterprises (with more than 
250 employees) have provided training. Only 14.2% of the employees 
in the interviewed enterprises took part in any training. 
Training is provided just when new products, services, new meth-
ods or new organization of the enterprise’s activities are introduced. 
Only one ﬁfth of the enterprises do regularly skills evaluation of
their employees. Mainly the big enterprises in the public sector carry 
out evaluations annually. 
Still more than half of the managers are aware of importance of 
vocational training so 52.1% of them are planning to provide train-
ing for their staff. An agreement between the employers and trade un-
ions concerning vocational training of their employees is rarely signed 
(only 3.0% of enterprises have signed such an agreement, mainly the 
big enterprises – with staff of more than 250 people).  
The importance of training can be deﬁned through its impact
assessment. Most of the enterprises do not consider it a priority and 
69.9% of them have never carried out an assessment.  
Usually the managers and analytical specialists (managing staff) take 
part in vocational trainings. 52.1% of enterprises have provided trainings 
to managerial staff, whereas only 14.4% to low qualiﬁed workers.
The preferred form of training are sharing experience short-term train-
ings and giving instructions at the workplace (66.8% of the interviewed 
enterprises). On the average one participant has spent 16 hours in training. 
31.5% of the enterprises delivered other forms of training like learning by 
correspondence, distance learning, learning through Internet, etc. 
Most of the enterprises (73.2%) have never organized training for 
improving the qualiﬁcation of the employed.
The state policy in the ﬁeld of professional qualiﬁcation is im-
plemented by the Employment Agency. The Agency is in charge of 
professional information and consultation, vocational and motivating 
training of unemployed and employed persons as well as the interme-
diate services relating employment.  
In 2006 the Employment Agency organized training upon employers 
request for more than 4500 employed in micro and small enterprises. The 
training was directed to employees and workers who had to meet new 
vocational qualiﬁcation requirements due to changes in the industry, inter-
ruption of work or reduced volume of production. Half of the training costs 
are funded by the state budged and the other half - by the employers. 
The employment policy is becoming predominantly oriented towards 
improving the employability of the unemployed and effective social inte-
gration for the most disadvantaged groups. In the National Action Plan 
on Employment (NAPE) are identiﬁed the target groups on the labour
market (young people up to 29, older workers, people with disabilities, 
women, unemployed without and with low qualiﬁcation) which repre-
sentatives are included with priority in vocational training. This enables 
the better targeting of the activities as well as the provision of the neces-
sary resources for the implementation of the activities in this direction. 
The system of training of unemployed is better organised and fund-
ed than the system for employed. Its scope is expanding constantly due 
to the fact that the employability of the unemployed is a major priority 
in the National Action Plan on Employment. In NAPE programs and 
measure for vocational training are included on an annual basis. The 
training for unemployed is organized by the Employment Agency and is 
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provided in professions deﬁned by labour market demand surveys. The
provided training is funded by the state budget. For ensuring better ac-
cess to training the trainees receive grants, money for accommodation 
and travel costs. In implementing the National Action Plan on Employ-
ment in 2006 more than 40000 unemployed have completed vocational 
training (every 12th unemployed has been trained). 47,9% of the trained 
unemployed were young people up to 29 years of age. Most of the un-
employed have participated in courses for computer operators, cooks, 
experts in applied ﬁnancial services and accountancy, hairdressers, pro-
ducers of bread and pastry, waiters and waitresses, barmen. 
Great part of trained unemployed has started a new job in a short 
period of time. This fact indicates that the vocational training corre-
sponds to labour market needs. Employers provide opportunities for 
an internship (up to three months) for 30% of trained unemployed that 
have successfully completed the training. This is the way to test in a 
real work environment the knowledge and skills acquired. 
The National Action Plan on Employment for 2007 envisages 
training for more than 43 000 unemployed (one in ten registered un-
employed will receive training). 
A number of programs enjoy high interest on the part of the un-
employed – such as the Program for computer training of youths, the 
National program for literacy and qualiﬁcation of Roma people, the
regional programs for literacy, qualiﬁcation and employment, the pro-
gram for vocational training of youths who have left school, projects 
for training in entrepreneurship, training in the ﬁeld of information
technologies for women, etc. 
Vocational training is also provided under PHARE program 
Projects.
An evaluation of the gross and net effect of the trainings for the 
unemployed organized by the Employment Agency will be conducted 
this year. Throughout 2006 a system for determining the needs of em-
ployers for labour force with speciﬁc qualiﬁcation is being developed
under «Vocational Qualiﬁcation» PHARE project. 
The effectiveness of training is limited by the low motivation and the 
insufﬁcient educational level of the long-term unemployed so motivational
training, literacy courses or vocational guidance precedes their training. 
In Chapter “Employment” of the ﬁrst National Reform Program
special attention is paid to improving the employability of the labour 
force, its qualiﬁcations and skills through developing lifelong learning.
New strategic documents are to be implemented in the ﬁeld of vo-
cational adult training. In the framework of PHARE Projects an Adult 
Training Strategy has been developed and a Lifelong Learning Strat-
egy will be developed by 2007.
The Operational Program «Human Resources Development» 
which provides the framework for funds allocation is co-funded by 
the European Social Fund and the state budget for the 2007 – 2013 
programming period. The Operational Program aims at improving the 
quality of life through increasing employment and labour productivity, 
giving access to high quality education and lifelong learning and social 
inclusion. The improvement of the quality of education and training is 
one of the major priorities of the Program. 
In accordance with the National Strategy for Continuing Vocation-
al Training 2005-2010 work will be done in the direction of improv-
ing the conditions for access to continuing vocational training through 
developing forms of training that are close to home (distance train-
ing, e-learning); ensuring opportunities for combining work and study 
through ﬂexibility of work hours; special measures for the disadvan-
taged groups on the labour market; implementation of methodology for 
selection and inclusion of unemployed people in vocational qualiﬁca-
tion training thus improving the reference between vocational training 
and the individual needs of the unemployed people. 
For the purpose of ensuring high quality of the continuing voca-
tional training actions have been envisaged for improving the organi-
zation of the vocational training for the unemployed, improving the 
curricula and training methods, introducing a system for control and 
evaluation of the training results. The improvement of the existing 
state educational requirements and the development of new require-
ments based on the vocations are under way. 
For achieving a close link between initial and continuing train-
ing a National Qualiﬁcations Framework will be developed in accord-
ance with the European Qualiﬁcations Framework. It will contribute
to achieving transparency and recognition of qualiﬁcations. The in-
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ternational experience in this ﬁeld will be researched as well as the
opportunities for validation of knowledge and skills obtained through 
non-formal and informal learning at the national level. 
Reaching effective interaction and coordination between the major 
institutions in the ﬁeld of vocational training and the labour market
is of primary importance. Suitable stimuli and mechanisms will be 
sought for sharing expenses and responsibilities in improving the level 
and effectiveness of investments in human resources including through 
reducing taxes. Opportunities will be sought for improving collective 
bargaining with regard to training and qualiﬁcation of the labour force
and inclusion of social partners. There are opportunities for greater 
decentralization and regionalization of the resources in the vocational 
education and training system. 
For the purpose of improving the link between education, train-
ing and the labour market an integrated information system will be 
established with registries for the people trained, specialty and level 
of vocational qualiﬁcation as well as for the training institutions with
data for their activities, provided trainings, training courses organized 
by the Employment Agency. 
The expected results from the coherent policy till the end of 2010 
are Bulgaria to increase considerably the level of participation of adults 
in life-long learning, the employment coefﬁcient to reach 61-62% for 
the age group 15-64 and to overcome the mismatch between the supply 
and demand of skills.
THE HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE
Migration – Challenges and Opportunities in Central 
and Eastern Europe with special regard to Hungary  
(Some possible economic impacts) 
Klára Fóti, Ph.D.
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Institute for World Economics
to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
Introduction
In many respects, Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) 
have to face similar challenges in migration since they have compara-
ble traditions, geographical position and demographic developments. 
The fact that after the political and economic changes, many of them 
has turned from a sending to a receiving country, illustrates their com-
mon traditions. As regards demographic developments, although their 
population trends are akin to those in Western Europe, in some aspects 
they are even more unfavourable because in addition to low birth rates, 
mortality is relatively high (compared to EU-25 average). In addition, 
in the region the natural population decrease (which is characteristic in 
these countries) is rarely offset by positive net migration because it is 
too low. Under these circumstances, the main dilemma is whether and 
what kind of migration could help in this situation and what kind of 
policy is needed for promoting favourable developments.
In Hungary future demographic trends and their implications 
to migration is subject of public debates and the issue is high on the 
agenda in policy making. Besides the unfavourable population devel-
opments, the increased interests are explained also by labour market 
reasons. Although the employment rate is low, labour shortage can be 
observed in certain segments, branches and occupations. Related to the 
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latter, illegal foreign work is an important issue, too. Therefore, besides 
migration and demographic trends, the paper is to deal also with some 
key labour market problems. The paper is structured as follows.  First, 
the main demographic developments will be described, then the cur-
rent labour market situation and some perspectives are outlined as a 
background to migration trends, which are to be analysed in the third 
section, including its impacts. Finally, as a conclusion, the main policy 
dilemmas are highlighted.
I. Recent demographic features of the region and population 
trends in Hungary
The table below illustrates the situation, described in the introduc-
tion. As can be seen from Table 1, natural decrease characterises all the 
New Members (NMS) and Croatia, with the exception of Slovakia, but the 
increase is minimal (0.8) even here. It is true that the natural increase is 
also minimal in the EU25 (0.7), but net migration offsets this. As a result, 
population growth could be observed on average in the EU25.  In none 
of the CEE countries, however, could similar increase be detected. Even 
in the most developed countries of the region (in their GDP per capita), 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the population growth is smaller. The 
reason is that there is a natural decrease in both countries which can-
not be offset by positive net migration, caused mainly by the inﬂow of
citizens from countries with which they formed one country before 1993 
and 1991, respectively. Higher mortality in the region also contributes to 
less favourable demographic developments than in the EU25. With the 
exception of Slovenia and Poland, mortality is higher everywhere in the 
region, and the number of deaths per thousand population is especially 
high in Latvia (14.2), Hungary (13.4) and Bulgaria (14.6)1
1 Mortality, of course, depends also on age composition. It may well be that the highest mortality in Bulgar-
ia is linked to the large outﬂow from the country, which occurred during the last couple of years. As a result of
this, the age composition of the country has deteriorated (because mainly young people left Bulgaria).
Table  1. Demographic features in the CEEs in 2005
 Countries
 
Live births Deaths
Natural 
increase/ 
decrease
Net 
migration
Effective 
increase 
/decrease
Per thousand population
EU-25 10.5 9.7 0.7 3.7 4.4
Czech R. 10.0 10.5 -0.5 3.5 2.9
Estonia 10.6 13.1 -2,5 -0,3 -2,8
Poland 9.8 9.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7
Latvia 9.3 14.2 -4,9 -0.5 -5.4
Lithuania 8.9 12.9 -4.0 -3.0 -7.0
Hungary 9.7 13.4 -3.8 1.7 -2.1
Slovakia 10.0 9.8 0.2 0.8 0.9
Slovenia 8.8 9.2 -0.5 3.6 3.1
Bulgaria 9.0 14.6 -5.6 -1.8 -7.4
Croatia 9.4 11.1 -1,7 2.6 0.9
Romania 10.2 12.3 -2.1 -0.5 -2.5
Source: Eurostat, Chronos Database
In Hungary, the demographic trends were unfavourable over the 
last couple of decades, and even a tendency of deterioration could have 
been detected. The rate of fertility in Hungary has been below replace-
ment for four decades. This presaged for a long time decrease in the 
population that the age structure and occasional increases in the birth 
rate postponed until the 1980s. Since then the population decline has 
become the rule. Not only did, however, low fertility contribute to de-
crease in population, but also the unusually high mortality rates, which, 
after several decades of steady improvement, had failed to fall further 
in the 1960s. Indeed, it began to rise towards the end of the decade. 
This deterioration continued as an underlying trend over the next two-
and-a-half decades (up to 1993), with only temporary improvements 
to be detected in certain years. These developments had a deep impact 
not only on the age structure and the overall size of the labour force, 
but also on employability of the older (or even the prime) age groups. 
It was an alarming phenomenon that mortality deteriorated especially 
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among middle-aged men over the above period.
The overall fertility of the population is obviously inﬂuenced by
the on-going tendency of a shift towards higher age of the ﬁrst child-
birth, which has recently continued. Fertility of the 20-24 age group has 
fallen back further, but among the 30-39 year olds it has increased by 
almost 10%.  Apart from this, recently some favourable tendencies can 
be observed. For example, mortality has improved primarily among 
men, including mainly middle-aged men, which is of high importance, 
and infant mortality rate also decreased (although it had been at a low 
level for quite some time). These tendencies, however, could hardly 
moderate the natural decrease in the population, which remained con-
siderable. Therefore, it is clear that the population decrease cannot be 
stopped within the foreseeable future. Amidst low reproduction of the 
population (i.e. fertility below replacement), the mortality surplus will 
remain even if fall in the number of deaths continued. At best, a grad-
ual decrease in the negative balance could be anticipated. 
As a consequence of all the above developments, Hungary has a 
rapidly ageing population, and according to forecasts, this will continue 
within the next two decades. It remains to be seen whether this will be 
accompanied by a dynamic economic growth which could also stimulate 
the labour market.  The latter has important implications also to the issue 
of migration, so the problem of employment which we turn to next.
II. Labour market situation and perspectives
 From the point of view of migration and its future perspectives, 
the current state of labour market is of high importance, since it could 
indicate both the present employment opportunities of foreign residents 
and job prospects of potential migrants.  In this regard, the Central 
and Eastern European region does not seem promising because tension 
on the labour market, although eased since the political and economic 
changes, is still present. On average, unemployment is by more than 5 
percentage point higher in Central and Eastern Europen countries than 
in the old EU-members. Although it declined in Poland and Slovakia 
where it stood at the highest level, still considerable being 17.7% and 
16.3, respectively. (Source: Employment in Europe, 2006.) In Lithuania 
and Latvia the unemployment rate is also higher than the EU-average. 
A source of further major concern is long-term unemployment which 
is particularly high in the above four countries. Related to all these 
facts, in none of the New Member States do employment rates reach 
the Lisbon Target of 70% (although in the Czech Republic it is close 
but even there it declined between 1998 and 2002). 
This poor performance is derived partly from the particularly low em-
ployment rate of the older population. In the New Members of the region the 
average employment rate of the 55-64 year-old age group is lower than in the 
‘old’ EU-members. (For example, in 2002 among males, the employment 
rate stood at around only 36% in Hungary, 41% in the NMs, whereas it was 
50% in the ‘old’ members.) The reasons for this lie not only in the effects of 
the lower retirement age, which featured all these countries previously, (dur-
ing the planned economy) but also other factors. One of the most important 
out of these is poor health status of the population (which seems especially 
true for Hungary, where until very recently the average life expectancy at 
birth stood at a low level even by East-European standard). Under these cir-
cumstances, it can be even concluded that to some extent the low retirement 
age could be justiﬁed. The fact that employment rate of this age group rate is
still low even nowadays, when the retirement age was raised2, in itself indi-
cates that there should be reasons other than just institutional, or problems of 
inheritance. In Hungary the very low ﬁgure is obviously also due to labour
market reasons, namely to the sluggish demand especially towards older 
people. (Indeed, examining wages, a Hungarian labour economist3 proved 
that during the 1990s on the labour market in Hungary the accumulated 
experiences seemed to have been devalued as against such skills, like adapt-
ability and ﬂexibility, generally featuring competencies rather young people
than older ones).  As a response, disability pension schemes became quite 
widespread: for example, among males even in the younger age group (50-
55), around 20% are in such pension, and in the next age group this share is 
even higher (being 27%). (Source: CSO, 2004.) 
2 The process of increasing the retirement age began in 1997, when it was decided that it would have 
been raised on a gradual basis to 62 years by 2009 for both males and females. Women’s retirement age 
stood at a low level of 55 in 1997, so its increase started already then, by elevating the retirement age by 
one year in every two years from then on.  In the case of men, however, the increase began later, in the year 
of 2000, since their retirement age stood at a higher initial level of 60 years. (As a result, their retirement 
age has already reached the targeted 62 years.)
3 See Köllő, 2002.
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From the point of view of future perspectives and within the context 
of an aging population, it is worth to examine which sectors employ mostly 
older age groups, and what kind of occupations older people usually have. 
It is clear from the data, that it is precisely in that sector, where usually 
migrants are concentrated, namely the agriculture, where share of older 
employees increased between 1990 and 2001: whereas in 1990 the share 
of the age group 50 and above in the sector’s total employment stood at 
18.3%, this increased to 25.05% by 2001. Similarly, in education and health 
sectors their concentration also became higher than before (the respective 
ﬁgures in education: 15.7% and 24.7%, in health: 13.7% and 23.7%). It can
be assumed that increased share in these two sectors is linked to the fact 
that role of older age groups became more important in the public services 
than before (over the same period, i.e. between 1990 and 2001 the share of 
the 50-59 age group increased from 13.4% to 20.4%, the 60 and above from 
0.8% to 2.4%, see: Fóti and Lakatos, 2004., p. 46.). This is understandable 
since, unlike in manufacturing, there have not been mass layoffs here (and 
due to budgetary restraints, cautious hiring featured the employment policy 
of state institutions). It is remarkable however that shift towards employing 
older people happened precisely in those sectors, where migrants are often 
applied (agriculture, health) and wages are generally low 4.
As mentioned, in the case of Hungary, population aging is of spe-
cial importance, having an immediate impact on the size of the labour 
force in the near future because by the end of this decade and by the 
early next one (from 2009-2010 on) precisely those age cohorts will 
have reached the retirement age, which are the largest in number. They 
were born in the early 50s, when due to severe administrative curbs 
placed on abortion, there was a sharp increase in the number of births5. 
This “baby boom” is all the more noticeable, since opposite effects 
followed it: on the one hand the 1956 mass emigration (more than 200 
thousand people left the country) and a sudden, complete relaxation of 
the abortion rules (leading from extreme restriction to liberalisation6).
4 This is one of the reasons why one should be cautious in drawing conclusions on labour demand 
exclusively from wages. It seems that factors shaping the demand are quite different in the public sector 
from those in the business one. 
5 The ‘bulge’ became known as the Ratkó generation, after the minister who had signed the decree. The 
proportion of live births peaked at 22-23 per thousand in 1953-4, producing a natural increase of 11-12 
per thousand.
6 As a result of swinging from one extreme to the other, the number of abortions exceeded the number 
of live births for several years.
Labour force projections7 are, of course, also count with these 
demographic changes. According to the baseline scenario, by 2021 
the number of economically active population will be 4.0 million, as 
against 4.1 million in 2001 (census data of that year).  This decrease is 
due partly to declining number of the young age groups, partly to pop-
ulation aging and partly to a slight fall in economic activity (the latter 
is attributed to longer period spent in education). As a result of longer 
education, the skill pattern of the labour force will be improved:  peo-
ple with lower than primary school educational attainment will decline 
by 68% and the number of those with only primary school will also 
fall to a considerable extent. The number of people with tertiary educa-
tional attainment, however, will increase by 58% (from 690 thousand 
of 2001 to 1.09 million by 2021. The optimistic scenario is based on the 
assumption that territorial disparities in activity rates will signiﬁcantly
diminish8. According to this scenario, the number of economically ac-
tive population will amount to 4.7 million people. At the same time, 
the number of those persons having lower than primary school educa-
tional attainment is higher in this scenario (of course, it will decrease 
but only by 25%). As a result of improved educational attainment in 
general, both scenarios reckon higher participation rates than today in 
the 25-54 (prime) age group. The baseline scenario sets this to 80%, 
whereas the optimistic scenario puts this even higher, to 86%.
It remains to be seen to what an extent the optimistic scenario 
could be regarded as realistic, since it is an open question whether the 
large territorial discrepancies could be diminished. Efﬁcient use of the
Structural and Regional Funds could help in this respect, but the dif-
ferences are so large that it seems unlikely that the gaps could narrow 
to such a considerable extent within just 16 years.
To sum up common features of the employment situation in the 
New Member States, according to some research results, higher levels 
of aggregate, long-term and youth unemployment is clearly linked to 
the particularly high tax burden on labour which is characteristic in 
Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Despite the high level of unemploy-
7 See Hablicsek, 2005. 
8 Maximum reference activity rates were set up by gender, each age group educational attainment. It is as-
sumed that the territorial activity rates would approach to the reference rates (see details in: Hablicsek, ibid).
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ment, the compensation and insurance systems have become less and 
less generous over the 1990s (eligibility conditions have tightened). 
Although a wide range of active labour market policy measures have 
been introduced during the transition period, spending on these meas-
ures has remained low (with the exception of Slovenia). 
Labour market ﬂexibility intensiﬁed in some aspects in the region
(for example as regards labour turnover), and average job tenure de-
clined to a considerable extent in the 1990s. Employment protection 
legislation is similar to the EU average, and slightly higher than the 
OECD average, although there have been signiﬁcant changes recently
in some countries, and variations across countries are substantial.
As a consequence of all these developments, it is clear that em-
ployment rate should be increased in most of the new member coun-
tries. The tax-beneﬁt system should be reviewed in order to alleviate
the tax burden on labour. This is inevitable to attract more people to 
the labour market. It is important to invest further in human capital, 
ensuring that the education and training system provides people with 
the skills needed in labour market9.
Therefore it seems that Central and East-European countries have 
major challenges to face if they want to improve their labour market 
performance. It would be important to modernise further their econo-
my, but new technology often requires less labour. There is still how-
ever, much scope to develop their service sector which could absorb 
labour and this could lead to higher employment rates. Under these 
conditions it is an open question, what a role labour migration could 
play in these economies. In the next section this topic will be examined 
mainly on the example of Hungary. 
III. Migration in Hungary with special regard to labour mobility
As mentioned, similarly to other countries of the Central and Eastern 
European region, Hungary has become itself a host country instead of a 
sending one. Net migration well demonstrates this development. Where-
as a negative balance was observed between 1980 and 1989 (192,400 
9 These are the recommendations of the European Union (for example the Wim Kok Report puts and em-
phasis on measures underlying these principles, and since its publication in 2003, these proposals, especial-
ly those concerning the reduction of non-wage labour costs, are still high on the agenda within the EU).  
people), during the following decade this turned to a positive one (where 
the order of magnitude is the same: 196,354, but this makes a big dif-
ference, compared to the previous decades because this means that by 
almost 200 thousand more people arrived than left the country).
As can be seen from Table 2., the age structure of immigrants in Hun-
gary is favourable from the point of view of economic activity because most 
of them are of prime age (25-49 years). This is especially visible since 1997. 
Therefore it can be assumed that most migrants aim at working in Hungary.
Table 2 Breakdown of foreign citizens in Hungary by age groups (1995-2003)
Age group 
(years)
1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003
-14 10.8 22.4 8.8 9.1 9.0 9.6
15-19 6.0 10.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 5.6
20-24 13.6 18.9 11.1 10.9 10.8 9.7
25-29 16.6 14.1 16.0 14.1 13.7 13.0
30-39 24.2 17.6 23.4 23.9 24.5 24.8
40-49 15.5 3.6 17.3 16.8 16.7 16.5
50-59 7.0 4.1 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.6
60- 6.2 8.6 8.9 10.0 10.0 11.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Demographic yearbooks, Central Statistical Ofﬁce, Hungary
Despite this age structure, it is difﬁcult to demonstrate that the
demographic situation had so far any meaningful impact on migra-
tion. If the structure of migrants is considered from the point of view 
of their origin, it can be assumed that rather income and wage differ-
ences, as well as the common language, traditions and culture played 
an important role. As can be seen from Table 3., around 40% of all 
migrants came from Romania, where the largest Hungarian minority 
lives (about 1.5 million), and wage differences are considerable (see 
Table 4). There are also a number of migrants from Ukraine (the cat-
egory “other European countries” includes also this country), which is 
the country of origin also for many ethnic Hungarians, and, as Table 4 
shows, wage differences are also large, compared to Hungary. 
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Table 3. Breakdown of foreign citizens in Hungary by their place of origin
Place/Country of origin 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003
European Union 8,5 10,3 11,5 10,7 10,5 10,0
Former republics of Yugoslavia 11,1 10,8 10,1 11,5 7,2 10,1
Romania 49,6 43,2 38,2 37,8 38,6 40,8
Other European countries 19,8 20,3 22,8 24,7 43,7 39,1
Europe total 89,0 84,6 82,6 84,7 83,9 84,8
Asia 7,0 10,5 12,1 11,5 12,4 11,6
America 2,1 2,6 3,0 2,3 2,2 2,1
Africa 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,1 1,1 1,1
Other and unknown 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,4
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Demographic yearbooks
If possible demographic impacts of migration are considered, it is 
clear that current patterns and tendencies do not lend support to any 
signiﬁcant effects. Not only is their total number small, but fertility
pattern of most migrants (primarily that of the ethnic Hungarians) is 
similar to the native population. 
Table 4. Ratio of gross wages in some East-European countries as compared to 
Hungary between 1994- 2003 (Hungary=100,based on US $ exchange rate)
Czech R. Slovakia Poland Slovenia Croatia Romania Russia Ukraine
1994 76 62 73 232 113 35   34   15
1995 99 78 92 305 178 45   37   18
1996 116 87 105 311 194 45   50   25
1997 110 88 111 285 188 36   51   27
1998 115 89 112 301 205 48   34   20
1999 112 80 131 293 197 39   19   13
2000 112 79 142 277 189 42   25   14
2001 107 71 138 245 168 41   31   15
2002 102 63 108 206 144 35   29   15
2003 98 64 93 200 137 33   29   14
Source: Own calculations based on data of WIIW (Vienna Institute of Comparative 
Economic Studies) Vienna
As can be seen from the above table (Table 4), due to ﬂuctuation of
exchange rate, comparison of gross wages could be problematic. (See 
for example the case of Poland, which is especially illustrative in this 
point of view). This is the reason why it is justiﬁed to look at the differ-
entials at purchasing power parity, on which the majority of analyses 
on migration potential are based (quite understandably):
Table 5. Income differentials compared to Hungary, based on per capita GDP 
in purchasing power parity (Hungary = 100)
Czech R. Slovakia Poland Slovenia Croatia Romania Russia Ukraine
1995 135 95 75 140 62 69 74 40
1997 131 100 80 142 67 64 68 33
1998 124 99 79 140 67 58 62 31
1999 118 96 79 140 63 54 62 30
2000 115 93 78 139 62 52 64 30
2001 118 97 79 137 72 48 56 35
2002 116 88 78 130 72 50 56 36
2003 113 86 76 128 72 49 58 38
Source: Own calculations based on data of WIIW (Vienna Institute of Comparative 
Economic Studies) Vienna
As can be seen, among the neighbouring countries income dif-
ferential is the largest in Romania and Ukraine. Besides presence of 
ethnic Hungarians in these countries, this fact also seems to play an 
important role in their dominance as sending countries (this is espe-
cially true in the case of Romania, see Table 3.)10. 
As regards labour migration, legal foreign work stands at a low 
level in Hungary. According to some ofﬁcial data (produced by the
Public Employment Service), share of their employment was about 
1.28%, in 2004, which increased to 1.53% (meaning a growth of 10 
thousand, from 50 thousand to 60 thousand). These data, however, do 
not include some categories, therefore share of foreign employment is 
10 It has to be noticed however, that according to some recent data, Slovakia is also an important send-
ing country. In September 2006 for example, out of the 66 90 work permits 47% were given to Romanian 
citizens, 25% Slovaks and 12% from Ukraine. Reason for the relatively large share of Slovak workers, 
however, lies mainly in other factors than just wage differentials. It is true that the minimum Slovak wage 
is still by about 30% lower than in Hungary, but the main reason is that Slovakia borders to some extent 
those areas in Hungary (mainly in the Western part) which are relatively developed and in some branches, 
occupations and areas, labour shortage can be observed (see: Tóth, J., 2007.) 
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supposed to be higher. Even taking of other categories into account, 
however, foreign workers’ legal presence can be put less than 2%.11 
Despite this, the most recent trends show into an increasing tendency. 
According to some assumptions, this might be attributed to the fact 
that part of black foreign employment has been whitened due to join-
ing the European Union. 12
There is even less information about emigration or labour outﬂow
from Hungary because there is no compulsory registration for those 
who leave the country either for longer term or for shorter periods. 
As regards the ﬁgures, researchers and experts have no other choice
than to rely on statistics on the number of Hungarians in the receiving 
countries. The picture from these sources, however, has not proved 
accurate enough to use the information as a base for policy-making. 
The estimates put the number of Hungarians working in one of the EU 
countries about 25-30 thousand. The estimated ﬁgures increased since
joining the European Union to about 50 thousand. Most Hungarians 
work in Austria (22 thousand), the second most preferred destination 
is Germany (12 thousand), and then comes the United Kingdom (11 
thousand). Among the other “old” EU-members, several thousand peo-
ple work13. (It has to be noted that according to a recent survey, carried 
out by the European Central Bank in 2006, it is Germany, which is the 
most preferred country for the citizens of the “Visegrád states”, i.e. the 
Czech Republic,  Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, where 37% wants to 
migrate. The other preferred countries are as follows: Austria, with 
24.4%, UK with just 6.4% France with 4.1%, etc., whereas only 2.8% 
of them would chose another New Member.)
Within the context of migration and black economy, the issue of il-
legal foreign employment is also the subject of debates in Hungary. In 
order of its magnitude, the number of illegally employed foreign workers 
11 See more details about the various categories of legal foreign workers in : Lukács, É. (2007)
12 See Lukács, ibid.
13 For example, 3500 in Ireland, 2500 in Italy and 2000 in Spain. In all the other „old” members, 
the number of Hungarian who work there, is negligible, being around some hundred, respectively. See: 
Lukács (2007), who draws the conclusion that according to these estimates, share of Hungarians working 
abroad is roughly equal to those foreigners who come to work into Hungary, being around 1.5-2% of the 
labour force.  She adds that it is misleading, however, to think that there is a balance between the in- an 
outﬂow of labour partly because it is likely that this process has not ended, and partly because there is a
qualitative difference between the inﬂow and outﬂow. For example brain drain could adversely affect the
Hungarian economy for example in the area of health service, where the inﬂow does not substitute the
outﬂow; therefore there is a shortage of doctors in certain areas. (Lukács, 2007.)
is estimated at 50,000 to 200,000. This cannot be regarded as particu-
larly high, but the share of the informal economy is considerable (experts 
put this about 20 to 30% of the GDP). In addition, those sectors, where 
illegal foreign work is concentrated, the share of illegally employed mi-
grants could reach as high as around 5 to 10%. The most affected sectors 
are: construction, agriculture, commerce and petty trading.
The presence of illegally employed foreign workers raises a number 
of dilemmas. The phenomenon itself clearly shows that there is a demand 
for such migrants. A survey, carried out in the late 90s, pointed out: “By 
way of illustration, it is generally agreed that there should, in general, be 
much simpler procedures and tax rules for seasonal casual workers em-
ployed on a daily basis. Foreign workers should be permitted to perform 
seasonal work because, in the peak season, the additional supply of work-
ers compensates for the shortage of labour, without reducing domestic 
employment opportunities… With simpler and more ﬂexible rules, par-
ticularly in certain sectors, a considerable proportion of illegal foreign la-
bour could be channelled into legal forms of work” (Juhász et al., 1999) 
As regards future perspectives, the most important question is 
whether Hungary would need additional labour, i.e. if migrant workers 
are needed in the medium and/or long run. The question leads us to the 
topic of migration policy dilemmas.
IV. Migration policy dilemmas 
Not only in the illegal, but also in legal foreign employment do those 
sectors seem to have become important recently, which are traditionally 
dominated by migrant workers. As seen from Figure 1 in the Appendix, 
shares of construction and trade, tourism and hospitality have increased 
to a signiﬁcant extent among those foreign employees who have work
permits. Although the proportion of agriculture is not large, in some 
years it seems slightly higher than in the whole employment14. 
When considering whether additional labour would be needed in 
the future, it is important to look at those main segments of the labour 
market where migrants are overrepresented. One could conclude from 
14 It has to be noticed, however, that in the case of agriculture, it can be assumed that share of work per-
mits depend to a large extent on the legal framework. Due to seasonal nature of the work in the sector, if 
procedures to acquire work permits are simple and the control is strict, this could lead to a higher share. 
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the aforementioned dominant sectors that it is mainly the bottom end 
of the labour market where most migrants are present (health and edu-
cation as well as telecommunication sectors have a low share).
In order to elaborate a sound migration policy, it is also important to 
assess the impacts of immigrants’ employment on the labour market and 
the economy as a whole. Literature on migration and experts’ opinion 
vary concerning this topic, they are sometimes even contradictory. There 
seems to be, however, a consensus that migration has important impacts 
on economic efﬁciency and distribution, which is manifested itself for
example in its effects on national income and distribution among non-
migrants (i.e. income per capita, economic growth, structural change, in-
equality, poverty rates, etc.). Migration could also affect national labour 
market for example through wage level, unemployment, labour market 
segmentation, etc. At the same time, some empirical labour economists 
say that the impacts of immigration on local workers are minor or in-
signiﬁcant. According to other experts, however, “labour immigration
has the potential to adversely affect wage and employment outcomes of 
some competing local workers in the short run”15. Indeed, also in Hun-
gary the main question is whether migration is playing a complementary 
or rather a competing role. As regards illegal foreign work, according to 
survey results (mentioned above), its complementary character seems 
dominant. Those multinational companies, which are present in Hun-
gary, attract also quite considerable foreign labour due to some labour 
shortage in that region, and lack of skilled workers.  In these cases also 
complementary nature of foreign work seems to prevail.   
The aforementioned conﬂicting views show how important it is to
get a complex picture about the role of migration. Therefore it should 
be investigated whether and how labour and migration policy are inter-
related and their changes within the context of the given economic situ-
ation. It is evident that various types of migrants have different roles 
as well as economic and social impacts in the host country. For exam-
ple, problems related with long-term migration are to be clearly distin-
guished from those of temporary migrants. In addition, various cat-
egories of foreign workers should also be treated in a different way (for 
15 See: World Migration Report, 2005, p. 206. It refers to Borjas (2003), when mentioning this statement
example, labour inﬂow, connected with the presence of multinational
companies on the one hand and seasonal migrants on the other).
It is clear that Hungary should also cope with those migration pol-
icy dilemmas, which are generally acknowledged as being the most 
important ones. Therefore the balance between, sometimes conﬂicting,
objectives should be found. They are as follows16:
- Labour market needs;
- Protecting national security;
- Minimizing public expenditure
- Promoting social cohesion
- Respecting human rights obligations
- Promoting international development and cooperation
Out of these, it is the ﬁrst which is most often highlighted in Hun-
gary (both in public debates and also among experts). The problem 
with this is that it is difﬁcult to foresee labour market needs in advance.
Concerning the current policy, however, experts suggest that in order 
to avoid possible disturbances, labour market monitoring is needed on 
a permanent basis17.
Recent efforts of harmonising migration policies within the Eu-
ropean Union have important implications for the formulation and ap-
plication of the Hungarian migration strategy. For example, although in 
Hungary up till now integration of migrants was not a major concern 
(due partly to their limited number and partly to the fact that many of 
the migrants are ethnic Hungarians whose integration has not proved a 
problem), now an integration policy is being elaborated.
As regards policy against illegal migration, there have been some 
conﬂicts among the members of the European Union. The experiences
of other regions and countries (including the United States) have al-
ready shown, however, (as pointed out by Borjas), that as regards ef-
ﬁcient protection against the inﬂow of illegal migrants, much room for
manoeuvre remains in policy-making of the individual  countries.
Under the above described circumstances the main dilemma is 
what kind of migration could help in meeting labour market needs, but 
avoiding any disturbances or conﬂicts there. There are several propos-
16 See: World Migration Report, 2005.
17 See Tóth, 2007.
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als. One of them18 suggests that Hungary should pursue a more ac-
tive migration policy in order to ﬁnd those foreign workers who have
the necessary skills to ease labour shortage in some areas. In order to 
launch such a policy, a thorough analysis of labour market develop-
ments (supply and demand) is needed. 
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Appendix
Figure 1. 
Source: Central Statistical Ofﬁce, Budapest
Security, Legal and Human Aspects 
of Migration – Experience and Policies
Annamária Veres, Ph.D. 
Migration Department, 
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, Budapest
I. Introduction:
1. Historical background: 
Starting with historical retrospect, prior to the change of regime 
Hungary was mainly a country sending out migrants and asylum seek-
ers. From the end of the ‘80s, this tendency changed and instead of 
emigration, immigration towards the country (both temporary and 
permanent) became more signiﬁcant. As a consequence, the Republic
of Hungary became a receiving country primarily for two groups of 
people: ﬁrst, for asylum seekers with Hungarian origin coming from
the neighbouring countries because of the Romanian revolution and 
the Yugoslav crisis. Second, for immigrants with Hungarian origins 
from the same countries, seeking better circumstances of life in the 
second half of the ‘90s (that is to say the so-called economic immigra-
tion). However, due to the greater openness of borders and to the un-
fortunate phenomenon of increasing organised crime lot of foreigners 
arrived in Hungary for whom our country was only a transit country 
and they continued to other Western European states. Brieﬂy, Hungary
was a receiving and a transit state at the same time.
This duality is still typical of Hungary. On one hand, by reason of 
our EU membership, our receiving role has further strengthened after 
the accession in 2004; on the other hand, our transit role has decreased 
thanks to the efforts aiming at rolling back illegal migration but be-
cause of our geopolitical situation it will certainly not disappear in the 
future.
As regards migration it is a joyful development that the number of 
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foreigners legally residing in Hungary is increasing year by year. This 
tendency mirrors the fact that Hungary can give a secure perspective to 
migrants arriving here as students, workers or entrepreneurs.
In one word, Hungary’s enticement is getting stronger. Neverthe-
less, it should not be forgotten that Hungary has serious demographic 
problems, the population is declining, and therefore the positive effects 
of migration ﬂows offer new opportunities to our country as well.
2. Institutional background:
In Hungary, the structure of governmental organs dealing with mi-
gration, asylum and border management issues has changed last summer. 
According to the new institutional structure, the Ministry of Interior has 
ceased to exist and the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement super-
vises the Ofﬁce of Immigration and Nationality and the National Head-
quarters of the Border Guards. Within the Ministry, the Department of 
Migration, as a newly created administrative unit, has the task to codify 
the laws and regulations concerning the entry and stay of third-country 
nationals, the status of citizens enjoying the right of free movement and 
stay deriving from EC law; moreover to negotiate international agree-
ments in the ﬁeld of migration and asylum and also to keep contact with
international organisations working in this domain (f. ex.: Söderköping 
Process, International Organisation for Migration, International Centre 
for Migration Policy Development, UNHCR). As to the Ofﬁce of Im-
migration and Nationality, besides the central authority there are seven 
(7) subordinated regional directorates. Similarly, the National Headquar-
ters of the Border Guards supervises ten (10) regional directorates whose 
number has dropped to seven (7) from the beginning of this year.
3. Challenges:
a) Reducing number of asylum seekers:
The number and contents of forced migrants and asylum seekers has 
been dramatically changed during the last decade. From 1989 to 2000 main-
ly people ﬂed from the conﬂicts in neighbouring countries sought asylum
in Hungary. In this duration we received app. 160 000 asylum seekers.
Our ﬁrst law in this ﬁeld, namely the Act on Asylum came into
force in 1998. This was important because of lifting the geographical 
limitation of the Geneva Convention since that time we receive and 
deal with non-European asylum seekers and refugees on a daily basis. 
During the Afghan war, Hungary – after Austria – received the most 
Afghan asylum seekers, in the central-east European area. [Silde] To 
2002 and 2003 the number of asylum seekers has been dramatically 
reduced. The reasons of this phenomenon can be the favourable geopo-
litical changes, the recruitment of the Hungarian Border Guard and the 
more effective participation in counter trafﬁcking.
b) Increasing number of legal migrants:
As I mentioned it before the number of foreigners legally residing 
in Hungary is increasing year by year. At present we have approximate-
ly 130.000 long-term residents which number is not too high compared 
to other European states. The majority of migrants have arrived from 
the neighbouring countries, belonging to the Hungarian minority liv-
ing there; consequently their social integration – because of the same 
language and culture – did not cause difﬁculties. However, nowadays,
the proportion of extra-European immigrants among migrants arriving 
to Hungary is getting bigger and bigger, which urges the elaboration of 
coherent integration policy in order to avoid their marginalization and 
so that they can become successful members of the society.
c) Illegal migration routes:
As to illegal migration, two of four migration routes go through 
the Carpathian Basin (Hungary), namely those from the West Balkans 
and from the former Soviet republics. The present situation in ﬁghting
against illegal immigration and trafﬁcking of human beings is more
favourable then couple of years ago, which is a result of multiplication 
of governmental measures: the border management system has been 
strengthened, a complex surveillance network has been set up with 
close cooperation between Police forces, the Border Guards, immigra-
tion, customs and labour authorities.
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d) Challenges after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria:
Among the EU member states in Slovakia and Romania lives the 
biggest Hungarian population. Because of that fact we expect signif-
icant number of migrant workers from these two countries; in this 
regard the east-west migratory ﬂows seemed to remain the same. Ac-
cording to data given by the National Employment Service the most 
foreign employees come from Romania to Hungary. From 1ts of Janu-
ary 2007 Hungary opened its labour market with restrictions toward 
Romania and Bulgaria, means that in the ﬁrst two years Hungary apply
automatic permission system regarding to 219 vocations. This list has 
made by the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs and based on a fea-
sibility study. Till 2009 the list has to be reviewed in every sixth month 
and it can be expanded.
We have to see at the same time that before of the accession there 
were large numbers of Romanian citizens worked abroad already, the 
simple fact of the accession will not lead to a mass inﬂux of labour
migrants from these two new member states.
II. The Migration Strategy of Hungary:
The Migration Strategy is one of the basic documents of the Hun-
garian migration policy. A document that wants to give proper answers 
to the challenges come from the complex phenomenon of migration. 
This is a governmental strategy to lay down the steps have to be taken 
in the ﬁeld of entry, reception, integration and return of foreigners.
1. Relation between migration strategy and law enforcement strat-
egy (with special regard to the responsibility of the Border Guards): 
There are several, so called sub strategies in Hungary. The scope 
of the law enforcement strategy covers the responsibility of the Police 
and the Border Guard, too. Border management and control is an in-
separable aspect of migration. Hungary’s law enforcement authorities 
play an ever increasing role in the European Union’s security system.
Elimination of risks threatening the Union’s external borders is basi-
cally a law enforcement related task, in the implementation of which the 
Hungarian Border Guards has the main responsibility. During the last 
one and a half decade, this organisation has transformed from a military 
organ into a modern, Western-European law enforcement body. The 
geopolitical situation greatly determines our tasks and duties. Manag-
ing migration can only be efﬁcient with a complex ﬁlter mechanism; in
addition helping countries of origin is of great importance as well.
To this aim, co-operation between Hungarian border control au-
thorities and those of the neighbouring countries is essential. In order 
to keep up internal security, the Hungarian government puts emphasis 
on the control of external borders and in relation to internal borders, on 
carrying out cross-border measures. Border Guards upholds extensive 
international co-operation network: on bilateral level, we have eighteen 
(18) international agreements on the co-operation to counter terrorism, 
drug trafﬁcking and organised crime.
As for the future, it is vitally important to promote and continue 
cooperation with Ukraine as it is at the external border of the EU and at 
the Hungarian border so as to address challenges in ﬁght against illegal
migration, smuggling of goods and human trafﬁcking.
Besides of these facts, the migration and law enforcement strategies 
have to be handled as equal documents of the Hungarian migration policy.
2. Priorities of the Strategy: 
Hungary needs the positive effects of international migration to re-
duce the unfavourable tendencies on demographic changes by manag-
ing migration. The one of the main purpose of the strategy is to clarify 
responsibilities belong to different ministries.
a) Legal migration:
The rules of entry and stay of EEA nationals are in accordance 
with the relevant EU law and regulations.
Other types of legal migrants are third country nationals arrive 
outside from the European Community, and third country nationals 
migrated within the Community. The rate of migrants legally stay in 
Hungary are expected to grow, it could reach 5% of the total number 
of inhabitants.
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b) Illegal migration:
The rate of illegal migration aimed at Hungary shows reducing ten-
dency. The number of those illegal migrants who use one of the legal chan-
nels of entry to cover their further illegal purposes (e.g.: lunch asylum 
application, entry with tourist visa in order to go other western European 
county) is increasing, this kind of migrants try to use the gaps in the law. 
Hungary can expect illegal migrants mostly from the territory of 
the former Soviet Union and from central-east Asia. One of the main 
purposes in this ﬁeld is to tackle the unregistered employment.
Concerning the return of migrants the voluntary return is still the most 
humanitarian way to get back to the country of origin. In order to strength-
en this practice we have to start dialogue with other member states. The 
European Commission urges this kind of practical co-operation as well.
c) Asylum:
The Hungarian Government has to take steps to prevent abuse of 
asylum for purposes of illegal or economic migration. The practical 
co-operation needs to be strengthened among European asylum au-
thorities as well. We want to make efforts to provide the quality of the 
asylum procedure, to this end we plan to set up an independent country 
of origin information centre. 
d) Counter trafﬁcking:
Concerning to tackle trafﬁcking of human beings Hungary has to
prepare at least four year national programme about the possibilities 
and challenges in this ﬁeld.
Measures in the framework of the so called 3P strategy (Prevention, 
Protection, Prosecution) have to aim capacity building in the govern-
mental/public and civil sphere, too. There is a separated shelter home in 
Hungary to accommodate the victims of trafﬁcking of human beings.
e) Employment:
We have to harmonise the migration trends with the requests of the 
labour market in order to use the possibilities of the European mobility. 
It needs bilateral employment programmes and simpliﬁed procedure
for those foreign employees wants to stay in Hungary.
Human resources in science and technology have to be motivated 
to come and stay in Hungary. The earlier selective, prohibitive meas-
ures has to be switched to a more opened and ﬂexible labour policy in
order to approve the sustainable development.
f) Competitiveness:
Hungary has to join to those countries who implement resettle-
ment programmes. The legal basis of this kind of action is still miss-
ing, we have to ﬁll this gap as soon as possible. To handle the triad of
competitiveness – labour policy – migration is a special and complex 
responsibility. The Government has to support middle and big entre-
preneurs to settle down in the country by integrated interests of the 
competent ministries.
The migration related statistics have to be developed to form a homo-
geneous system, in order to use the European funds more effectively.
g) Education:
The main purpose in this ﬁeld to give ﬁnancial and professional
support for those educational institutions what deal with migrants. 
Anti-discriminative measures have to be taken in order to raise the 
accessibility of public educational system for migrants. Preparatory 
language training has to be set up fro those migrants who do not speak 
the language. The Government has to ensure the legal and professional 
conditions of the education of migrant minors. 
h) Health care:
The accessibility of newcomers to the health care system has to 
be clariﬁed. Traumatised migrants and unaccompanied children need
bigger attention.
3. Specialities: 
a) Hungarians in neighbouring countries:
The purpose of Hungary is to help these Hungarians to live in their 
homeland or to come and stay in Hungary if they wish to do so. In order 
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to make easier to maintain the cultural connections and cousinship at 
1st of January 2006 the national visa came into force and the procedure 
of naturalization became quicker and more equitable. Hungary would 
like to support these communities according to the EU law.
In order to their integration and autonomy, Hungary wants to sup-
port the accession of the neighbouring countries via bi- or multilateral 
international connections. 
b) Emigrants from Hungary:
The migration potential of Hungary is lower than in the other 
countries of the region. According to the recent experiences the move-
ment of Hungarian people remains within the Union and the purpose 
of this kind of migration is not a long-term stay but temporary employ-
ment. The main reason is that the older members of the EU opened 
their labour market with some restrictions as well. At the same time it 
can be shown that comparing with other newly acceding countries the 
number of Hungarian employees is much lower in those countries, too, 
that does not apply such restrictions.
The migration of doctors, health assistants and researchers appears 
to be standard. 
III. Integration:
Integration is a part of the Migration Strategy as well but I deal 
with this issue separately, because of its complex nature.
1. Integration in the European Context: 
Historically, the adaptation of migrants and their integration to the host 
country had been channelled through assimilation processes. This concept 
by which the “alien” should gradually become “native” was, at that time, 
a social need in order to safeguard social structures and guided by the re-
action of the host society to the presence of diversity. The most powerful 
example of assimilation was that of the United States, but assimilation was 
the pattern not only for the migration countries (the Americas and British 
Dominions) but also for the European ones during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. This process was facilitated by easy naturalization of migrants.
Till the 1970s, immigration in Europe was either an intra-continen-
tal phenomenon or linked to the colonial history of the major migration 
countries. In the last thirty years, however, migration changed charac-
teristics. Assimilation patterns ceased to be used to achieve cohesion 
while, in parallel, the multi-cultural model of integration gradually ap-
peared. In the recent years many countries profess that integration is 
their avowed goal and is seen not only as a remedy to the emergence 
of socially excluded areas but also as the implementation in practice 
of equality for all. Economic parameters also play a role: the success-
ful integration of migrants is not only a factor of social cohesion but a 
prerequisite of economic efﬁciency as well.
At EU level, integration as an aspect of a common approach to the 
migration policy ﬁrst appeared in the conclusions of the 1999 European
Council in Tampere, Finland. [Some words about the thought of “burden 
sharing, the instruments (the four special fund) based on this] Gradually, 
and with the formulation of common EU actions and policies on migration, 
integration also became a major aspect of the common migration policies.
Mainly due to the increased number of refugees and asylum seekers 
in the last decades, most of the EU member states considered refugee 
integration as a crucial element in their general policies on asylum. The 
forced character of the refugees’ departure from their countries of origin 
and their inability to return, render more urgent and pressing the need to 
provide them with essentials of security and protection, while the same 
considerations do not, in general, apply to other categories of non-nation-
als. Thus, although many European countries do not distinguish between 
integration of migrants and integration of refugees in developing the 
framework of their general policies on integration, several, among them, 
promote more formulated, specialised and targeted measures for refugees 
within these general policies. In this part, integration will be analyzed on 
the basis of the broader concept of integration of third-country nationals, 
including refugees and persons under other forms of protection.
a) The signiﬁcance of integration for European societies:
First of all, the migration ﬂows, in the last 30 years, have become
more diverse, both culturally and socially. Secondly, it has been recog-
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nised, that the integration of third country nationals has positive con-
sequences on the economy of the host country, either directly – insofar 
as it increases collective wealth – or indirectly by reducing social costs 
(new employment outlook, covering of present and future labour mar-
ket needs). Thirdly, integration enhances social inclusion and cohesion. 
The tendency among Member States is to use integration policies in or-
der to combat social exclusion. Integration is, thus, the modern expres-
sion on equality and participation in today’s diversiﬁed societies.
Finally, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the US, 
the member states started increasingly to look at immigration and in-
tegration in the light of security and the effort to combat terrorism. 
In many European Union member states it is now recognised that the 
successful integration of migrants and refugees – and in some cases 
of nationals with an immigrant background – is one of the best arma-
ments against home-bred terrorism.
2. Deﬁnition:
Although there is no legal deﬁnition on integration there is one
that stands on a more or less common agreement: 
Integration is a multi-faceted dynamic, long-term and continuous 
two-way process, which is based on mutual rights and responsibilities 
of legally resident third country nationals and the host society. 
This deﬁnition implies that the receiving member states must, on
the one hand, create the conditions for the economic, social, cultural, 
civic and political participation of third country nationals, and, on the 
other, the immigrants must respect the laws in the host society as well 
as its basic values and behaviours. It also requires the shared involve-
ment of migrants to the integration procedures developed for them, 
without renouncing their identity and aiming at the future independent 
co-existence with every other citizen.
Following the deﬁnition mentioned above, the member states have
also agreed that an indispensable principle in the context of integration 
is the need of an holistic approach of integration, which includes all as-
pects of economic, social, cultural, civic and political life and addresses 
a broad span of issues in various areas such as, employment, education, 
housing, health and social services, culture and inter-religious dialogue, 
voting rights, citizenship, non-discrimination policy and delinquency 
and protection of groups of persons with special needs.
3. Implementation: 
a) Mainstreaming with some specialised services:
In the ﬁeld of integration of migrants and refugees, mainstreaming
is conceived as directing the governments to make decisions about how 
to make integration an integral part of all public portfolios (policy-
making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies) and 
how to incorporate this perspective in all aspects of society, at all lev-
els and by all actors and stakeholders. Mainstreaming requires that all 
members of an increasingly diverse population are guaranteed equal 
treatment to national citizens before institutions and services and in a 
non-discriminatory way.
Mainstreaming is not about numbers: theoretically one can main-
stream policies that affect directly even a small number of persons – and 
indeed the objective is to ensure genuine equality or relevance for all. 
However, it is generally assumed that mainstreaming for too small a 
number of persons is not productive as it may involve a signiﬁcant up-
heaval not justiﬁed by the results achieved. In practice this means that,
wherever mainstreaming is applied for integration, it refers to a wide tar-
get group according to the national situation, covering not only refugees 
and persons under international protection, but also third-country nation-
als and, sometimes, nationals of the State with a migrant background.
b) Funding:
Another important issue for actions on integration areas is the 
available funding: integration requires adequate resources for making 
the relevant policies effective and responsive to real migrant and refu-
gee needs, as well as, a ﬁne balance between the general ﬁnancial pro-
visions and provisions targeted for integration measures. The apparent 
high initial cost is offset by the reduction in targeted expenses (beneﬁts
etc.) and the indirect gains – that are difﬁcult to measure but still real
– of a more cohesive society. In the present circumstances, co-ﬁnanc-
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ing arrangements with the European Union are an option for most EU 
member States, while the private sector and migrants themselves also 
could be very useful in a absolute complementary way.
4. The signiﬁcance of integration for the Hungarian society:
Hungary remains even today largely a homogeneous mono-cultural 
society. The presence of foreigners in its territory remains, if not margin-
al, certainly less conspicuous than in most other countries of Europe.
First, the present situation might change rapidly. Experience from 
the recent past, especially in formerly emigration countries (Italy, Spain, 
Greece or Ireland) demonstrate that these countries received a signiﬁ-
cant immigrant population in a few years’ span. These countries were 
totally unprepared, from a social, political and legal aspect, for this situ-
ation; immigrants were marginalised and the society felt alarmed by 
the sudden inﬂux of migrants. Hungary, as a member of the European
Union and a country with an external border, has many probabilities to 
receive larger numbers of third-country nationals seeking employment, 
better life conditions or protection. It is important therefore that Hun-
gary prepares itself, legally and socially for such an eventuality.
Finally, actions on integration today present an economic advan-
tage, since the successful integration of third country nationals in the 
society would contribute to the Hungarian economy and its welfare 
rather than being a drain on the public funds.
a) Principles guiding a Hungarian Integration Strategy: 
The Hungarian administration, though both conscious of the need 
to carry on with a concrete shape of an integration strategy and will-
ing to proceed to signiﬁcant changes in patterns and policies, was not
able to provide speciﬁc terms of reference for the target groups, the
content and the funds available for such a strategy. However, one major 
achievement of the previous years’ continuous professional discussions 
is that the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement has expressed a 
clear will to draft an Act on Integration.
b) Hungarian – Greek Twinning project on integration:
In the framework of the Transition Facility Project entitled “Facili-
tating Refugee Integration in Hungary” was implemented by the Hun-
garian Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, the Ofﬁce of Immi-
gration and Nationality and the EU Member State partner, the Centre 
of International and European Economic Law of Greece (CIEEL). The 
ﬁnal component of the project was a strategic document, the White
Paper for the Integration of Refugees, Persons Under Subsidiary Pro-
tection and Other Third Country Nationals Residing Legally in Hun-
gary. This White Paper proposes the political, legal and administrative 
framework as well as the contents for a comprehensive national strat-
egy for refugee integration in Hungary.
The Paper provides answers to the request for a comprehensive 
integration strategy for recognized refugees and persons who have re-
ceived a subsidiary protection status according to the Asylum Act of 
1997 and the 2001 Act on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners. Conse-
quently, it does not go into the Hungarian authorities’ legislation and 
practice on asylum procedures, even less on the wider entry and resi-
dence of aliens’ issue.
This choice is justiﬁed by the fact that integration throughout Eu-
rope is on the one hand, a multi-dimensional and multi-targeted exer-
cise, and on the other, it also remains an exclusive national competence 
orientated to the real needs and political priorities of each country.
Some of the proposed suggestions could also be used in the frame-
work of a future, all-inclusive integration strategy, which would in-
clude, besides refugees, other groups of third-country nationals.
IV. Legal aspects of migration:
New legislation will come into force from 1ts of July 2007:
On its session of 18 December 2006, the Parliament of the Repub-
lic of Hungary has passed two new legislative acts on migration. The 
Act on the Entry and Stay  of Persons Enjoying the Community Right 
of Free Movement and the Act on the Entry and Stay of Third Country 
Nationals  will replace the current Aliens Act (Act XXXIX of 2001 on 
the Entry and Stay of Foreigners) as of 1 July 2007.
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The “Free Movement Act” implements the Council Directive 2004/
38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
The “new Aliens Act” contains the provision necessary for the full 
implementation of the Schengen acquis in Hungary. It complies with the 
Schengen visa regime, and fully harmonizes with Schengen-related and 
other EU legal measures on the ﬁeld of both legal and irregular migration.
Concerning the international protection and the asylum procedure 
a new “Act on Asylum” is under development. We have to incorporate 
3 relevant directives:
The Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers, the Council Directive 2004/83/EC 
on minimum standards for the qualiﬁcation and status of third country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted 
and the Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on proce-
dures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
According to the abovementioned White Paper the Ministry of Jus-
tice and Law Enforcement wants to create a totally new, comprehensive 
act on integration which should replaced former sectorial legislation.
26/January/2007, Soﬁa
THE ROMANIAN APPROACH
Romanian Competitiveness 
– a Rough Ride to catch up with the EU
Andreea Vass, Ph.D.
Researcher, Romanian Academy
Advisor, Department of Economic and Social Policies, 
Romanian Presidential Administration, Bucharest
I. What makes nations competitive?
Competitiveness seems to be a comparative concept measuring 
the ability and the performance of a ﬁrm, an economic sector or a
country to sell and supply goods and services in a given market. 
The idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely determined 
by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary 
truth. For example, the European Union is the largest exporter in 
the global market, but it is still lacking in competitiveness com-
pared with the United States and Japan. Even though most of the 
economists share similar diagnostics of the European problem – the 
taxes and regulations imposed by Europe’s elaborate welfare states 
– the European policy-makers, starting with Jaques Delors (1993), 
explain that the root cause of European unemployment is the lower 
level of investment in infrastructure and high technology. Becom-
ing the most competitive nation by 2010—the goal of the  Lisbon 
agenda—was soon replaced by the  growth and jobs strategy as 
the main road towards competitiveness. In this context, the current 
key policy challenges identiﬁed in the European Competitiveness 
Report 2006  (December 2006) rests in: the energy market liberali-
sation, efﬁciency and security of supply; the regulatory of business
environment; innovation and technology policies that contribute to 
a successful lead market strategy.
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So competitiveness remains a concept 
that is not well understood, despite wide-
spread acceptance of its importance. Nev-
ertheless, all the economists agree that the 
national economic welfare is determined 
by productivity, in both traded and non-
traded sectors of the economy. 
Therefore, to understand competitiveness, the starting point must 
be the sources of a nation’s prosperity. A nation’s standard of living is 
determined by the productivity of its economy, which is measured by 
the value of output - goods and services - produced per unit of inputs 
used by a nation or a region - especially its knowledge, human, capital 
and natural resources. In other words, productivity sets a nation’s or 
region’s standard of living, through wages, returns on capital and on 
natural resources (Porter, 2006):
• Productivity depends on the value of products and services 
(e.g. uniqueness, quality), as well as on the efﬁciency with
which they are produced;
• Prosperity does not rely on what industries a nation or region 
competes in, but how ﬁrms compete in those industries;
• Productivity in a nation or region is a reﬂection of what both
domestic and foreign ﬁrms choose to do in that location. The
location of ownership is secondary for national prosperity;
• The productivity of “local” industries is fundamental to com-
petitiveness, not just that of traded industries;
• Devaluation and revaluation do not make a country more or 
less “competitive”.
Yet nations and regions compete in offering the most productive 
environment for business. Here the public and private sectors should 
play different but interrelated roles in creating a productive economy. 
A sound macroeconomic, political, legal, and social context creates the 
potential for competitiveness; it is still not sufﬁcient. Only ﬁrms can
Competitiveness is 
a seductive idea and a 
way of leaving prom-
ising prosperity…
through productivity
create wealth, not the government. 
The main factors behind increasing a 
ﬁrms’ competitiveness are:
• Costs – such as wages, utilities, and 
prices - their impact on the ability of ﬁrms
to compete in international markets;
• However, better business performance 
is paramount, above all efﬁciency factors,
such as a good physical infrastructure, high 
levels of education, training and research 
and a regulatory and tax environment that 
encourages entrepreneurship, enterprise, 
competition, productivity and innovation.
Looking at the groups of companies, Michael Porter deﬁnes four
“pillars” in the “diamond of national competitiveness” that lead to com-
petitive strengths and weaknesses of countries and their major sectors:
• the existence of resources (i.e. human resources and research 
and information infrastructures); 
• a business environment that stimulates innovation; 
• a demanding local market; 
• the presence of supporting industries.
Therefore, strategy-makers have to look for the resources alloca-
tion and performance, but also for the overall business environment 
improvements and the social progress.  A more competitive economy 
is one that is likely to grow faster over the medium to long run.  
 
II. Facts on Romania’s growth and 
productivity performance
After the European Council in Hel-
sinki (1999), when Romania was invited 
in order to negotiate the EU membership, 
our efforts of adjusting the political, eco-
nomic, social and legislative systems have 
increased signiﬁcantly. Relevant upgrades
Determinants of 
national competitive-
ness:
…partly the costs 
and prices…
…but it is more 
about the better busi-
ness performance.
Romania has 
reduced 
the  GDP per 
capita gap with 10 
percentage points 
relative to EU-25 
in the last 7 years.
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in the management of the public and private sectors during Romanian 
transition to a functional market economy have been induced due to 
the integrative pressures of the acquis communautaire. The coherence 
of these policies has grown. As a consequence, a buoyant and dynamic 
economic environment emerged after 2000. Constant economic growth 
led the Romanian GDP per capita to exceed 34% of the EU-25 average 
level in 2005. It is estimated for 2006 to be 36% at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) and 17% at the market prices. 
Romania’s integration into the global economy through the stra-
tegic partnership with the European Union has been so far based on 
cheap labor as well as low and medium-technology exports. The crea-
tion of new jobs has helped solve many severe social problems. Yet such 
exports are low value added and have a small contribution to raising 
the living standard through high and lasting economic growth rates.
In the EU-27 internal market, especially as Romania is set to join 
the European Monetary Union in 2014, the only force contributing to 
economic catching-up will be the competitiveness of each individual, 
company, sector and business environment as a whole. There are some 
Romanian success stories. Still, with very few exemptions, most of the 
international classiﬁcations throws Romania at the European periph-
ery in terms of prosperity driving forces’ performance. Escaping it 
urges a much higher and long-run economic and human development 
in Romania than the EU average. 
With a GDP per capita (PPP) of $9,446 in 20061, Romania is con-
sidered an upper-middle income economy, according to the World 
Bank Country Classiﬁcation Groups. Romania improved its competi-
tiveness relative to EU-25 average and new EU members in some 
important indicators:
• Romania has one of the highest GDP per capita average 
growth rates in the region (for about 10% annually during 
2000 – 2005, at PPP), overcome only by Estonia. Despite this 
dynamism, we still had the lowest level of GDP per capita in 
2005, relative to the other EU members used for benchmark-
ing, except for Bulgaria;
1 IMF World Economic Outlook, Economic Indicators for Romania, 2004-2007, April 2006
Fig. 1. Prosperity Performance
Source: Calculations based on latest Eurostat databases, January 2007
• GDP increased even faster in 2004-2006 than earlier. In 2004, 
GDP growth was 8.4%, one of the highest in Europe. This 
rate was halved in 2005, mainly due to ﬂoods in signiﬁcant
agricultural areas. For 2006 growth is estimated at 7.0%. For 
the next years, the GDP growth potential is evaluated at ap-
proximately 6%;
• Labour productivity growth (GDP per employee) of 80%, 
between 2000 and 2005, seems to reveal Romania as an out-
standing performer in our region. Explanations come actually 
from a signiﬁcant reduction of labour force in the economy,
with more than 1,5 million. Again, the 2005 labour produc-
tivity level is one of the lowest in the EU, 2.8 times lower 
than the EU-25 average and 3.6 times lower than in Ireland. 
Surprisingly the economic restructuring was accomanied 
by a low level of unemployment, 5.1% in November 2006, 
much lower compared to other middle-sized or large Europe-
an countries such as Poland (14%),  Germany (12%), France 
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(9%), and Spain (7.6%).
Fig. 2. Labour productivity
Source: Calculations based on latest Eurostat data bases, January 2007
• Labour productivity in industry increased by 11% in the ﬁrst
three quarters of 2006, fueled mainly by the productivity 
growth in the mining and quarrying industry (26.6%), fol-
lowed by manufacturing (10.5%), electric and thermal energy, 
gas and water industry (5.8%).
• Although Romanian exports per capita increased more rap-
idly than in many other Central and East European countries 
(CEECs), during 2000 - 2005, their nominal level remains by 
far the lowest. Structural upgrading is also presently in favor 
of medium-tech (35% share in total exports 2006) and to a 
lower extent of high-tech products (gaining 5% in the exports 
structure in the last 7 years, reaching almost 13% in 2006). 
Still the resource-based exports and low-tech are dominant, 
accounting for 36% and 14% respectively (according to the 
author’s estimations)
Fig. 3. Export Performance
Source: Calculations based on latest Eurostat data bases, January 2007
• Romania's main exports are clothing and textiles, leather and 
footwear, with 25% share in total exports (FOB prices), fol-
lowed by industrial machinery, electrical and electronic equip-
ment (18%), metallurgic products (13%), mineral products 
(10%), wood and furniture (10%), cars and other auto vehicles 
(9%), chemical products (6%), software, pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural products (fruits, vegetables, and ﬂowers). Trade is
mostly centred on the member states of the European Union, 
with Germany and Italy being the country’s largest trading 
partners. Yet the foreign trade deﬁcit is expanding. Imports
exceeded exports by almost 50% in 2006, signiﬁcantly more
than in the previous years;
• Benchmarking Poland and Romania, a comparative report 
ﬁnds that the specialization pattern of exports ranks the two
countries on the strongest positions in low-tech and medium-
88 89
low-tech industries on the EU market, while the market shares 
attained in high-tech industries are very small2. Poland has 
had a more advanced export structure –there were recent gains 
in the medium-high-tech sector; productivity increased more 
rapidly than wages– thus unit labour costs in manufacturing 
declined by 17.8% during 2002 - 2005. The costs of Polish 
producers diminished and they could compete with lower 
prices and sell larger quantities. By contrast, in Romania pro-
ductivity did not increase as fast as the wages during the same 
period, which led to an increase in manufacturing unit labour 
costs of 24.5%. Romanian producers could not sell as much 
as before in the same quality. They were pushed to increase 
export prices even if quantities had to be limited. Still, the 
Polish unit labour costs are on average higher than in Romani-
an manufacturing sector as a whole; but kept below Romania 
in key export industries: textiles-clothing-leather, machinery, 
electrical and transport. Romanian exporters could align costs 
and prices and maintain competitiveness through quality in-
crease, but they could not substantially increase the amount of 
exports. At the opposite, Polish producers increased the quan-
tity of exports relatively more rapidly than the quality.
• Flows of foreign direct investments (FDI) into Romania in-
creased.  Still, as late as 2004, Romania was lagging behind 
the other countries in terms of FDI stock in GDP, except for 
Lithuania and Slovenia. A ﬁfth of the annual gross ﬁxed capi-
tal formation was covered by the average inﬂow of FDI, dur-
2 Hunya, G. (2006), EU Membership – Support and Challenge to the Competitiveness of the Polish and 
Romania economies, Draft paper to be presented at EUIJ Kansai, 9 December 2006 and at EUIJ Tokyo, 
11 December 2006
ing 2001-2004, 2 times lower in Bulgaria. 
Fig. 4. FDI Performance
Source: Calculations based on latest Eurostat data bases, January 2007
• A much stronger increase of FDI followed in 2005 – 2006, 
making Romania the single largest investment destination in 
Southeastern and Central Europe. These performances (5.2 
billion Euro in 2005, and 8.5 billion Euro in 2006) were ex-
plained partly by several large privatization deals in banking 
(e.g. the acquisition of Banca Comerciala Romana by Erste 
Bank - Austria). In addition, the privatization of natural gas 
providers and their purchase by Gaz de France and Ruhrgas 
(Germany), led to a stock of almost 29 billions Euro in 2006 
(close to the Polish performance in 2004, of almost 30% in 
GDP). Another record level of FDI is expected in 2007. This 
should help competitiveness through bringing new interna-
tional best practices, management skills, expertise and capital 
investment into the local business environment;
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• Relevant explanations for the Romanian economy late FDI in-
crease reside in the unﬁnished privatisation process, on one
hand, and from the introduction of the ﬂat tax of 16%, for both
personal income and corporate proﬁt - one of the lowest ﬁscal
burdens in Europe, on the other hand. These have been ac-
companied by measures to improve the business environment, 
especially in terms of ease of starting a business, policy incen-
tives leading to the increase of employees and private sector 
proﬁtability (reaching an unprecedented 5% level in 2005). Ac-
tually, government intervention in the Romanian economy is 
to some extent even lower than in other European economies3.
• The business environment reform. The regulations of launch-
ing a business in Romania are more favourable than in the 
region and in the OECD countries. The procedures, costs and 
time required signiﬁcantly diminished, placing Romania on
the 7th place worldwide in ease of opening a business and en-
tering the market (Word Bank, 2006). Relevant improvements 
have been achieved in facilitating the imports and exports, 
thus gaining a competitive advantage over other 86 countries 
worldwide in 2006. The protection of investors and contract 
enforcement are relatively solid. The ﬂat tax rate is also com-
petitive, but the number of tax payments, the procedures and 
time for registering a property are still relative high. Despite 
the above-mentioned positive outcomes, the quality of the leg-
islative regulations adopted during 2004 - 2006 was unsatis-
factory. Overly rigid non-wage costs, the difﬁculties faced in
ﬁring workers and in shutting down a business are other added
weaknesses of the Romanian business environment that put a 
break on the development of entrepreneurship; 
• The sectors with the fastest growth in 2006 were:
- constructions and related industries – building materials 
industry, metallic constructions and metal products in-
dustry – estimated growth of13% in 2006, with a further 
12% growth forecast for 2007; 
3 Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom, 2006
- electronic equipment industry ( 10.6% growth in 2006); 
- telecommunications industry;
- production and distribution of electric and thermal energy; 
- furniture industry;
• A fast-growing ﬁnancial sector supports the industry develop-
ment. The banking sector is highly developed, with a banking 
assets volume of approximately 38 billion Euros. There are 39 
banks currently active on the Romanian market, 6 of which are 
branches of foreign banks. 58% of the banking assets are con-
centrated in the ﬁrst 5 banks in the system, while the majority
of the banking assets are held by foreign-owned banks (87.8%). 
The insurance sector has developed exponentially, represent-
ing, at the end of 2005, 1.2% of the GDP. In 2006, estimates 
indicate a growth of almost 20%. Although less developed 
than the banking system, the capital market is one of the most 
dynamic markets in Europe, with a capitalization of approxi-
mately 21 billion Euros, in 2006. Enhancing the legislation on 
investor protection, introducing the mortgage bonds, launching 
the private pension funds and the EU accession generate posi-
tive prospects for the ongoing development of these sectors.
EU membership does not guarantee higher competitiveness: 
the case of Central and East European countries (CEECs)
Competitiveness improvements before accession. Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Hungary etc. have taken particular measures in early the 
1990’s to promote the competition among enterprises, to strengthen 
the governance and to stimulate foreign direct investments, aiming at 
including domestic companies in the global production network. They 
reaped soon the beneﬁces of competitiveness.
In an international comparison, CEECs show a relatively strong eco-
nomic growth performance, coming close to that of the ﬁrst and second
tier of Asian Tiger countries over the past decade, which emerge as the 
best growth performers (setting aside China, with an average economic 
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growth of almost 10% in the last two decades). Its dynamic growth per-
formance has even accelerated despite an economic slowdown in their 
most important trading partners. Despite being considerably smaller 
than their competitors in East Asia (taken together about half the size of 
China), the CEECs have gained a very considerable market share in the 
EU-15 which is their main export market. Meantime, pronounced reduc-
tion in their trade deﬁcits, despite weak demand in EU and strengthening
currency, reveals signiﬁcant competitiveness improvements.
Regional growth forecasts – CEE a leader
Real GDP growth 2006 2007 - 2011
North America 3,2 2.6
Western Europe 2.8 2,3
CEE 6,3 5,5
Asia 5.3 4.5
Asia without Japan 5.9 5.2
Latin America 4.7 3.7
Middle East/North Africa 5.8 5.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.3 5.0
Source: European Inteligence Unit, Jan. 2007
CEECs are to become during 2007 – 2011 the fastest growing re-
gion of the world, according to the European Intelligence Unit estimates 
from January 2007. This trends lead to an unprecedented rise of competi-
tion in the region in the next few years:
• CEECs produced only 4% of world GDP in 2005, (at market ex-
change rates), but the highest economic growth rate in 2006;
• Today, the CEE region gets more foreign direct investment 
than anywhere else in the world (record FDI in 2005 of $80bn, 
UNCTAD, 2006), adding between $1.1 and $1.3 trillion in 
market size annually. Labour intensive manufacturing will 
continue to go to cheaper locations in CEE region, but high 
value added manufacturing, research and development, shared 
services etc. are moving too, at unprecedented levels. 
• Signiﬁcantcomparativeadvantagebecauseof lowerperceivedrisks
relative to Latin America, China, India, Middle East or Africa.
• EU funding 2007-2013 equals $140bn – a major opportunity 
but it depends on how much it will be absorbed. 
EU membership does not guarantee faster growth. The old mem-
bers are likely to maintain a competitive edge in advanced business serv-
ices. But in terms of infrastructure (human capital, telecommunications, 
etc.), the ease and reliability of doing business, the new members occupy 
rank four behind the two groups of advanced economies (EU and other 
OECD) and the ﬁrst tier of Asian Tigers. Romania and Bulgaria rank
generally lower, thus having to defend their position more intensively 
against competition from the second tier of Asian Tigers and emerging 
market economies, such as Turkey and Mexico. The two giant emerg-
ing markets, China and India, still have a long way to go to catch-up in 
these qualitative indicators. A distinguishing feature of EU-10 is their 
strong performance in terms of human capital and business infrastruc-
ture, which is yet not totally matched by an equally strong performance 
in institutions, guaranteeing a reliable and sound business environment.
III. Key policy challenges 
We should not fall prey to illusions, 
however, and lose sight of the bigger picture. 
Romania is a factor-driven economy to a 
large extent, moving only now towards 
an efﬁcient-driven development stage. We 
have basically two options ahead of us:
• To compete on the European market and globally with Poland, 
China and India on the labour-intensive product markets, or
• To build a sound policy for efﬁcient investments that may turn
Romania from a spectator into an active player on the high-
technology based global market.
Taking into account the perishable nature of the ﬁrst option, we are
left to play the second card. So, ﬁrms in Romania will not be able to
compete internationally only on the basis of natural resources and low 
wages, but rather on the basis of higher diversiﬁcation, productivity and
quality, ingenuity and innovation in product and process design and 
Are the current 
sources of Romanian 
economic success 
sustainable?
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delivery. Romania has no choice but to become a vibrant knowledge 
economy, being in a position to cash in on its integration opportunities, 
economic strategic location, savvy foreign policy, abundance of natural 
resources, sound macroeconomic policies, booming industries, high-
skilled and still inexpensive labor force and the stock-market growth. 
Pragmatically, economic planning has to be coherent and unitary, as to 
cover a few key objectives, even though every ﬁeld seems a priority, that
is those niches that could sustain the ongoing development. 
Nonetheless, what creates productivity inSweden is different from 
what drives it in Romania or Bulgaria, and again different in Ghana. 
Porter (1990) notes that countries are separated into three speciﬁc stag-
es: factor-driven, efﬁciency-driven, and innovation-driven, each imply-
ing a growing degree of complexity in the operation of the economy.
a) In the ﬁrst stage, competitiveness hinges mainly on well-func-
tioning public and private institutions, appropriate infrastruc-
ture, a stable macroeconomic framework, and good health and 
primary education. See for example the Romanian pattern of 
specialization in the world-wide footwear cluster, in the pres-
ence of Italian subsidiaries. They focused on lower to medium-
price range products, but recent orientation towards design, 
marketing and premium shoes was inﬂuenced fundamentally
by linkages and spillovers across ﬁrms in competition (Fig. 5).
b) As wages rise with advancing development, Romania should 
move into the second stage, when we must begin to develop 
more efﬁcient production processes and increase product qual-
ity. At this point, competitiveness becomes increasingly driven 
by higher education and training, efﬁcient markets, and the
ability to harness the beneﬁts of existing technologies. These
are currently exactly the main bottlenecks in raising Romanian 
competitiveness, on which we are to focus further on.
c) Finally, as countries move into the third stage, they are only 
able to sustain higher wages and the associated standart of 
living if their businesses were capable to compete with new 
and unique products. At this stage, companies must compete 
by producing new and different goods using the most sophis-
ticated production processes and through innovation. For ex-
ample, even though Singapore is one of the most impressive 
success stories of economic growth in the 20th century, with 
the highest export per capita in the world in 2005, it is now 
on a challenging path to move from an economy based on ef-
ﬁciency to one based on differentiation and innovation.
Fig. 5. Romania’s role in the footwear cluster
Source: Research by Harvard Business School student teams in 2002 – Van Thi Huynh, 
Evan Lee, Kevin Newman, Nils Ole Oermann (Porter, 2006)
Going through different country and regional experiences leads 
to the conclusion that the transition through the different stages is not 
necessarily linear or gradual. Nor does it happen automatically. There-
fore, Romania has to simultaneously address stringent issues related 
to the traditional competitive assets and to the main competitiveness 
shortcomings, and also to develop new competitive assets. 
Speciﬁc post-accession competitive pressures consist in the loss of 
competitiveness in labour-intensive and low skill industries, partly due to 
a gradual loss of cost advantages, but also to the increasing import pres-
sure from China and other low cost producers in European markets. 
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In 2007, after the EU accession, there will be strong 
pressures on wages towards convergence with Western 
European standards. Strong growth for Romanian la-
bour productivity is forecasted over the 2006-2008 
period by the European Commission4. In both produc-
tivity and wage levels, expansion is likely to be higher than in most EU-27 
member states. But if the labour productivity per employee is outpaced by 
employee compensation (a proxy for wage growth), as EC forecasts suggest, it 
will lead to a direct short-term threat to competitiveness. On the other hand, it 
may bring more emigrants back home, with higher skills and motivation.5
However, the National Commission of Prognosis estimates an an-
nual negative real unit labour costs growth (Fig. 6) during 2006 – 2010. 
It actually means that labour compensation will shift from the 2005 
trend, and it will grow less quickly than labour productivity. This is 
partly because until 2004, competitive wage costs made Romania an attrac-
tive Eastern European relocation destination for labour-intensive indus-
tries. Since then the growth rate of cheap but high-skilled industries, 
such as IT industries and call centers, increased signiﬁcantly.
Fig. 6. Labour costs versus labour productivity perspectives to 2010
Labour costs 
versus labour 
productivity
Source: Estimations of the National Commission of Prognosis, Jan. 2007
4 EU’s Autumn Forecast Report, November 6, 2006
5 Lately, only 12% of the returning Romanian emigrants were carrying in their luggage a higher educa-
tion diploma, much lower than in Bulgaria or the other CEE countries (World Bank, Migration and Remit-
tances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, A. Mansoor, B. Quillin, 2007).
Currently, wages in Romania are increasing from an extremely 
low base, by comparison with Western Europe. A recent survey6 in-
dicated that a typical 2006 weekly gross wage costs in Romania is 66 
Euro - 80% higher than in Bulgaria and similar to Latvia, but more 
than 2 times lower than in Hungary, almost 4 times lower than in Slov-
enia, and ﬁnally more than 10 times lower than in Germany.
Such issues remain a concern, but simultaneously excessive wage 
growth must be prevented. Pay levels in many of the EU’s global com-
petitor countries are much lower even than in Bulgaria, Latvia and Ro-
mania (Fig. 7). Both India and China are rapidly growing production 
and IT service centers, while Russia is attracting considerable inward 
investment because it combines a huge internal market for goods and 
services with very low wage costs. 
Fig. 7. Median gross weekly private sector earnings in 2006, Germany =100%
Source: FedEE, Pay in Europe 2006, www.fedee.com
There are a number of other 
stringent issues the Romanian 
Government must be working 
on, in particular the main 
four sectors that are heavily 
dragging down the economy 
productivity. These are the 
Stringent issues:
• Agriculture
• Energy intensiveness
• Infrastructure
• Tourism
• Education
• Research and innovation
6 FedEE, Pay in Europe 2006, www.fedee.com
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agriculture, energy, and tourism industries, along with the lack 
of a proper infrastructure base:
• The economy is currently heavily agrarian. Over 10% of Ro-
manian GDP comprises agricultural production, as opposed to around 
2% in EU (e.g. 3% in Poland). Additionally, one third of the Romanian 
population is employed in agriculture and primary production, one of 
the highest rates in Europe. But its share in exports is insigniﬁcant.
However, agriculture is the main destination for the European struc-
tural funds. If we take also into consideration the low price of arable 
land and the investments forecasted in rural agriculture, this sector be-
comes one of the most attractive economic branches, with a substantial 
growth potential in the future. 
• Energy intensiveness of the Romanian economy is four times 
higher than the EU-25 average7. This lack of efﬁciency appears at the
production, the distribution and the consumption levels as well. The 
on-going liberalization process has not yet yielded an efﬁcient market
with competitive prices; 
• Tourism in Romania has a three times lower contribution to the 
economy than in countries like Spain, Italy, and Greece, where tourism 
is an important economic asset. Its weight in exports is 2.5 lower than 
in the EU-25. Bulgaria was early to understand this opportunity and 
reacted accordingly, adjusting their offer to Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which are by far the biggest spenders. Romania should capi-
talize mainly its business tourism, spa and agro-tourism assets.
• With only 200 km of highways, Romania is far behind Hungary 
or Poland and this puts a signiﬁcant upward pressure on infrastructure and
transportation costs. With an economy in expansion, the necessities related 
to the transport infrastructure development are very high. The government 
has developed a very ambitious strategy for the next ten years, based on:
- the modernization of the road network - a special atten-
tion will be paid to highway construction (approximately 
1050 km);
- ensuring the railways’ interoperability (reaching 1100 kil-
ometers in length);
7 Atlas method of World Bank, 2005
- increasing of the merchandise trafﬁc in internal and mari-
time ports, as well as the modernizing of airport equip-
ment and facilities in four airports of national interest (de-
livering services to 11.3 million travelers a year). 
Moreover, in an increasingly knowledge-based economy, human 
capital education and life-long learning are key factors linked to econom-
ic success, productivity, social cohesion, full employment and a better 
quality of life and work. Yet, the education and research sector remains 
severely unreformed - unlinked to the market needs and future labour 
markets dynamics - despite the recent substantial improvements in the al-
located funds. 2007 budget increases education spending to 5.2% of GDP, 
more in line with “old Europe”, as well as to 0,56% of GDP for research, 
development and innovation (RDI). The quality improvements are still 
expected. For example, the Romanian universities are lagging much be-
hind the performance of top 500 universities worldwide (according to 
the Shanghai classiﬁcation, 2006). Only one out of ten Romanians over 
25 has a tertiary education, half the average EU-25 level. The propensity 
towards life-long learning is even four times lower than in the EU.
Romania’s innovation performance remains very weak8. Thus, 
Romania ranks 2nd to last out of 33 countries. Only two indicators are 
above the EU average: the percentage of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) that have introduced non-technical change and the new-to-mar-
ket product sales. Innovation is mainly limited by the poor implementa-
tion of intellectual property rights, by the low levels of life-long learn-
ing, by the inadequate supply of venture capital funding, by the public 
and private expenditures for RDI, by the state aid for innovation, by 
the exports of high-tech products, and by the weight of expenses with 
communication and information technologies in the GDP, of the new to 
ﬁrm product sales9. Actually, 83% of the Romanian companies are non-
innovative, 3% are strategic innovators and only 2% implement new 
technologies.10 There is little innovation and, as a consequence, there 
are few industries using new technology intensively. 
8 The Romanian aggregate innovation index is 38% of the EU and in the last year, Romania was still 
losing some ground, being part of the ‘non catching–up’ group of countries, according to the European 
Trendchart – Romania 2005 (European Commission, January, 2006).
9 European Innovation Scoreboard , European Commission, 2006
10 CIS 3 Report of the National Institute of Statistics , European Commission, 2006
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Romania is committed to increasing the public funding for RDI up 
to 1% of the GDP by 2010. Many challenges are left to be addressed. 
Until now, in developing the innovation capacity, the public policies have 
focused on strengthening the human resources and the research capacity 
in the research institutes and the university sectors. Fewer measures were 
geared towards the development of innovative performance in industry. 
The private spending of 2% in the GDP is actually a utopia and it 
will remain unchanged, unless the presence of public instruments to 
support it. At least four business RDI challenges should be addressed:
• The very low level of public funding of innovation (only 10% 
of innovative ﬁrms receiving funding);
• The very low levels of innovation expenditures (3% of the in-
novative ﬁrms’ turnover);
• The failure to commercialize R&D breakthroughs;
• The weak innovation culture in the country.
Moreover, as presented earlier, almost 
half of the export capacity is signiﬁcantly re-
liant on basic commodities (i.e. ores, coal and 
salt), cheap textile and footwear products, and 
other low-tech industries. Moving up further 
the value chain to an increased contribution 
of services and higher-tech industries will be necessary, as less skilled 
work is low labour costs dependent in preserving its competitive ad-
vantage. Newly announced engineering and software development cent-
ers by multinational ﬁrms, for example, are encouraging in this respect.
They are to take advantage of the high level of  information technology 
and communication (ITC) engineers per capita, more than anywhere 
else in the world besides India. Diversifying the economy, particularly 
developing the IT sector, is a key knowledge-economy goal. 
The ITC is one of the most dynamic economic sector and a rel-
evant competitive asset in EU-27. Increasing four times in the last 
seven years (2000 – 2006, and with 25% during 2005-2006), its ac-
tual contribution to GDP is 4.2%11. Telecom services predominates 
Moving up the 
value chain 
in production and 
exports
11 ITC share in the total number of active companies is 3% and in the total number of employees 2.3% in the 
(3.1% in GDP), followed by software and hardware industries (with 
0,8%, respectively 0,25% in GDP). Further development opportuni-
ties comes from the less ITC expenditures than half of EU-15 aver-
age (3% in GDP). As a consequence of the low level of domestic 
demand, Romania is a net software exporter (three times higher than 
imports), but still a net importer of hardware products. Industry spe-
cialists agree that the current software export growth is fueled by 
the major offshore and services centers, as well as from domestic 
companies offering patented software products, services and busi-
ness process outsourcing. 
In a high-tech local industry 
emergence, four evolution stages in 
climbing the ladder of know-how 
have been identiﬁed in the Romanian
post-communist business environment 
– endowed with highly-skilled labour 
force, but lacking an open market and management knowledge: 
- The research and development division of a foreign compa-
ny;
- Software outsourcing provider for foreign companies;
- Complex software solutions provider and owner of a portfolio 
with copyrighted products – entering successfully the regional 
competition;
- Acquisitions of local players by international competitors fol-
low as an attempt to cope with the increased world-wide com-
petition.
Romania is a highly attractive outsourcing market. Many western 
companies have taken an interest in either investing or setting up 
partnerships with local software companies. Oracle, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, Microsoft are strong global players present on 
the Romanian software market and Canon CEE GMBH, Fujitsu 
Siemens, HP, IBM, Intel Corporation, Konica Minolta, Philips or 
Xerox on the hardware market. Major Romanian IT clusters have 
developed around the large cities. They rely on the output of the IT/
science universities (i.e. graduating software engineers) to support 
Against all odds:
the rise of software 
industry in Romania.
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their growth. Labour demand is however increasing much faster 
than the overall number of IT graduates per year (around 7000). 
The education system reform should address this issue.
Fig. 8. IT clusters in Romania
Problema  rezolutiei  mai bune incercati sa o 
rezolvati direct de la sursa net: 
http://rbd.doingbusiness.ro/anis_romania_
software_sept06.htm
sau: 
Am atasat si formatul sau JPEG langa doc.
Source: The Employer’s Association of the Software and Services Industry, 2006
For comparison, the pharmaceuticals market turnover was simi-
lar to the software industry, but with a signiﬁcantly lower growth rate
(17% annually, during 1999 - 2005). Strong multinational players enter 
the market, highlighting again the development opportunities. Expend-
iture per capita on healthcare is still more than six times lower than in 
the EU-25 and the drug consumption is among the lowest in Europe 
(less than half in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland; 14% of 
the EU average). However, imports account for 20% in consumption, 
being concentrated on more sophisticated, patent-protected, drugs. 
Meanwhile, the domestic producers largely focus on the production of 
low-value generic drugs.
Overall, the large Romanian con-
sumer market - with 4.4% in the EU-27 
population - is ongoing expansion, so that 
the local demand is the main contributor 
to GDP growth, unlike the EU-25, where 
the exports dominate. The contribution 
of foreign demand (export-import) to the 
real GDP increase has remained negative (-4.4%). 
The strong wage and credit growth fuels this excess demand, 
pushing the annual current-account deﬁcit above 10% of GDP. Given
the expectation of signiﬁcant revenue from privatization and inﬂows
of foreign direct investment such levels have proven so far sustainable. 
Nevertheless, the expected decline in privatization receipts in 2007-
2008 seems to increase Romania’s external vulnerability, unless the 
domestic producers overcome the disadvantaged position relative to 
the imported goods. In certain economic sectors – such as industry and 
energy – prices tend to adjust faster to the EU, increasing the utilities’ 
and other intermediary products’ costs. Another serious consideration 
for exporters competing in European markets is the substantial real 
exchange rate appreciation, accompanied by strong wage growth, that 
damaged proﬁtability and competitiveness in some sectors. In 2005,
these pressures were higher than in many other member states. Higher 
interest rates, the full liberalization of the capital account and a gen-
erally positive view of Romania’s prospects after EU accession will 
stimulate further the speculative capital inﬂows in 2007-2008. How-
ever, modest real appreciation is expected. 
The central bank met its 5% year-end target for inﬂation in 2006,
but raised its forecast for 2007 inﬂation from 4% to 4.4%. This meas-
ure issues an even stronger warning about upward pressures, including 
rapid growth in aggregate demand. High levels of public consumption 
and investment activity in 2007-2008 will lead to expansionary ﬁscal
policy. Investment activity is the main engine of growth, as new and 
Domestic 
production 
outpaced by the 
local consumption
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modernized production facilities come online and large public invest-
ment projects get under way. In this context, prudence in wage policies 
and productivity gains are strongly recommended. 
We cannot improve national competi-
tiveness, without overcoming the ongoing 
obstacles, for which Romania was many 
times criticised for being EU-compliant 
only on paper. It is mainly the corruption, 
the unreformed public administration, the 
legislation of low quality and low predict-
ability, the relatively rigid employment 
laws, and low investor protection that in-
duce higher costs in the business environ-
ment.
Social conditions remain challeng-
ing in many parts of the country. Poverty 
persists in the country, with over 15% of 
the population living below the poverty line. Two-thirds of Romania’s 
poor live in rural areas. Risks of job losses are likely especially in these 
areas, where small and medium enterprises are unready for the Euro-
pean competition. Training skilled workers and attracting investment 
outside Bucharest will be crucial goals in the struggle to diminish the 
regional gaps and keep up high long-run economic growth. 
Ongoing problems:
• Public 
administration
• Legislation 
quality
• Labour Code 
traps
• Corruption
• Poverty
• Rural 
development
Romanian Competitiveness landscape in 2006
Strengths and opportunities:
• Solid macroeconomic policy;
• 7th largest member of the European 
internal market;
• Flat tax rate of 16%;
• Low unemployment;
• Increasing living standards and 
number of employees; 
• The deﬂation process looks sus-
tainable; 
• Large and expanding consumer 
market; 
• Short-term competitive wage 
advantage;
• Relevant business environment 
improvements;
• Selected successful manufacturing 
sectors, such as the rapidly developing 
ITC sector;
• Relative lower government inter-
vention in the economy;
• Positive trend of SMEs develop-
ment;
• Liberalization of telecommunica-
tions market. 
• Established industrial and technol-
ogy parks, incubators and clusters;
• Member of CEECs – fastest 
economic growth region in the world 
the next ﬁve years – expanding the
prospective regional demand;
• Signiﬁcant sources for investments
from structural and cohesion Euro-
pean ﬁnancial instruments;
• Potential regional hub in gas and 
energy transport;
• ITC export development and 
branding; 
• Ending the privatization process 
and focus on attracting high-technol-
ogy greenﬁeld investments;
• Supply chain for foreign compa-
nies, following the Barcelona target 
of 3% for RDI in GDP, but the low 
domestic demand for RDI;
• Competitive markets regulations 
improvements;
• Service sector liberalization in EU-
27, reaping the cross-border invest-
ments advantages;
• Increased export potential, accord-
ing to the National Export Strategy;
• Signiﬁcant agricultural and tour-
ism export potential.
• Niche tourist destinations.
Weaknesses and threats:
• Reinforcement of position and image as a 
low value-added economy;
• Loss of competitiveness if the wage and 
other inputs costs increase is not surpassed by 
labour productivity;
• Price convergence with EU and risk of in-
vestments reallocations to lower costs regions;
• High losses in electricity/thermal energy, oil 
and gas transport and distribution networks and 
thus high costs for the business sector; 
• High energy intensity of the economy;
• The lack of objective, relevant microeco-
nomic data to analyze competitiveness and 
track the impact of competitiveness efforts; 
few independent research organization separate 
from the government to tackle the issue;
• The ability to implement and enforce policies 
and ensure a stable policy environment for busi-
ness is weak;
• The legal system still suffers from low cred-
ibility in terms of predictable and fair applica-
tion of the law;
• High share of traditional agriculture in GDP;
• Increasing trade deﬁcit;
• Limited entrepreneurial culture;
• Poor SMEs access to business ﬁnance and
services;
• Under developed ITC infrastructure and 
services;
• Undemanding home consumer market;
• Old technology / high costs of non-labour 
inputs;
• Low level of inputs for education and RDI 
sector, but even lower outputs quality - weak 
connections to real economy;
• Weak development of Technology Transfer 
and RD infrastructure;
• Migration abroad of highly-skilled labour-
fource;
• Relative low share of population with 
completed higher education; low propensity to 
life-long learning;
• Weak tourism infrastructure and poor 
marketing;
• Competitiveness gap between urban and 
rural areas; 
• Administrative barriers to business and traps 
in the Labour Code;
• Lack of capacities in managing properly 
the European funds for improving economic 
competitiveness;
• Romania perceived as the EU member with 
the highest level of corruption.
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IV. Benchmarking Romanian and Bulgarian competitive-
ness performance
Monitoring the international comparisons of national competitive-
ness factors proves helpful in obtaining a clearer picture of Romania’s 
position and of the trends in the global and European economy. Bul-
garia is used as a benchmark because of the progress similarities under 
the competitive pressures of EU integration. 
Tab. 1. World rankings of Romania and Bulgaria in international reports, 2006
No. Competitiveness indicators
Ranking
Best performing
Romania Bulgaria
1. GDP at PPP1 44 66 USA
2. Population2 51 94 China
3. GDP at PPP / capita2 65 64 Luxembourg
4. Global competitiveness3 68 72 Switzerland
5. World competitiveness4 57 - -
6. Exports 2 55 69 EU
7. Exports/capita 2 60 58 Singapore
8. Imports 2 44 65 USA
9. Human development 5 60 54 Norway
10. Quality of life 6 58 - Ireland
11. Corruption perception 7 84 57 Finland, Island, New Zeeland
12. Economic freedom 8 92 64 Hong Kong
13. Economic Globalization9 30 - Singapore
14. Ease of doing business10 49 54 Singapore
15. Innovation capacity11 32 26 Sweden
16. Bertelsmann Economic transformation index12 19 16 Slovenia
17. FDI performance index 13 24 9 Azerbaijan 
18. Agricultural output 14 32 76 China
19. Industrial output15 53 72 EU
20. Services output15 50 67 USA
21. Electricity consumption 16 41 55 USA
22. Natural gas consumption 17 32 55 USA
23. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita 18 84 71 United States Virgin Islands
Sources: 
1. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, estimations for 2006 
– out of 176 countries;
2. CIA World Facts Book 2006 – out of 232 countries;
3. World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 – out of 125 
countries;
4. IMD International: World Competitiveness Yearbook 2006 – out of 61 economies;
5. Human Development Report 2006 – out of 177 countries;
6. The Economist: The World in 2005 - Worldwide quality-of-life index, 2005 - out of 111 
countries
7. Transparency International: Global Perception Report 2006 – out of 163 countries;
8. Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom 2006 – out of 161 countries;
9. AT Kearney: Foreign Policy Globalization Index 2006 – out of 62 countries;
10. World Bank,  Doing Business in 2006 – out of 175 countries;
11. European Commission: European Innovation Scoreboard 2006 – out of 33 European 
countries;
12. Bertelsmann ”Economic Transformation“ index, 2006 - – out of 119 economies;
13. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Foreign Direct Investment 
Performance Index 2006 - out of 141 economies
14. CIA World Facts Book 2006 – out of 162 countries;
15. CIA World Facts Book 2006 – out of 163 countries;
16.CIA World FactBook 2006 – out of 196 countries;
17. CIA World FactBook 2006 – out of 213 countries;
18. US Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) for 
the United Nations Statistics Division – out of 182 countries.
The most comprehensive reports on com-
petitiveness are those conducted by the World 
Economic Forum, in its Global Competitive-
ness Report, and the Institute for Management 
Development, in its World Competitiveness Yearbook. Romania ranks 68, 
respectively 57, far behind the other CEECs. The Global Competitiveness 
Index - made up of over 90 variables - measures the set of institutions, poli-
cies, and factors that lead to sustainable current and medium-term levels of 
economic prosperity.”12 The variables are organized into nine pillars, each 
representing an area considered as an important determinant of competitive-
ness. The World Competitiveness Yearbook, with its 312 criteria, describes 
how nations and ﬁrms perform in creating and utilizing their wealth.
What are the 
rankings about?
12 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-07 
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Somewhat similar annual reports are the Ease of Doing Business 
Index and the Indices of Economic Freedom. 
There are various criticisms. For example, any positive effect that 
a low level of taxes might have is much more disputed than the im-
portance of rule of law, lack of political corruption, low inﬂation, and
functioning property rights. Some of the highest ranking countries 
in the economic freedom index, like Iceland (5), Denmark (8), Fin-
land (12) or Sweden (19) are widely recognized as having some of the 
world’s most extensive welfare states, which are strongly opposed by 
advocates of laissez-faire.
The proponents of the Ease of Doing Business Index argue that the ef-
fect of business regulations is more important than government consump-
tion. The Global Competitiveness Report looks at several other factors that 
also affect economic growth such as infrastructure, health, and education. 
The World Bank is a strong supporter of the importance of economic 
growth for reducing poverty. However, the World Bank does not believe 
that laissez-faire policies are an effective way to achieve this goal if they 
allow large inequalities of wealth to develop.
The intensity and magnitude of the economic transformation (and 
political as well) is still relevant for the post-transition economies and 
it is measured by the Bertelsmann index.  Slovenia, Estonia and Czech 
Republic are the best consolidated market-based economies. Romania 
is the last in the group of market-based economies, in process of con-
solidation, but lagging behind Bulgaria.
Romania improved almost all its competitiveness factors, climb-
ing in the international rankings last year (except from the Global com-
petitiveness, Starting a business, Enforcing contracts – descending in 
each ranking 1 position, Getting credits – 7 positions). Pre-conditions 
are favorable for medium- and long-term economic development. Stra-
tegic investors are adjusting their perception of risk, according to the 
votes of conﬁdence received lately:
• World Bank ranked Romania on the 2nd place worldwide in 
terms of speed and quality of reforming the business environ-
ment and 1st in Europe. However, Romania stands at the 49th 
place in terms of ease of doing business in 2006.
• Again, Romania ranked 2nd in 
the top of economic transforma-
tion most-improved countries in 
terms of according to the Bertels-
mann index, after Pakistan;
• In terms of foreign direct invest-
ments performance, Romania 
ranks 24 in a list of 141 countries, 
benchmarked by the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), up 7 
positions from the last year – the 
favorable legislative framework
and the ﬂat tax rate of 16% have been the main reasons for these changes.
• Moody’s upgraded the foreign currency long-term debt rating 
to Baa3 - “investment grade” - from Ba1.
Even so, Tab. 1 reveals that Romania is still lagging behind not only 
the other EU-25 members, but Bulgaria as well. Valuable exceptions are: 
• the global competitiveness – because of the Bulgarian fall by 
11 positions in the 2006 rankings;
• ease of doing business – explained by the Romanian jump of 
22 positions in comparison to only 5 for Bulgaria in 2006; 
a competitive advantage of the business environment places 
Romania on the 7th place for starting a business, relative to the 
Bulgarian’s 85th. Still, the latter’s better performance in inno-
vation, getting credits, registering property, closing a business 
etc. is associated with a higher performance of Bulgaria in 
attracting the foreign direct investments.
Actually, both countries have a long way towards convergence 
with the living standards of the most developed countries, from the 
size of GDP to the level of carbon dioxide emissions per capita.
Romanian Context: 
work in process
… performers in 
recovering the business 
environment quality, the 
economic freedom…
… need for major 
improvement in all 
competitiveness factors.
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V. Economic competitiveness policy-making
Few policy-making Romanian initiatives have been related in the 
last years to the sectoral competitiveness perspectives, and not a broad 
national approach, with rather hectic impact on the whole economy:
• National Export Strategy 2006 – 2009; 
• National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation 2004 
– 2006, respectively 2007 – 2013.
• National Program to Increase the Competitiveness of Roma-
nian Industry Products 2002 – 2005 and 2006 – present;
• Sectoral Plan for RDI in Industry 2006 – 2008.
The Romanian integration to EU brings an element of relative in-
novation in public-policy making concerns. The preparation of coher-
ent, comprehensive, long-term national development strategies in the 
EU-12, and in Romania in particular, is the ﬁrst opportunity for draft-
ing strategies linked to clear and certain resources.
One such strategy is the National De-
velopment Plan for 2007-2013 (NDP 2007-
2013), focusing on the sustained economic 
growth and competitiveness as the ﬁrst Ro-
manian Government’s priority. Its  strategic 
vision rely on narrowing the GDP per capita 
gap relative to EU average by at least 10% 
in the next 7 years. The competitiveness ob-
jective is addressed by the National Strategic 
Reference Framework 2007 – 2013 (NSRF 
2007-2013), which is however rooted in the 
NDP 2007-2013 policy-mix. 
Two shortcomings of the national competitiveness strategy are ob-
vious. First, it gives priority only to the public investments for devel-
opment, addressing only those objectives that are compatible with the 
intervention areas of the Structural  and Cohesion Funds. The funds 
to be allocated are worth 58.7 billion Euro, of with 43% are coming 
from the EU budget. However, this plan cannot replace a national com-
petitiveness strategy, and this is where the Government  efforts should 
focus in the post-accession period.  
The strategic 
vision of the NDP 
for 2007 – 2013 is:
to reduce the 
GDP per capita 
gap relative 
to EU average 
with at least 10 
percentage points.
Second, if beneﬁts are to be drawn from joining the EU, the Roma-
nian Government should develop a much longer-term strategic vision, 
focusing on maintaining a high annual economic growth rate of at least 
7% for the next three decades (from an average of only 5.5% during 
2000-2006). This may guarantee a real catching-up with the EU in the 
next 25-30 years. To achieve this target, we need a more productive econ-
omy through efﬁcient resource allocation, higher national and foreign
direct investments and a high technology-based business environment. 
V.1. Settings priorities
Member states are designing strategies in different policy contexts, 
with different priorities, and different implementation challenges. 
There are three broad groups of strategies identiﬁed by the European 
Policies Research Centre, depending on the main goal set by each na-
tional government:
• convergence strategies – EU-12 new mem-
ber countries;
• regional competitiveness strategies - many 
EU-15 old member countries
• “mixed” strategies - Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain.
The priorities of Romania’s competitiveness strategy follow close-
ly the characteristics of the ﬁrst group of strategies.
Seven sectoral instru-
ments (Operational Programs 
- OPs) are called to achieve 
the national interlinked pri-
orities of the NSRF with the 
EU. One of these is aimed 
squarely at boosting econom-
ic competitiveness:  The Sec-
toral Operational Program 
“Increase of Economic Com-
petitiveness” (SOP IEC). 
Different 
competitiveness 
policy contexts 
and priorities 
in European 
countries.
Competitiveness priority setting 
for 2007 – 2013 in Romanian:
… average annual growth of 
GDP per employed person by 
about 5.5%...
…reaching 55% of the EU 
average productivity by 2013.
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Its objective is to increase Romanian economic productivity by an 
annual average of 5.5%, reducing the disparities to the average produc-
tivity of EU. Considering that labour productivity in European Union 
will increase until 2013 by an average of 1% per year, this target will 
allow Romania to attain  55% of EU average productivity by 2013. This 
will be achieved by concentrating efforts on six priority items:
1. An innovative productive system;
2. Research, Technological Development, and Innovation for Com-
petitiveness;
3. ITC for private and public sectors;
4. Increased energy efﬁciency and sustainable development of the
energy system;
5. Promoting Romania as an attractive destination for tourism and 
businesses;
6. Technical Assistance
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) contribution 
to this objective, of 2.55 billion Euros for 2007-2013, represents 13.3% 
of the Community contribution to the Romanian NSRF. About twice 
as much EU funding is dedicated to the upgrade of transport infra-
structure, followed closely by the environmental protection program. 
Regional and human resource development objectives each receive ap-
proximately 50% more funding than competitiveness (Fig. 9).
Within the competitiveness objective, priority item 1 beneﬁts from
the most substantial ﬁnancial allocation (31%) of total ERDF funds 
(Fig. 10 and 11 for sources of funding to each priority item). 
Fig. 9. NSRF allocations by operational programs in Romania, 2007 – 2013
Source: Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2006
Fig. 10. ERDF funds allocation to the competitiveness priority axis, 2007 – 2013 
(representing about 83% of the total ERDF allocation to Romania)
Axis legend:
1. An innovative productive 
system
2. Research, Technological 
Development, and 
Innovation for 
Competitiveness
3. ITC for private and public 
sectors
4. Increased energy 
efﬁciency and sustainable
development of the energy 
system
5. Romania, an attractive 
destination for tourism and 
businesses
6. Technical Assistance
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Fig. 11. Priority axes by source of funding, during 2007 - 2013 (Million EURO)
Source: Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2006
The relative importance given to the competitiveness operational 
program through the allocations of European funds (ERDF+ESF+CF) 
is higher in Romania than in Poland, but lower than in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, or Latvia (Tab. 2). Ireland is men-
tioned as a “best practices” example in EU funding public management 
in most of the specialized studies on this issue. Its experience is outstand-
ing in integrating community assistance within a coherent, macro-eco-
nomic policy framework, supported by social consensus. The Irish have 
established human resources ﬁnancing as a priority in the last decade,
with a weight of 35% in the total structural funds, as compared to a 25% 
average in the other European states, for education and training (Fig.12).
Tab. 2. Allocations of EU funds for competitiveness during 2007 – 2013
Total 
EU 
funds
(Bill. 
Euro)
Out of which the competitiveness programs:
Poland 55,34 12,7% Economic competitiveness
Romania 19,2 13,3% Economic competitiveness
Bulgaria 5,94 14,2% Competitiveness
Estonia - 14,8%
Entrepreneurship - 13,7%
Research and development - 11%tt
Czech Republic 26,61
18% Entrepreneurship and innovation - 12%
Research, development and innovation - 6%
Latvia 4 19,2% Competitiveness and knowledge economy
Slovakia 10 20,8% Innovation and knowledge-based economy
Hungary - 31,27%
Economic competitiveness, including here-in 
the 20% allocated to transport.
Source: Data from the CEE Bankwatch Network, March 2006
Fig. 12. GDP trends after accession
Source: Calculations based on statistical data provided by EUROSTAT, 2006
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V.2. Territorial dimension of investments in innovation
The competitiveness sectoral program does not focus the priority-
settings and ﬁnancial efforts on poles of growths, nor on disadvantaged,
urban or rural arrears, despite the Romanian peculiarities (relevant en-
dowments with agricultural, natural resources and tourism potential, 
huge gaps in regional distribution of income, enterprises, research and 
development capacity, the dominance of rural social challenges etc.). 
The capacity of the regions to develop and implement innovation poli-
cies depends not only on their own strenghts and weaknesses, but also 
on the diversity of the national regulatory environments and on the 
extent of co-operation between the major stakeholders at this level. 
Actually, direct grants to enterprises are 
the most important Romanian approach to 
improve their capacity in RDI absorption. 
The Government motivation for this 
course of action resides in the fact that the 
entire territory of Romania is under the 
convergence objective and this strategy 
is in accordance with the European guidelines’ proposals. This 
approach is also extended to the energy, traditional and SMEs 
sectors who are exposed to global competition, and must therefore 
make additional efforts to remain competitive. 
Direct support is combined with several actions reinforcing business 
support services, in both the supply and the demand sides, in order to 
foster entrepreneurship and R&D activities and promote the information 
society. The need for infrastructural endowments in remote areas (for 
ITC) and interconnections (for energy) is also particularly emphasized 
if Romania is to become a more attractive place to invest and work. 
At the European level different approaches envisage a territorial 
dimension. Some countries focus on:
• areas of potential – growth poles, competitiveness poles 
and excellence poles: e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland;
Preeminence of 
direct grants to 
enterprises and 
several business 
support services in 
Romania
• disadvantaged areas, with preferential allocations or criteria: 
e.g. Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia; 
• support for speciﬁc types of territory:
- urban areas: city regions (UK); urban districts (Czech 
Rep); major urban areas (Belgium, Finland); cities and 
urban systems (Italy); gateway towns (Ireland); sustain-
able urban centres (Greece);
- rural areas (Czech Rep, Greece, Poland, Spain);
- peripheral areas (Finland, France);
- islands (Malta);
• territorial, multi-regional operational programs (Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania).
Therefore, there is no single “miracle strategy” to make economies 
more innovative. The key European Commission recommendations for 
the next programming period (2007 - 2013) are13:
• To identify a limited number of priorities for regional innovation 
policies, where the region can develop a competitive position;
• To focus support more on the demand than supply side of in-
novation;
• To balance the technology focus with other forms of innovation;
• To invest sufﬁciently in human capital;
• To ensure better co-ordination of innovation policies.
Overall, the implementation responsibility rests with the Manag-
ing Authority of the Competitiveness Operational Program, within the 
Ministry of Economy and Trade. It has to remain constantly alert to 
ensure that the directives set out in the National Strategic Reference 
Frameworks are actually implemented. There is also a further need for 
actions at the operational level:
• To establish transparent and efﬁcient selection systems for
projects to be funded;
• To introduce a degree of ﬂexibility and risk in policy planning;
13 European Commission, Directorate-general Regional policy: Innovation in the National Strategic 
Reference Frameworks, 31 October 2006
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• To improve the monitoring and evaluation culture to increase 
the value-added of interventions.
Competitiveness must also become a bottom-up process. The cen-
tral Government is the only driving the policy proposals, decisions 
and incentives. Roles and responsibilities must be decentralized, so 
that Romanian economic development rely on a collaborative process, 
involving government at multiple levels, companies, teaching and re-
search institutions, and other institutions. Individuals, companies, and 
institutions should undertake this responsibility.
VI. Final policy recommendations
a) Efﬁcient use of European Funds for improving the business
competitiveness:
The use of Structural and Cohesion Funds in improving the busi-
ness competitiveness is subject to shifting priorities at the European 
level that must be taken into consideration. There has been a deempha-
sis from a focus on…
• general business investment support (often through grant 
schemes), especially for new start-ups and SMEs;
• provision of premises, creation or equipping of business cen-
tres;
• site (re)development / rehabilitation,
… towards more support for:
• inter-ﬁrm cooperation / business networks;
• advisory/counselling services to business (esp. strategic plan-
ning, internationalisation);
• integrated, multi-service business support within business 
centres;
• targeted start-up support (university graduates, young entre-
preneurs, women, innovative activities, employment-intensive 
growth areas);
• micro-enterprises’ and community enterprises’ access to ﬁnance.
These are part of long-term trends in regional policies.
b) Efﬁcient use of European Funds for more and better jobs:
Shifts from:
• general skills-based training measures (employed / unem-
ployed);
• sector-speciﬁc training programs;
• investment in the training infrastructure;
towards more support for:
• targeted training on speciﬁc groups – i.e. women, youth, disa-
bled, immigrants;
• development of new training methods (ITC teaching tech-
niques, distance learning, Human Resource Development 
management);
• training related to innovation and ITC.
c) Efﬁcient use of European Funds for innovation and the knowl-
edge economy:
Shifts from:
• investment in Research – Technology - Development Infra-
structure (RTDI) - science parks, technology centres, univer-
sity facilities;
• incentives for business R&D and innovation;
• business-research links;
towards more support for:
• integrated support (regional innovation system approach) – re-
search services, entrepreneurship, training, business advice;
• broadening of business-research links towards innovation 
networks;
• ITC access/use by businesses (e-commerce), communities, 
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public sector;
• access to specialist ﬁnance (risk capital, venture capital, seed
capital);
• environmental RTDI;
• human capital – training of researchers.
d) Efﬁcient use of European Funds for environmental sustainability:
While signiﬁcant support is still needed for:
• environmental infrastructure projects (e.g. waste-processing);
• clean-up and rehabilitation of derelict / contaminated sites;
• protection / enhancement of areas of ecological interest;
more support for is necessary in the meantime:
• company-based environmental and energy management,
• development of green areas, outdoor space, natural parks, pro-
tected areas;
• investment in renewable energy sources;
• sustainable development management/monitoring projects;
• preservation of biodiversity / wildlife.
e) Romania needs to improve its competitive standing and be-
come one of the top 30 in the global rankings 
National public and private funds should accompany the Euro-
pean support for improving the competitiveness factors. It may not be 
possible to excel in every indicator. But government policies should 
adapt the development strategies by managing not only the domestic 
resources and competencies, but also by adapting to global changes. 
This will mean adopting the worldwide best practices for each compe-
tition factor that may be improved. Raising competitiveness will bring 
improvements in international rankings and, more importantly, deeper 
integration with the developed economies.
f) The road to adding higher value
Rather than try to win back low-wage and low-skill assembly jobs, 
Romanian Government should undertake three essential steps to fur-
ther the economic development: 
• encourage the transition to higher-value-added activities, 
• identify and exploit our comparative advantage (e.g.  highly 
educated and moderately paid Romanian scientists and en-
gineers), and 
• push forward with reforms that create more competition, 
entrepreneurship, and ﬂexibility.
The expansion into higher-value-added activities comes not from 
a shift into entirely new industries, such as high tech, biotech, or na-
notech, but from the natural evolution of companies within existing 
industries14. As low-skill, labor-intensive operations head elsewhere, 
Romania should resist the temptation to try to lure them back with 
tax breaks or other ﬁnancial incentives. Such initiatives are not likely
to inﬂuence foreign investment signiﬁcantly and won’t compensate
for rising wage rates over the longer term. In some cases they can 
lead to counterproductive overinvestment. Instead Romanian Gov-
ernment might use the funds to improve the transportation networks, 
the power grids, and the telecommunications lines. A strategic di-
rection should focus on capturing in Romania to a larger extent the 
new wave of the outsourcing in high value added manufacturing, in 
research and development, as well as in shared services moving to 
the CEECs. Beyond that, policy makers must boost competition in 
the broader economy so that companies are compelled to improve 
their operations, to adopt best practices and to innovate. Predicting 
changes in the business sectors is also to become an integral and ex-
plicit step in public policy making.
g) Build a Romanian Competitiveness Institute (RCI)
RCI should become a think-tank, based on a public-private partner-
14 In northern Italy’s textile and apparel industry, for example, the majority of garment production 
has moved to lower-cost locations, but employment remains stable because companies have put more 
resources into tasks such as designing clothes and coordinating global production networks. A similar 
series of events has played out in other countries developing around the world: companies start out in the 
simple, labor-intensive parts of an industry but over time hone their skills to compete in more proﬁtable
areas, such as marketing, product design, and the manufacture of sophisticated intermediate inputs.
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ship, focused on the current and forthcoming economic policies15. It should 
build capacity in order to address the following questions in a meaningful 
way, and assist decision makers with informed policy options:
• What is the impact of current policies on the Romanian econ-
omy competitiveness?
• What roles should the country play in the European internal 
market?
• What unique or speciﬁc values can we provide for a business
location?
• For what range or types of businesses and functions can Ro-
mania be competitive?
The Romanian Competitiveness Institute should also become a 
central facilitator of the regional co-operation on competitiveness. The 
action plan should not be too sophisticated. We cannot however omit 
the huge need for developing a competitiveness research database and 
for case studies and international reports analyses. Last, but not least, 
RCI members should to undertake education and training programs, 
especially in microeconomic of competitiveness and public policy 
courses, exploring customized programs from European governments, 
while also looking to those from the USA, ASEAN or other countries. 
The necessary conditions for RCI success are: a strong leadership; 
world class research; clear intellectual framework; inclusiveness; per-
manence and independence.
15 Some countries have national competitiveness councils. Ireland (1997), Greece (2003), Croatia 
(2004) and the Philippines (2006) are just some examples that have advisory bodies or special govern-
ment agencies that tackle competitiveness issues. The latter came into being under the initiative and 
ﬁnancial support of the Philippine Exporters Confederation - the country’s biggest business group, as part
of the national action agenda to make it easier for business to operate efﬁciently.The older Irish National
Competitiveness Council uses a Competitiveness Pyramid structure to simplify the factors that affect 
national competitiveness. It distinguishes in particular between policy inputs in relation to the business 
environment, the physical infrastructure and the knowledge infrastructure and the essential conditions 
of competitiveness that good policy inputs create, including business performance metrics, productivity, 
labour supply and prices/costs for business.
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Annex 1. Macroeconomic indicators and the business environment
Indicators 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006e 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f
Gross Domestic 
Product
EUR 
Mill. 52,606 60,784 79,258 95,858 112,128 127,027 141,149 154,090
Economic growth % 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.3 4.1 7,0 6,5 6,3 5,9 5,6
Gross added value 
in industry % 4.4 5.1 4.6 6.8 2.5 6.4 4.8 5.2 5.4 5.6
Private sector in 
GDP % 68.0 69.4 67.7 72.2 70.4 71,4 - - - -
Domestic demand % 8.4 3.9 8.4 12.1 8.3 9.5 8.6 7.8 7.3 6.9
FOB Export EUR Mill. 12722.0 14675.0 15614.0 18934.7 22255.1 26100 30550 34750 39300 44400
CIF Import EUR Mill. 17383.0 18881.0 21201.0 26281.0 32568.5 40260 36100 52300 58790 65850
FOB / CIF trade 
balance 
EUR 
Mill. -4661.0 -4206.0 -5587.0 -7346.3 -10313.4 -14160 -15550 -17550 -19490 -21450
Foreign direct in-
vestments (Balance 
of Payments)
EUR 
Mill. 1312 1194 1910 5127 5237 8500 5800 5600 5600 5600
Inﬂation rate
(December / De-
cember)
% 30.3 17.8 14.1 9.3 8.6 4.7 4.5 3.5 3.0 2.5
Exchange rate 
RON/EUR* % 2.6027 3.1255 3.7556 4.0532 3.6234 3.525 3.43 3.38 3.35 3.35
Budgetary deﬁcit
in GDP % 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.1 0.8 1.4 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.0
Number of employ-
ees in economy, out 
of which:
1000 
pers. 4,619 4,568 4,591 4,469 4,559 4,615 4,745 4,825 4,900 4,960
• Industry (total), 
out of which:
% 41.2 41.4 40.3 39.0 36.7 35.5 34.6 33.8 33.0 32.4
- Extractive 
industry % 7.4 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3
- Processing 
industry % 83.6 84.3 85.6 85.7 85.2 85.6 85.7 85.9 86.1 86.3
- Electricity 
and heating energy, 
gas and water
% 8.9 8.5 7.5 7.6 8.0
8.0 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4
Unemployment rate
%, 
end 
of the 
pe-
riod
8.8 8.4 7.4 6.3 5.9 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.0 4.9
Labour productiv-
ity per employee, in 
industry
% 6.7 5.0 5.4 11.8 7.0 7.4 5.5 5.8 6.0 6.2
Average gross wage
• gross Euro 162 170 177 202 267 323 370 414 458 499
• real % 5.0 2.4 10.8 10.5 14.3 8.8 6.5 7.9 5.5 5.3
Unit labour cost
• nominal % 16.3 11.4 12.7 8.6 5.3 3.6 3.4 3.3
• real % -6.1 -3.2 0.6 -1.2 -1.4 -1.3 -0.5 -0.1
Notes: * preliminary estimations base on 2006 achievements.
Source: National Institute of Statistics, National Commission for Economic Forecasting, National Bank 
of Romania, Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments, The National Trade Register Ofﬁce, 2006
Romanian Brain Drain, Between Risk and Opportunity.
Case Study: Students Mobility 
Andreea Vass, Ph.D.
Researcher, Romanian Academy
Advisor, Department of Economic and Social Policies, Romanian 
Presidential Administration, Bucharest
KEY POINTS:
• 10 ttract over 75% of world’s brain drain out of the 2.6 mil-
lion students who study in a foreign university;
• 2% of European students do their studies in another Euro-
pean country. In 2004, 16000 Romanian students, countries 
aapproximately 2.4% of the entire Romanian student popula-
tion, were out of the country doing their studies in another 
European country. We have to keep in mind, however, that 
the total Romanian student population is signiﬁcantly smaller
compared to other European countries;
• Romania has too few students and university graduates. 1 
in 10 Romanians aged over 25, which is half the European av-
erage and one third of the American one, has post-secondary 
studies;
• Too few Romanians study in a foreign university: a little 
over 1 in 1000 Romanians, which is 3 times less than Bul-
garia; 
• Very few foreigners come to study in our country: we have 
9500 foreign students in public universities and 500 in private 
schools; half of foreign students in Romania come from the 
Republic of Moldova; by comparison 1% of all international 
students choose the Czech Republic or Hungary;
• No Romanian authority takes any interest in the 23000 Ro-
manian students who have left the country to study abroad 
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(out of which 16000 study in European countries). No one 
seems to want to know what their qualiﬁcations are, in what
ﬁeld, how many of them come back or how well integrated
they are by the Romanian society. They could make a differ-
ence for Romania’s scientiﬁc and technological progress;
• World Bank estimates that only 12% of returning Roma-
nians have obtained a university degree from abroad;
• Stubborn ignorance and complacency come at a great cost 
– these estimations are based on OCDE and EUROSTAT sta-
tistics, as neither the Ministry of Education, Research and 
Youth (MERY) nor the National Institute of Statistics, nor 
anyone else in this country for that matter, know exactly how 
many Romanian students study abroad;
• This matter deserves to be dealt with separately as a key point 
in Romania’s post E.U. accession strategy emphasizing the 
need to get as much support as possible in order to:
- Facilitate Romanian students’ access to foreign higher 
education institutes;
- Capitalize on Romanian students’ foreign university edu-
cation upon their return home.
It may come to no surprise to anyone that Romania has too few 
higher education graduates. Nor that the expenses for the higher 
education represent nearly the same amount per capita as in the 
other 25 E.U. countries, when adjusted for the differences in GDP. 
Nor that, according to international university rankings Roma-
nian universities score one of the lowest performance in Europe. 
Besides all that, today we risk that our best students migrate to 
western higher education schools without returning to their home 
country. A careful analysis of this phenomenon reveals an even 
harsher reality: statistics (per 1000 inhabitants) comparing youth 
from the other recent EU members to Romanian youth show that 
Romanians are in no rush to study abroad. Furthermore, accord-
ing to World Bank estimates, a merely 12% of all returning Ro-
manians come back with a university degree, which places us a 
long way behind Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries. 
(“Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union”, A. Mansoor, B. Quillin, 2007).
It is not difﬁcult to explain such an exodus of brains. On the one 
hand, gifted young people abroad ﬁnd themselves in an environment
that guarantees them high-quality education and internationally recog-
nized degrees. On the other hand, such students may be offered good 
ﬁnancial incentives and, for the most competent among them, the op-
portunity to advance their career within universities, research insti-
tutes or big multinational companies. It goes without saying that the 
receiving country draws great beneﬁts by capitalizing on these foreign
talents. If they do not return to their home countries, such countries 
lose a potential of added value that could help their societies’ devel-
opment. Such added value could be signiﬁcantly greater than the one
created by the rest of the population that does not have access to higher 
education. 
10 countries attract over 75% of world’s brain drain 
Some might say it is an easy lesson to learn. Yet, even developed 
countries have come to assimilate it relatively late and to various de-
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grees. Over one ﬁfth of the 2.6 million international students world-
wide are in the United States (22%, on a descending trend compared 
to previous years). This percentage remains unmatched even by adding 
up the next two countries’ brain drain ratios: the United Kingdom and 
Germany (11% and 10% respectively). If we add in France’s capacity 
to attract intelligence (9%), Australia’s, Canada’s, Japan’s (4% to 6%), 
Russian Federation’s, Belgium’s and Spain’s (1% to 3%), we come to 
the conclusion that these 10 countries’ high-performance knowledge 
centres attract over 75% of all migrating brains. Remarkably, there are 
17 American universities among the ﬁrst 20 ranked by the Shanghai
Top 500 World Universities. 
Direct academia investments explain, for the biggest part, the 
differences in higher education quality. In its turn, performance thus 
achieved prompts yearly growth of funds allocated to higher educa-
tion in most countries. However, there are different strategies when it 
comes to the role of public funds versus private funds in supporting 
higher education. In Korea, USA or Japan for instance, private invest-
ments are greater than public ones. In Austria, Germany, Denmark or 
Norway private funds play a minor role; what is more, in these coun-
tries private resources are used mostly to support pre-school education 
and signiﬁcantly less for higher education purposes.
However, the percentage of international students per univer-
sity reconﬁgures the above ranking. Thus, Australia, Switzerland,
Austria, New Zealand, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France have over 10% of foreign students in their total number of high-
er education students according to the latest OCDE statistics. Lately, 
this ranking includes the Czech Republic with 4% (more than USA 
– 3,5%), and Hungary with 3% of international students.
2% of European students study in another European country
With the Bologna Process, the European Union aims to create a 
European Higher Education Area which should promote intellectual, 
cultural and social values together with political and economical di-
mensions. Students and professors play a central part in this project. 
E.U. programs revolve around them providing a large framework of 
interdisciplinary and region-based cooperation. Results have already 
started to appear. According to EUROSTAT estimates, in UE-27 the 
number of young people who study in another European country grows 
annually by approximately 5%. Up to now, however, this growth has 
paralleled the general growth in the number of students, which means 
that the percentage of internationals has remained relatively constant 
- approximately 2% of the total number of students. The Cypriots and 
the Luxembourgers have been of course the most mobile students given 
the few local universities. Over 10% of Maltese students have studied 
abroad in another European country. They are followed by the Greeks, 
the Irish, the Slovaks, and the Bulgarians who are signiﬁcantly more
mobile than the rest of the Europeans (6% to 8%). At the other end, 
the Polish and the British are the least inclined to study abroad. 
Similarly, Romanians are in no rush to study in European 
higher education schools. If 10 years ago their number was signiﬁ-
cantly larger than the number of Bulgarian students abroad today the 
number of Romanian students in a European university barely reaches 
80% of the number of Bulgarians. Therefore, although our population 
is more than twice as big, the number of Bulgarian young people in a 
European university is bigger than ours by about 4500 students. More-
over, when it comes to registered international students in Romanian 
universities, we have about 1500 such students less than Bulgaria. 
Between 1998 and 2004 Bulgarian students’ mobility multiplica-
tion rate of 4 matched the Slovaks’, though indeed bigger than the rate 
of the new member states: 3 for Romanian students, 2.5 for the Czech 
and the Polish, and 1.5 for Hungarian students. 
How much does it cost to study abroad?
In 2004, of about 23000 Romanian students abroad, approxi-
mately 20% were attending universities in France, 18% in Germany, 
14% in USA, 13% in Hungary, 7% in Canada, 5% in Italy, 3% in 
the United Kingdom, 2% in Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium 
respectively, so on and so forth. Their mobility has been supported 
mostly through scholarship programs, subsidies and to a very small ex-
tent through loans. Private funding is rapidly becoming a viable source 
of ﬁnancial support as well.
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According to the average annual tuition fees in public colleges 
and universities in US dollars at the purchasing power parity exchange 
rate (source: OCDE), we can identify at least 6 groups of countries 
with their corresponding tuition rates: 
a. Countries without tuition fees: Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Island, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden;
b. 150 – 1000 USD: France, Hungary, Turkey; less than 500 
USD: Belgium, Austria, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland;
c. 1000 – 2000 USD: United Kingdom, Holland (note: in these 
countries there are only private higher education institutions 
where students get enrolled through government programs);
d. 2000 – 3000 USD: New Zealand, Israel;
e. 3000 – 4000 USD: Canada, Chile, Australia, Japan, Korea;
f. Over 4500 USD: USA.
In most of these countries the higher tuition fees for international 
students have ceased to apply to Romanians after Romania’s accession 
to the E.U.
1 in 100 international students choose the Czech Republic or 
Hungary
The Czech Republic or Hungary has achieved remarkable results 
through their good quality higher education systems. Czech universities 
attract annually 15000 foreign students, while Hungarian universities 
about 13000. This means that 1 in 100 international students choose a 
university in one of these two countries. If we take into account Eu-
ropean students’ mobility solely the ratio becomes 4 students in 100. 
Thus, the Czech Republic imports twice as much intelligence as it 
exports annually, while Hungary 60% more. Bulgaria followed by 
Poland is the next in line to attract international students to Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
These countries have higher education institutions which have en-
tered the Shanghai Top 500 and succeed in meeting the high quality 
education needs of young people from countries like Slovakia, Roma-
nia, Ukraine, Serbia and Montenegro, Israel etc. Romania is not men-
tioned by this ranking. In addition, Romania does not have universities 
with worldwide exposure that play a central part in student promotion, 
such as the American University in Bulgaria, the Central-European 
University in Hungary, Jagello University in Poland or Carol Univer-
sity in the Czech Republic. 
A little over 1% of Romanians study abroad 
Many question the methodology used by the Shanghai ranking. 
It is nevertheless difﬁcult to argue with the following statistics that
plainly show that:
• Romania has few higher education graduates – 1 in 10 Ro-
manians aged over 25, which is half the European average and 
one third of the American average;
• Few Romanians leave to study abroad – a little over 1 in 
1000 Romanians, which is 3 times less than Bulgaria; 
• Few international students choose Romania to do their 
studies – 1600 from EU-25, about 4500 from the Republic of 
Moldova, and the rest up to 9500 students from countries like: 
Israel, Tunisia, Greece, Ukraine, India, Serbia and Montene-
gro, Albania or Bulgaria. 
Who cares?... 
Romanian students’ access to the European Higher Education Area 
will certainly open new prospects of a solid high education network 
based on mobility, ﬂexibility, high-quality education and signiﬁcantly
reduced tuition fees that apply beginning this year. 
There is a huge lack of interest towards students who wish to study 
abroad or those who have a degree from a prestigious foreign univer-
sity. It is both the fault of Romanian authorities as much as ours, the 
general public, who choose to focus instead on the “5 o’clock news” or 
the latest gossip on politicians. 
Information campaigns on high education programs are in-
sufﬁcient. PLOTEUS is a portal supported by the European Commis-
sion. It helps students, those who look for employment, parents, career 
counsellors and professors to ﬁnd information, but even this is not in-
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formative enough. The National Agency for International Scholarships 
is the MERY counterpart. We do not dispose however of sufﬁcient
presentations, accounts and studies of different European education 
systems. We do not have access to a reliable data base on continuing 
professional training opportunities available in the European Union. 
Despite years of European exchange and scholarship programs 
and institutional support - Erasmus, Socrates, Tempus, GRUNDTVIG, 
Transversal, Jean Monet etc. – there is still a lack of straightforward in-
formation booklets on European travel requirements, living expenses, 
tuition fees, accommodation, legislation and other useful information 
for potential applicants. University program transparency is not en-
couraged nor rigorously applied in the Romanian public space, while 
objective and efﬁcient selection criteria have not as yet found their way
into the Romanian educational environment as they should have. Un-
der these circumstances, the right of the Romanian public to freedom 
of movement can only be guaranteed by providing the necessary in-
formation.
No one is interested to know what happens to students who 
leave the country to study abroad. For instance, why aren’t we capa-
ble to set up a Romanian Students Centre in the Cité universitaire and 
in all the other major university centres? We are lucky indeed to have 
passed the Iorga law that helped buy the buildings where the Academia 
di Romania di Roma and the Institute of Humanities Studies in Venice 
are located today. For the rest of it, one can only grieve for the fate of 
the Romanian scholarship student who ﬁnds herself or himself with-
out any institutional support and usually becomes a mere entity at the 
mercy of chaotic circumstances.
No one is interested to know what happens to Romanians who 
hold undergraduate or graduate degrees from prestigious universi-
ties. How many of the 23000 Romanian students abroad return home? 
Who cares enough to keep a quantitative and qualitative record of the 
ﬁelds they specialize in and of the extent to which these talents are
put to good use? Does anyone ever make use of these young people’s 
expertise? I cannot help thinking of the 40 percent unﬁlled university
positions that we precariously ﬁll today with young PhD-track stu-
dents whom we do not pay enough but rather rotate or by aggressively 
piling up teaching hours.
After all, if we want to lure Romanian graduates back home in 
order to strengthen the Romanian educational system we should start 
by monitoring them. Please note that my forecasts are based on OCDE 
statistics for international student mobility and on EUROSTAT statis-
tics for the European context. And that is because neither the MERY 
nor the National Institute of Statistics can offer precise information on 
this topic. Under the circumstances a classiﬁcation by ﬁeld of study or
education levels would be evidently too much to ask. And yet we inces-
santly grieve over our brains’ exodus. We keep complaining about the 
severe lack of experts in various ﬁelds. In reality, we choose to stub-
bornly and foolishly ignore those who could make a difference.
Case study: Students mobility in 2004
Sources: Calculations based on  OECD Statistics, January 2007
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Assessing the Human Capital in Romania 
- Current State of Understanding and Expectations
(Presentation)
Daniela Hincu, Ph.D.
Canceller, Faculty of Management,
Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest
Instead of introduction
The President of  British Council, Lord Neil Kinnock, declared in 
the opening of the 2007 Youth Summit (January, Bucharest), that in or-
der to pursue a rapid development for Romania, after its accession to EU, 
the emphasis should be placed on young people education and training. 
Lord Kinnock called the Irland ‘s example, which succeeded in the 
higher growth rate in Western Europe, for 12 years, investing in edu-
cation. The opportunity to invest in education reaches the maximum 
level in 4-5 after accession.
Outline
• Current understanding – deﬁnitions, models of thinking,  im-
plications
• Romania - various perspectives on country’s performance re-
lated to the HC facets
• Assessing HC in Romania, envisaged action
• Challenges for the future
Human capital (HC) – general framework
• “The knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embod-
ied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social 
and economic well-being” (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development – OECD, “Human Capital Invest-
ment: An international Comparison”, 2001).
HC is the sum of the abilities and knowledge of individuals 
• It measures the quality of the labour supply and can be accu-
mulated though education, further education and expanded by 
experience. 
• Further education and training on the job (in courses and sem-
inars) allow people to keep their HC up to date and replace 
depreciated knowledge with new one. 
• Education is an investment in human capital, while learning 
is the process of acquiring knowledge or skills through study, 
experience or teaching. 
• Knowledge is the awareness and understanding of intercon-
nected facts, truths or information gained in the form of expe-
rience, learning and introspection. 
Even if HC is embodied in the individual, the national stock 
of human capital can be thought of as the total sum of the human 
capital of all those normally resident in its territory.
• Human capital resides in individuals.
• Social capital resides in social relations. 
The creation of knowledge is clearly a social activity so it is nec-
essary to ask whether a simple aggregation of the human capital pos-
sessed by individuals is sufﬁcient, and then act properly.
• Political, institutional and legal arrangements describe the 
rules and institutions in which human and social capital work.
Human capital is heterogeneous
No single type of attribute can represent the whole range oh hu-
man characteristics that interfere on the economy and society. 
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While the level of individuals’ skills, knowledge and competen-
cies can be taken to represent the “stock” of human capital at any one 
time, these various attributes cannot be easily quantiﬁed.
HC facilitates structural change
• The rapid structural change caused by globalization and tech-
nology change has increased the importance of HC over the 
last years. In the rich countries, this structural change in-
creased the pressure on the suppliers of less qualiﬁed labor.
Physical work is substituted by machines at home and cheaper 
labour input from abroad.
• Structural changes increase the pressure on low skilled workers
HC facilitates innovation and higher productivity
Higher HC (required through better and longer education) allows 
individual to perform more specialized and higher value-added tasks, 
more efﬁciently and quickly; this individual can apply more new ideas
and be more innovative.
The HC needs to be nourished by innovation
• to understand the potential for the general innovativeness in soci-
ety – and the economic growth that can result from this innova-
tiveness – it is necessary to assess each of the components: paren-
tal, schooling, vocational/university, adult and job evaluation. 
Other Deﬁnitions…
• The skills, capacities and abilities possessed by an individual 
which permit one to earn INCOME.” (The Penguin Diction-
ary of Economics, 1984)
• Human capital is deﬁned as an individual’s productive skills, 
talents, and knowledge. It is measured in terms of the value 
(price multiplied by quantity) of goods and services produced.
HC is, therefore, a notion that captures the valuation of the 
attributes people invest in. 
But …
the main problem 
is not so much how to deﬁne HC as how to measure it.
The right measure of HC?
Income related …
The positive impact of HC on the level of income is rather un-
controversial: although the transmission mechanisms and the feedback 
loops are complex and nontransparent.
Estimating HC with reference to future earnings
The value of an individual’s HC is dependent on the future stream 
of beneﬁts that the individual realizes through use of that capital. 
The value can only be estimated with respect to the expected fu-
ture stream of beneﬁts - it requires risk and uncertainty to be taken
into account.
The future stream of beneﬁts to an individual is not exclusively
market determined. Although in practice most research focuses on ex-
pected market returns, it is clear that in principle the individual derives 
a more all-encompassing stream of utility from their acquired capabili-
ties and knowledge. The problem is, of course, that that wider stream 
of beneﬁts is often intangible and therefore resistant to measurement.
Estimating human capital with reference to future earnings
where: He = Human capital deﬁned from earnings and other beneﬁts
E = Earnings (often expressed as the difference between actual 
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earnings and a basic, unskilled, wage rate)B = other (non-market) ben-
eﬁts derived from increased human capital
i = interest rate
p = the present; t = time
The possibility that an individual’s HC capital could be 
described by comprehensively enumerating that individual’s 
knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes.
• This approach is that the various characteristics do not have 
a common unit of measurement and are therefore not easily 
aggregated, although statistical techniques such as ‘principal 
components’ can sometimes get around this problem. 
• We may be able to devise tests that would give measures of 
people’s numerical, verbal, written and social abilities, and 
of their knowledge base within particular disciplines (sufﬁ-
ciently accurate to approximately rank persons within each 
category) but this leaves us short of an overall measure. 
Capital as a summation of attribute
where: 
mi = market related attributes and capabilities
wi = market returns for attribute or capability mi
oj = other valued individual attributes and capabilities
vj = unit return for other (non-market) individual attribute or ca-
pability oj. 
More sophisticated models
• The theoretical models of the impact of human capital on eco-
nomic activity have become sophisticated over the past centu-
ries, especially in the last decades.
• Alfred Marshall (1890) noted that “the most valuable of all 
capital is that invested in human beings”
• Benjamin Franklin - “investment in education pays the best 
interest”
• Gary Becker (1964) – suggested the term of Human Capital 
• Robert Lucas (1998) modeled the link between HC and eco-
nomic activity by splitting the economy into two sectors: 
The education sector produces new capital with the help of exist-
ing HC (teachers), while the ﬁnal goods sector uses both hu-
man capital and physical capital as inputs. 
Policy implications: economic policy that raises the rate of growth 
of HC will lead to higher growth rates of GDP.
• Paul Romer (late 1980s) - model of knowledge spillover, where 
the stock of knowledge determines the growth rate of GDP
 Policy implications: – the high level of HC allows for the high 
growth rate of GDP
• Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) – HC is additional accumu-
lated production factor, but returns are decreasing 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil - an aggregate neo-classical Cobb-
Douglas production function is proposed:  
In the long run, income per capita depends on the savings rate, 
the level of human capital, the growth rate of the population and exog-
enous technological progress
The early growth literature typically used measures of 
HC such as:
• Adult literacy rates – while an undeniable component of HC, 
it completely disregards the level of literacy, the type of lit-
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eracy, and the contribution of additional skills in numeracy, 
analytics, technical knowledge etc.
Literacy levels often do not correspond to educational levels.
• School enrolment rates – a measure with little theoretical 
credibility as it relates largely to people who are not in the 
labour force and therefore provide almost no contribution to 
current GDP it is a ﬂow rather than a stock (which is what HC
capital is) – indeed it is not even the ﬂow in the desired stock.
But, education explains income of individuals
• Quantitative analyses at the micro-level can explain a large 
part of an individual’s annual or monthly income by one’s 
level of education and work experience. 
• Econometric estimates consistently show a statistically sig-
niﬁcance effect on an individual’s average years of education
– even after controlling for other factors like parents’s level of 
income or education. 
• Only the magnitude is somewhat controversial: estimates on 
the gain of income from additional year of educations range 
from 5% to 15% (Bergheim, 2005).
• Measures in income inequality in a society largely reﬂect in-
equalities in educational attainment.
• The high positive private returns are an incentive to invest in 
education
And, enrollment rates – future HC
- provide valuable information about the future development of 
human capital 
- measure the share of the typical age who attend secondary or 
tertiary programs. 
Countries with a high number of average years of education need 
relatively high enrolment rates to keep their HC constant by replacing 
existing workers with new workers who have the same skill levels.
The different attainment rates (e.g. secondary, tertiary) and their 
development over cohorts can provide important information about the 
likely future path of the average years of education. 
If the new entrants into the labour market have spent more time in 
school than those retiring, the average HC of the working-age population 
will rise. According to OECD study – it is estimated that 10% rise in hu-
man capital leads to a 9% rise in GDP per capita over the long term.
Nowadays, several approaches to estimating human capital 
stocks and investment in human capital 
The highest level of education completed by each adult (educa-
tional attainment) reﬂects his/her skills level. The International Stand-
ard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED-1997) classiﬁes educational 
attainment in six categories of educational programmes, two of which 
(categories 5A and 6) are for university degree or equivalent. 
ISCED 5A programmes are largely theoretically based and are in-
tended to provide sufﬁcient qualiﬁcations for gaining entry into advanced
research programmes and professions with high skills requirements. 
ISCED 5B programmes are generally more practical/technical/oc-
cupationally speciﬁc. ISCED 6 programmes lead to an advanced re-
search qualiﬁcation and are devoted to advanced study and original
research (e.g. PhDs). 
Educational attainment is related to the stock of knowledge and 
skills in the population. Tertiary level is deﬁned as ISCED-1997 levels
5B, 5A and 6. 
Several approaches to estimating human capital stocks and 
investment in human capital 
• Education expenditure per student provides some indication 
of the resources allocated to investment in human skills. 
Investment in human resources is here restricted to tertiary-level 
education because it is closely associated with acquiring new knowledge 
(skills), enhancing existing knowledge and diffusing knowledge. Expendi-
ture per student for a particular level of education is calculated by dividing 
the total expenditure at that level by the corresponding full-time equiva-
lent enrolment. Data in national currencies are converted into USD PPP. 
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• University entry rates reﬂect the accessibility and attractive-
ness of high-level knowledge. 
- represent the proportion of those in a given age cohort 
who enter university at some point during their lives. 
Net entry rates are deﬁned as the sum of net entry rates for single ages.
The total net entry rate is therefore the sum of the shares of new 
entrants aged i to the total population aged i, at all ages. 
When no data on new entrants by age are available, gross entry 
rates are calculated. These are the ratio of all entrants, regardless of 
age, to the size of the population at the typical age of entry. 
The best available proxy for HC is the average years of edu-
cation of the population aged 25 to 64.
Investment in formal schooling tends to have a rate of return of 
5-15% in additional earnings for every year in school. 
The returns are higher for the private individuals than for society 
because schooling is mostly subsidized and hence individuals do not 
pay the full price for their education.
Quality of HC difﬁcult to measure
The average number of years spent in school do no take into con-
sideration the quality of education, although quality is likely to affect a 
person’s productivity and income. 
The OECD’s PISA (Program for International Student Assessment 
tests for the young and the literacy surveys of the IALS (Interna-
tional Adult Literacy Survey) for the adults ﬁll this gap.
It is a high correlation between the level of education and the par-
ent generation (years of education) and the PISA results of the young 
generation. 
Measuring human capital
• Recently, the Lisbon Council for Economic Competitiveness 
and Social Renewal (a Brussels-based think-tank focusing on 
the EU's Lisbon Accord to become the premier knowledge 
economy) released its European Human Capital Index The in-
dex is made up of four factors:
1) HC Endowment - measures the cost of all types of educa-
tion and training in a particular country per person active 
in the labour force (i.e. employed person). Speciﬁcally, we
look at ﬁve different types of learning for each active per-
son: learning on the job, adult education, university, pri-
mary and secondary schooling and parental education. 
 The ﬁgure is subsequently depreciated to account for ob-
solescence in the existing knowledge base and some level 
of forgetting. 
2) HC Utilization - looks at how much of a country’s human 
capital stock is actually deployed. It differs from tradi-
tional employment ratios in that it measures human capi-
tal as a proportion of the overall population.
3) HC Productivity - measures the productivity of human 
capital. It is derived by dividing gross domestic product by 
all of the human capital employed in that country. This di-
verges from traditional productivity measures, in that the 
ﬁgure takes account of how well educated employed labour
is, instead of just how many hours are being worked.
4) Demography and Employment - looks at existing eco-
nomic, demographic and migratory trends to estimate the 
number of people who will be employed (or not employed) 
in the year 2030 in each country.
Where HC measures may be relevant
• The three main areas are:
1. economics of education
2. employability
3. economic growth.
Clearly, these areas are not independent of each other
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Human capital measurement
• Explains what is meant by human capital measurement 
• Describes various human capital measurement models and 
how they seek to identify clear links between HR metrics and 
business performance 
• Looks at the debate on how and where human capital informa-
tion should be externally reported 
Measurement in practice
• human capital models 
• data collection 
• types of HR measures 
• examples of links between HR metrics and business perform-
ance data 
• ‘human capital drivers’ or key variables that can make a dif-
ference 
• planning HR interventions 
A number of human capital models have been devised to help es-
tablish the important HR interventions or 'human capital drivers' that 
can make a measurable difference to how staff perform. 
The starting point for most organisations is the production of a 
reliable series of HR metrics. 
But instead of looking at these in relative isolation, the aim of the hu-
man capital approach is to be able to link improvements in such meas-
ures directly to corresponding improvements in business performance. 
A number of the linkages may appear to be intuitive, but human capi-
tal measurement is about delivering objective data to inform the direction 
of HR strategy and to help make better HR investment decisions. 
Importance of HC assessments
• Understanding the intricacy and the rhythms of the inﬂu-
ence mechanism (the long lags between education reform 
and GDP growth)
• Recognizing the success factors 
• Derive education-related policy recommendations (provide 
input for the decision-making process of investors, corporate 
strategists and policy-makers)
The ability of a society to develop, master and make use of in-
novation for generating economic growth and prosperity depends 
largely on the widespread endowment and utilisation of the human 
capital of its citizens.
Reducing gaps 
• Romania is targeting not only political integration in EU, but 
also the convergence with the development of EU countries, 
both in nominal and in real terms. This process of reducing 
gaps involves for Romania sustained growth rates in the pe-
riod 2007-2013, maintaining at the same time macroeconomic 
equilibrium as stable as possible. The driving factor of eco-
nomic growth when acting on a market open to strong compe-
tition is the increase of economic competitiveness.
• Moreover, increasing the competitive advantages should be a per-
manent objective, taking into account both the European trends 
and the challenges of globalisation. Hence, improving competi-
tiveness should not be seen as a process of taking advantage of 
short term opportunities (e.g. lower labour cost), but more as a 
process of building of an economic structure based on capital in-
vestments and on research, development and innovation. In other 
words, the prospect of convergence on medium and long term 
relies on the development of the knowledge-based economy.
Romania - the quest for:
• mechanisms of transforming the comparative advantage of 
low cost labor in a competitive advantage
146 147
• providing guidance for a faster orientation to the subsectors of 
high technological growth
• preventing poor social dynamics related to the increased mi-
gration ﬂows (social exclusion, braindrain)
• poor restructuring range of professional careers (researchers 
leaving the ﬁeld, reorienting themselves to market-oriented
activities because of low salaries and lack of “horizon”
Advantages
• Good and stable economic performance: Global Competitive-
ness Report
• In the path of buiding a KE and SE , “KAM methodology- World 
Bank Institute”, “Global Innovation Scoreboard” report (GIS)” 
• No obvious gender divide according to the Human Develop-
ment Report 2006
• Increase of the level of e-readiness (according to the EIU Re-
port 2006)
• Accelerating rhythm of foreign investment ﬂows – assuming
that these will bring structural changes on the demand of vari-
ous professionals
Quality of the human capital in Romania
By level of educational attainment, in Romania, the share of the 
population in the 25-64 year old age group with at least upper second-
ary education increased from 67.9% in 1999 to 70% in 2003, above the 
levels recorded in other European countries. 
• Still, in the same age group, the share of the population with 
university education, although on a ascending trend (from 
8.7% in 1999 up to 9.6% in 2003), remains below the level re-
corded in the most developed countries (1999: USA – 27.7%, 
France - 16.4%, Germany – 15%, Great Britain – 15.4%) 
(White Paper on Labour Force, DTI/UK – 2003).
• The competitiveness of the human capital is directly inﬂu-
enced by the educational attainment. For the 20-24 years age 
group, Eurostat indicates that, in case of Romania, in 2004, 
75.3% of the population in this age group had at least upper 
secondary education; this level is close to the average level of 
76.6% recorded in case of EU-25 and above the level of 73.8% 
recorded in case of EU-15. 
Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Devel-
opment - SOP HRD
The general objective of SOP is the increase of Romanian com-
panies’ productivity by reducing the disparities compared to the 
average productivity of EU. 
The SOP HRD supports the Lisbon Strategy in what concerns 
reaching the expected objective of full employment. 
The strategy on human resources development is in line with the 
Community Strategic Guidelines 2007-2013 and stands as an essen-
tial component in reaching the overall community objective for growth 
and jobs. The strategy will focus on investing in human capital, mod-
ernization of education and training systems, increasing access to em-
ployment and strengthening social inclusion for vulnerable groups.
INNOVATION
• In terms of innovation in businesses, Romania lags behind 
other European countries. During 2002-2004 only 20% of 
companies undertook innovative activities. This percentage is 
far behind the EU15, where in 1998-2000, 44% of companies 
were considered innovative.
• A large part of innovative companies (86%) are SMEs out of 
which 55.2% are small enterprises and 30.9% are medium 
sized enterprises.
• The majority of innovations made by companies refer to in-
novative products and processes (67.5%). SMEs implemented 
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innovative solutions related to product design (8%), innova-
tive process (21.1%) and 57% implemented innovative prod-
ucts and processes. 
• Despite the improvement, according to Networked Readiness 
Index (2004), Romania still ranked 53rd out of 104 countries, 
compared with 61st out of 102 countries in 2003. The majority 
of expenditures related to innovative activities were made for 
purchase outﬁts, equipments and software (62.2%). By ﬁeld of
activity, 67.4% operate in the manufacturing sector and 32.6% 
in the services ones. 
SOP HRD
Priorities Axis 
1. Education and training in support for growth and development 
of knowledge based society
2. Linking life long learning and labour market
3. Increasing adaptability of labour force and companies
4. Modernising the Public Employment Service
5. Promoting active employment measures
6. Promoting social inclusion
SOP HRD
• The knowledge-based economy will be tackled by promoting 
education in support for the development of knowledge based 
economy (PA 1) with areas of intervention on (1) ensuring 
quality education in support for growth and employment and 
further for developing competitive human capital; (2) univer-
sity education in support for knowledge based economy; (3) 
competitive human capital in education and research.
• Romania will pursue the objective of making Europe more 
competitive by supporting actions aiming at promoting the 
spirit of entrepreneurship and making the public services more 
efﬁcient. The enhancement of the entrepreneurial culture and
spirit is a speciﬁc area of intervention under PA3 “Increasing
adaptability of the labour force and enterprises” by which en-
trepreneurship can become a career option for everybody, as 
an important solution for counterbalancing the negative effects 
of the structural adjustment and industry restructuring proc-
esses, and by generating economic and social alternatives. 
Sectoral Operational Programme - Increase of Economic 
Competitiveness
• The global objective of Sectoral Operational Programme - In-
crease of Economic Competitiveness - SOP IEC must be con-
sidered in correlation with human capital development that of-
fers a long term and sustainable value to operations to be co 
ﬁnanced. The staff ability to adapt to the changing economic
environment is becoming a crucial factor for economic strength. 
To improve enterprises’ competitiveness, it is necessary to en-
sure highly qualiﬁed staff, including management staff.
• The SOP IEC is the main instrument for achieving the ﬁrst na-
tional thematic priority of NDP 2007 – 2013, i.e. Increasing of 
Economic Competitiveness and Development of Knowledge 
Based Economy. The main goal of the strategy is to increase 
the competitiveness position of the Country in a context of 
overall macroeconomic stability, while accompanying at the 
same time the natural process of FDI growth.
The target is an average annual growth of GDP per employed per-
son by about 5.5%. This will allow Romania to reach approx. 55% of 
the EU average productivity by 2015. 
To achieve this goal, the strategy will have to:
- address the weaknesses of existing industrial sectors and their 
outdated and often poorly eco-friendly and excessively ener-
gy-intensive technologies;
- further diversify the productive basis of the country to mini-
mize the risk of shocks from sectorial overdependence;
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- bridge the gap between R&D activities and their industrial 
application and promote research-led innovative sectors;
- foster the pervasive use of ICT technologies;
- increase the efﬁciency and sustainable development of the ener-
gy system as a factor of overall competitiveness, while address-
ing at the same time energy efﬁciency issues at the end users.
Conclusions
• Many of the growth “stars” owe their economic performance on 
solid gains in human capital… to that extent that HC is the most 
important factor of production in today’s world economy. 
• These success stories (Spain, South Korea, India, China etc.) 
show that policy changes can lead to positive developments. 
Successful countries share the one-track school system and 
the goal of bringing as many children as possible into higher 
education with a certain level of quality. Private ﬁnancial re-
sources are an important ingredient in these systems. These 
countries understand that education is an investment.
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Human capital in the EU policies and instruments : overall pol-
icy objective, regulatory environment and ﬁnancial instruments
The Lisbon strategy provides an overall policy framework for the 
EU policies relevant for human capital: economic and employment poli-
cies. Lisbon objectives place human capital at the centre as it is the key 
for knowledge and services driven economy. Creating a growth friendly 
regulatory framework also requires competent and committed human 
resources engaged in legislative, administrative and judiciary activities. 
These components are key elements for achieving good governance.
But as many of you also know, Lisbon sets targets for many areas 
(R&D, employment, microenterprises). Human capital appears as a 
constant concern in all these areas particularly when comparisons are 
made with the US and Japan. 
1 The content of this contribution does not fully cover the entire volume of contributor’s presentation.
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To illustrate this, I will only refer to the Lisbon target for R&D expen-
ditures set at 3% of GDP: a target achieved only by Finland and Sweden. 
Micro economists teach us that regulatory environments do matter 
for growth and innovation. The 3 following slides are devoted to the 
social policy and regulatory environments. OECD has classiﬁed the
regulatory instruments used in the OECD countries into 3 categories: 
economic, social and administrative. In general, social regulation in-
cludes protection of the environment, health and safety at the workplace, 
protection of workers rights, social security, and so on. At EU level, it 
is debated whether there is or there is no legal competence allowing for 
community driven harmonisation of social protection schemes (hard 
law). There is, however, a substantial body of regulations and direc-
tives protecting the free movement of workers and their social security 
rights (portability) - regulation 1408/1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving with-
in the Community, which is a landmark piece of legislation.
In addition, there is an open method for coordination of member 
states’ social protection based on three strands shown on this slide. 
Member states submit to the Commission national strategic reports 
on social protection and inclusion which are subject to Commission as-
sessment produced in individual ﬁches. The Commission prepares a
horizontal analysis on how member states do in terms of benchmarks 
and community guidelines on cohesion. We are also able to map out 
any new trends and threats appearing at community level by examin-
ing trends taking place on national level. The latest Joint report was 
adopted by the Commission on 19.01.2007 and tabled to the Council.
In the 2007 Joint report Bulgaria and Romania will be included for 
the ﬁrst time as new partners in the Open Method of Coordination.
As part of our work on the regulatory environment relevant for 
the social policy, social protection appears as the main regulatory in-
strument important for growth and innovation. At different historical 
times, Bismarck and Lord Beveridge gave to Europe mechanisms for 
protection of the labour force from economic, social and any other type 
of hazards that may occur during the life cycle of individuals. 
Economists know that over time capital depreciates and invest-
ments have to be made to maintain it. It is the same with human capital, 
one of the production factors for any market economy: it needs to be 
protected in times of change (globalisation, restructuring) and against 
risks of depreciation (unemployment, health hazards, disability). This is 
the role assigned to social protection in all of the EU member states. 
The diversity of what is called « European social model » stems 
from the various arrangements for ﬁnancing and delivery of social pro-
tection services: in some countries the systems are insurance based 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary), in other countries 
they are tax based (UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Malta). 
In some countries, delivery of social services is mainly done through 
public institutions, in other through a mixture of public and private 
institutions. In all, however, collective funding (solidarity) is the ingre-
dient holding together the arrangements for human capital protection.
The concept of human capital includes immeasurable variables 
such as personal character or social capital (social bonds, networks), 
family traditions and bonds. Some scientists would include in this con-
cept only education, skills and knowledge – an understanding largely 
used in the EU. However, within other socio-economic circumstances 
(developing countries) human capital will also include health and nu-
trition. Many of you know that labour markets have different segments 
and that, markets, in general, are full with imperfections. Thus, the 
return on human capital will differ between different labour market 
segments. Discrimination against minority or female employees would 
imply different rates of return on human capital and thus it may hinder 
the depth of inclusion into the social fabric and the level of opportuni-
ties for realisation of the human potential. 
Often, it is not the education or knowledge that one has which de-
termines the value of individual education but the credential or degree 
received. A person with a degree from an elite school is likely to have 
higher income, compared to a person with the same knowledge but 
coming from a less known school. 
In other words, ﬁghting discrimination at EU level reﬂects the
commitment to equal opportunities for human capital development. 
Gradually, a substantial corpus of legislation has been build to prevent 
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any type of discrimination. Initially, it started with sex discrimina-
tion related to pay, working conditions and social security. Then, the 
Amsterdam Treaty (art.13) empowered the Community to take ac-
tion against discrimination based on a new range of grounds: racial or 
ethnic, religion or belief, age disability and sexual orientation (Racial 
Equality Directive and Employment Equality Directive of 2000). 
The equal treatment directives play a safeguard role in providing 
those who feel excluded from access to economic and social opportu-
nities with a tool to defend their interests and therefore increase their 
economic opportunities and return on human capital. 
In countries with unfavourable demographic perspectives, as our 
host country, equal opportunities for all is not only a political commit-
ment mirrored in national and community law but it becomes a key for 
achieving the Lisbon targets. Various reports point, for example, that 
in the private sector in BG there is a shortage of skilled labour and at 
the same time educational deﬁcits among minorities still persistent.
Recently, the Commission President while speaking about the new so-
cial reality of Europe clearly spelled out the Commission view on equal 
opportunities by saying: 
« But vague support for equality of opportunity is meaningless un-
less it is accompanied by policies to ensure that it becomes a reality 
for all citizens ».
In July 2006, the new regulations on the Social Funds were adopt-
ed. Both the cohesion and structural funds will back up human capital 
development. The European Regional Development Fund will ﬁnance
innovation and technologies in SMEs, hard education and health infra-
structure as well as expansion of broadband internet access to increase 
the overall economic competitiveness. Global package worth 308 bn 
EUR, 250 bn in Convergence. ESF roughly 10bn EUR per annum.
The European Social Fund – the oldest structural fund- will fo-
cus on convergence and regional competitiveness priorities. Within 
« convergence »  countries (incl. Bulgaria and Hungary), the ESF is 
the privileged human capital ﬁnancial instrument supporting reforms
in education, vocational training and development of human potential 
in research and innovation. In Bulgaria, the ESF will fund two opera-
tional programs: the OP on human resources development (€1.033B) 
and the OP on administrative capacity (€154M). In Hungary, the ESF 
(€3.5B) will lend its support to two operational programs: a social re-
newal OP (€3.3B) and a state reform OP (€145M).
What is new for the programming period is the importance given 
to issues of administrative capacity which includes the capacity for 
laying down a regulatory framework favouring the human capital de-
velopment.
However, the allocation among structural funds and the alloca-
tions to knowledge-economy activities will illustrate the weight and 
choices made between human capital and innovations policies and 
other policies. These allocations will illustrate the commitment to the 
Lisbon agenda. 
In the previous programming periods, Ireland had invested one 
third of its structural spending in education which proved to be instru-
mental in attracting its human capital back to the country and in rais-
ing its overall productivity. 
The Irish experience brings up important questions as to whether 
there is «brain drain » as opposed to « brain vortex » which would en-
gulf to places where the return on human capital is higher.
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund is the latest member in 
the family of funds at EU level, which was speciﬁcally designed to ex-
press the Union’s solidarity towards workers affected by trade adjust-
ment redundancies. It reﬂects both the competitiveness and fairness
commitments of the EU. 
EGF will support people and not companies or institutions by 
funding active labour market policies such as training, job search al-
lowance or assist self employment. The annual amount of the Fund will 
allow assistance to 40-50 000 workers per year. 
Other EU ﬁnancial instruments for human capital development
include R&D framework programme – 50 billion EUR for seventh ﬁ-
nancial period, Education and training programmes – 7 billionn EUR 
for the new Lifelong Learning Programme
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Challenges and Opportunities
Bulgaria has achieved a stable macroeconomic environment and 
an impressive pattern of economic growth over the last ﬁve years. Ac-
cumulated budgetary surplus allow some ﬂexibility and accumulated 
reserves ensure stable ﬁnances. These positive conditions coincide 
with the accession to the EU and the access to structural funds from 
the very beginning of the new programming period 2007-2013.
This is an extraordinary opportunity to all EU countries: the new 
programming period is based on new regulations clearly favouring 
human capital investments and policies as part of the broad Lisbon 
framework. At the same time, the new European Social Fund rules put 
an emphasis on administrative capacity to carry out reforms. This is an 
opportunity to be seized by member states willing to go even further 
than the Irish economic success. 
If the EU has put in place policies and resources to promote human 
capital, it is up to national authorities to create the right instruments 
and ﬁnd out the right answers to national challenges. The inclusion of 
ethnic minorities in the socio-economic fabric, the reduction of early 
school leavers and an improved offer of higher education are part of the 
efforts to boost productivity in a country with shrinking labour force. 
The Commission will carefully assess the operational programmes for 
the new period and their ability to achieve the common policy objec-
tives as well to what extent the operational programmes under the SFs 
respect the policy objectives assigned to the ESF. 
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United States’ Migration Policies 
and Their Implications
Uma A. Segal
School of Social Work & Center for International Studies,
University of Missouri—St. Louis, MO, USA
Introduction
For all immigrants, whether in the United States legally or without 
the proper documentation, this is an anxious and turbulent time.  It is 
also a time of special concern for those who hire undocumented work-
ers and for those who provide services to them.  On May 25, 2006, 
the U.S. Senate passed The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 
2006 which would provide a path to citizenship to illegal1 immigrants 
and provide for a guest worker program.  The U.S. House of Represent-
atives opposes both the path to legalization as well as the guest worker 
program, which would bring approximately 200,000 foreigners into the 
country annually on a temporary basis.  This bill has six components, 
and regardless of whether a particular component is supported by either 
the House or the Senate, details of what each favors do differ:
Components of Immigration Reform
House 
Position
Senate 
Position
1 Creation of a temporary worker program Opposed Passed
2 Legalization of undocumented immigrants Opposed Passed
3 Worksite enforcement Passed Passed
4 Criminal penalties for illegal immigrants already in the U.S. Passed Passed
5 Border security—focusing on fencing Passed Passed
6 Border security—addressing the need for more personnel Passed Passed
1 The terms “illegal,” “undocumented,” and “unauthorized” are used interchangeably in referring to 
immigrants who do not have the requisite legal papers to be in the U.S.
The House and Senate must now come to a compromise about what 
they will forward to President George W. Bush for his ﬁnal approval. 
Undocumented workers currently in the country worry about forcible 
repatriation without the opportunity to return once they have left the 
U.S.  American employers who, either knowingly (or unknowingly) 
hire undocumented workers are concerned about their workforces and 
the implications of their deportation. Those who assist immigrants who 
are in the country illegally wonder if they will be exempt from penal-
ties if they can prove they are providing “humanitarian” rather than 
“exploitative” assistance.  Finally, those who immigrated legally, or are 
awaiting a decision regarding their applications for immigration, may 
evidence distress that the path to legal entry may be smoother for those 
who are here without the proper documentation than it is for those 
who attempt to enter through established institutional channels.  By the 
time of the meeting in Soﬁa, Bulgaria, on January 26, 2007, there may
be a clearer picture of the details of the bill, but, in all likelihood, the 
establishment of an infrastructure and its implementation and enforce-
ment will be slow and arduous, if not impossible, processes, and the 
public will continue to debate the issue heatedly.  
The last year has seen major movements among the U.S. popula-
tion, both in support and in opposition to this bill, which embodies the 
greatest changes in the immigration law in the last 20 years.  How-
ever, mixed opinions about the presence of undocumented workers, 
particularly from Mexico, have historically been intrinsic to U.S. im-
migration policy since the late 19th century (Bernstein, 2006).  The 
liberalized immigration law of 1965, which was designed to eliminate 
discriminatory practices against Europeans and to end the “remnants” 
of the exclusionary practices against Asians was, in fact, “coupled 
with measures explicitly designed to minimize ‘brown’ immigration 
from Mexico and ‘black’ from the Caribbean” (Zohlberg, 2006, p. 
8).  However, since at least the turn of the 20th century, perhaps in 
response to pressures from the agricultural industry and its need for 
plentiful and cheap labor, “legislators resisted closing the country’s 
‘back door’ despite their explicit commitment to preserving the ‘origi-
nal American stock’ from contamination by Mexicans…” (Zohlberg, 
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2006, p. 9).  Clearly, a debate continues, at the very least, regarding 
the presence of workers who have entered, or remain in the U.S. il-
legally and a disproportionate number of them are from Mexico and 
from other Latin American nations.
Overview of Immigration to the U.S.
Individuals and families from around the globe form a continuous 
stream of immigrants to the United States.  The backlog of visa ap-
plications and waiting lists to enter the U.S. stretches to several years. 
Undocumented immigrants, both those who enter without legal papers 
and those who overstay their visits, abound.  Refugees and asylees 
continue to enter in record numbers from countries in political tur-
moil.  Disproportionately large numbers of entrants into the U.S. in 
recent years have been people of color from Asia, Africa, and Central 
and South Americas, and despite encountering a series of barriers, an 
overwhelming majority remains, making this nation their permanent 
residence.  Reasons for this ongoing inﬂux are readily apparent, for in
spite of the problems prevalent in the U.S., it continues to be one of the 
most attractive nations in the world.
There is much in the U.S. that native-born Americans take for 
granted and that is not available in many other countries, and there 
are several amenities, opportunities, possibilities, lifestyles, and 
freedoms in the U.S. that are not found together in any other nation. 
In theory, and often in reality, this is a land of freedom, of equality, of 
opportunity, of a superior quality of life, of easy access to education, 
and of relatively few human rights violations.  It is a land that, in the 
21st century, is struggling toward multiculturalism and pluralism in 
its institutions and social outlook.  It is a land that, compared to sev-
eral others, offers newcomers a relatively easy path through which to 
become integrated into its largesse.  While the debate over the value 
of immigration persists, the fact is that it is a debate, and while immi-
gration policies are not without discrimination and selectivity, they 
are more open now than they have ever been.  Thus, despite both po-
litical and social perceptions of foreigners following the September 
11, 2001 terror attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center 
in New York, despite increased security measures and scrutiny of in-
dividuals, and despite some highly disturbing xenophobic backlash, 
new immigrants continue to arrive in the U.S. in record numbers.  In 
addition, most, if not all, of the vast numbers that entered years be-
fore, whether or not they have become naturalized citizens, value the 
quality of life this nation continues to allow them, for frequently for 
many, even when life here is difﬁcult, it is less so than it would have
been in their countries of origin.
Immigrants’ adaptation in a new country reﬂects the interplay
of the reasons for departure from their homeland, their experience 
of migration, their tangible and intangible resources for function-
ing in unfamiliar environments, and the effects of the receptiveness 
of the host country (both politically and socially) to their presence 
(Figure 1).  Furthermore, regardless of the length of time immi-
grants are in the U.S., they are invariably faced with a duality of 
cultures and must learn how to function within norms and expecta-
tions that frequently conﬂict.
Although one may be interested in emigrating from one’s home-
lands, the move is highly contingent on the receptiveness of the poten-
tial host nation to immigrants in general, and immigrants from speciﬁc
countries in particular.  Most governments now have strict immigration 
laws, this was not always the case, and people were relatively free to live 
where they chose.  U.S. immigration history, since the mid-18th centu-
ry, has been signiﬁcantly impacted by legislation that has substantially
colored the face of immigration in the last two and a half centuries.
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Figure 1:  Model / Framework for the Immigrant Experience
From: Segal, U. A.  (2002).  A framework for immigration: Asians in the United States, 
New York: Columbia University Press,  p. 4.
Legislative History and Its Impact
U.S. immigration history may be divided into seven periods dur-
ing which legal measures formally allowed or controlled the categories 
of people allowed to immigrate (Kim, 1994, pp. 8–9).  
1. The colonial period (1609–1775), during which most immi-
grants were from the British Isles and the colonies had little 
effective control.
2. The American Revolutionary period (1776–1840), when Euro-
pean immigration slowed because of war and there were gen-
eral anti-foreign feelings.
3. The “old” immigration period (1841–1882), during which 
local governments recruited people from Northern Europe. 
Chinese were also able to immigrate without much difﬁculty.
4. The regulation period (1882–1920), when the Chinese were ex-
cluded from immigrating.  However, large numbers of immigrants 
were admitted from Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.
5. The restriction and exclusion period (1921–1952), when a quo-
ta system restricted immigration from Central, Eastern, and 
Southern Europe, and when all Asians were excluded from 
admission because of their ineligibility for U.S. citizenship.
6. The partial liberalization period (1952–1965), when Asians 
were assigned the same quota as those from Central, Eastern, 
and Southern Europe, and were also allowed naturalization.
7. The liberalized policy period (1965–present), when the quota 
policy was repealed to allow entry to immigrants from Third 
World countries.
Below are brief sketches of immigration-related legislation or 
action2 that, since the beginning of the liberalization period, have af-
fected diverse populations in a variety of ways, from entry into the 
U.S. itself to access to fundamental rights.  
1965: The Immigration and Nationality Act ﬁnally liberalized im-
migration and repealed legal discrimination because of race, 
2 These and additional laws relevant to immigration and immigrants are available through the Web site 
of the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Retrieved May 30, 2006, from  (http://www.
uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/legishist/index.htm)
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gender, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.  It 
rescinded the national origins system, replacing it with an-
nual quotas of the Eastern (170,000) and Western (120,000) 
Hemispheres, with up to 20,000 individuals being permit-
ted entry from any one nation.  This quota did not include 
spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens.  
1978: Separate ceilings for the two hemispheres were abolished 
and a world-wide annual ceiling of 290,000 was established.
1980: The Refugee Act removed refugees as a preference category. 
The President, in conjunction with Congress, and based on the 
political climate of the world, determines the annual ceiling 
and the distribution of that ceiling among identiﬁed countries
for that year (ceilings have ranged from 50,000–90,000).
1986: The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was a 
comprehensive reform effort that legalized undocumented 
immigrants who had been in the country since January 1, 
1982, but made it unlawful to hire undocumented workers.  
1990: The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the annual ceiling 
for immigrants to 700,000 and established an annual limit 
for certain categories of immigrants to attract skilled work-
ers.  It also established the Immigrant Investor Program, 
offering up to 10,000 permanent resident visas to those 
willing to invest at least $1 million in U.S. urban areas or 
$500,000 in U.S. rural areas.
1996: Welfare Reform ended many cash and medical assistance 
programs for most legal immigrants (and other low-income 
individuals), 
1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA) expanded enforcement operations of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, particularly at the 
border and reorganized the procedures for removal of inad-
missible entrants.
2001: The USA Patriot Act was passed by Congress in response 
to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York and 
Washington, DC.  It gives federal ofﬁcials greater power to
track and intercept national and international communica-
tions and to prevent the entry of foreign terrorists and detain 
and remove those who may be within the U.S.
2006  Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006  that at-
tempts to curtail and address the presence of undocumented 
immigrants. 
Implications of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act had a major and 
permanent impact on U.S. immigration, dramatically altering the 
traditional origins and numbers of immigrants to the U.S. Prior to 
1965 and the amendments of October 3rd to the Immigration Act 
of 1924 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which 
resulted in the liberalization of immigration laws, the majority of 
entrants into the U.S. were from European countries.  When the 
1965 amendments: (i) abolished the national origins quota system; 
(ii) established a preference system for relatives of U.S. citizens 
and permanent residents; (iii) exempt immediate relatives of citi-
zens and some special groups (certain ministers of religion, former 
employees of U.S. government abroad, etc.); and (iv) expanded the 
limits of world coverage to a 20,000 per-country limit, the inﬂux of
new immigrants from non-European countries was unprecedented 
and continues into the present.
While minor modiﬁcations are frequently made to the Immigra-
tion Act of October 1, 1965, it remains the primary directing force 
of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It set the 
annual immigrant quota at 290,000, dividing 170,000 for the Eastern 
Hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western Hemisphere. INS speciﬁ-
cations of the world-wide level of immigration and the selection pro-
cedures are detailed in Title II of the Immigration Act (INA, ACT 
201) as is the preference in allocation of immigrant visas (INA, ACT 
203).  Even more signiﬁcantly, while INA, ACT 202 identiﬁes the
numerical limitation to any foreign state, it includes in it a non-dis-
crimination clause, stating, “... no person shall receive any prefer-
ence or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an 
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immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place 
of birth, or place of residence.” (p. 7)3
The Immigration Act speciﬁed spouses and unmarried adult
children of U.S. citizens as exempt from the numerical quota and es-
tablished a preferential system for the allocation of entry visas.  Some 
modiﬁcations have occurred since the original 1965 Act, through the
Immigration Act of 1990, which restructured the immigrant catego-
ries of admission, increasing the numbers for skilled workers and 
adding the diversity category. However, in many important ways, it 
has remained substantively the same, and it is clear that system al-
locations are not based on the prevention of entry of any particular 
national group. Thus, the numbers of immigrants admitted legally 
are: (a) ﬁxed by law; (b) limited only by demands for those consid-
ered eligible; and (c) restricted by processing constraints (Gordon, 
2005). The 2006 ﬁscal year limits are in the categories below:4
Family Sponsored Immigrants (480,000 annual numbers)
1. Unmarried sons and daughters of citizens (23,400 annually)
2. Spouses and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of per-
manent resident aliens (114,200)
3. Married sons and married daughters of citizens (23,000)
4. Adult brothers and sisters of citizens (65,000)
Employment-Based Immigrants (140,000 annually)
1. Priority workers (40,040)
a. Aliens with extraordinary ability
b. Professors and researchers
c. Certain multinational executives and managers
2. Members of the professions holding advanced degrees (40,040)
3. Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers (40,040)
4. Special immigrants, usually refugees adjusting their status (9,940)
5. Employment creators, “investors” (9,940)
3 Immigration and Nationality Act.  Retrieved October 25, 2006, from http://www.immigration-usa.
com/ina_96_title_2.html.
4 U.S. Department of State. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulle-
tin/bulletin_2924.html 
5 This number is in addition to the 290,000 annual limit (exempt from the 290,000 numerical cap).
Diversity (55,000 annually, effective 1995)
Non-preferential immigrants ineligible under the other categories
A substantial number of legal immigrants include those not subject 
to these numerical limits—relatives of U.S. citizens and children born 
abroad to permanent residents.  In 2004, this number was approxi-
mately 407,000 (U.S. Census, 2004). An interesting addition to the im-
migration quotas is the “investor program” that issues approximately 
10,000 visas annually to those who are willing to invest one million 
dollars in urban areas or $500,000 in rural areas of the U.S.
Demographic Trends
Newcomers to the U.S. enter under a variety of conditions.  Early 
migrants of the 19th and early 20th centuries came as volunteer immi-
grants, indentured laborers, or as slaves.  Most however, were consid-
ered “legal immigrants,” particularly in the absence of any legislation. 
Present-day immigrants may be categorized as voluntary immigrants 
(illegal or undocumented) or as refugees (and asylees).  Several le-
gal immigrants, after a minimum length of residence in the country, 
choose to apply for U.S. citizenship.
The U.S. Bureau of the Census indicates that in 2004, of the 
approximately 288 million residents of the country, 34 million (12%) 
were foreign born and another 30 million (10%) were children of those 
who had migrated from other countries (Table 1).  On October 17, 2006, 
the population of the U.S. reached the 300 million mark, and this increase 
is a result, not only of birth, but of immigration. Of the foreign born, ﬁve
million are from Europe, eight million from Asia, 18 million from Latin 
America, and three million from other regions, including Africa.
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Tables 2 and 3 present immigrants (1981–2004) and refugees 
(1991–2003) respectively, by region of birth (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2006).  During these years, the largest number from any one country 
was from Mexico.  However, it is clear from the distribution of sending 
countries, that although the largest number of immigrants to the U.S. 
Between 1981 and 2004 has been Mexican (4,621,800), this is still less 
than a quarter of the total entrants during that period (22.86%); the 
percentage is even less if the 1.4 million refugees are included.  Hence, 
it is essential that, while recognizing the strong Mexican presence in 
the U.S., one remain cognizant of the diversity of immigrants.
Table 2: Immigrants, by Country of Birth: 1981 to 2004
(Numbers in thousands)
Region and country of birth 1981- 1990 1991-2000 2001-2003
total total total 2004
All countries 7,338.1 9,095.4 2,833.9 946.1 
Europe 705.6 1,311.4 450.3 127.7 
Asia 2,817.4 2,892.2 936.6 330.0 
Africa 192.3 383.0 163.0 66.3 
Oceania (NA) 48.0 16.0 6.0 
North America 3,125.0 3,917.4 1,063.1 341.2 
Canada 119.2 137.6 52.9 15.6 
Mexico 1,653.3 2,251.4 541.7 175.4 
Caribbean 892.7 996.1 268.9 88.9 
Cuba 159.2 180.9 65.3 20.5 
Dominican Republic 251.8 340.9 70.1 30.5 
Haiti 140.2 181.8 59.7 14.0 
Jamaica 213.8 173.5 43.7 14.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 39.5 63.3 16.6 5.4 
Central America 458.7 531.8 199.5 61.3 
South America 455.9 539.9 198.6 71.8 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Ofﬁce of Immigration Statistics. (2006).
2004 yearbook of immigration statistics.
See also <http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm>.
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Table 3: Immigrants Admitted as Permanent Residents Under Refugee Acts, 
by Country of Birth: 1991 to 2004
Region and country 1991 to 2000, 2001 to 2002, 2003 2004
of birth total total
Total 1,021,266 234,590 44,927 71,230
Europe 426,565 118,736 17,290 24,854
Asia 351,347 41,406 9,885 14,335
Africa 51,649 20,360 7,723 12,443
Oceania 291 52 18 28
North America 185,333 51,503 8,454 18,323
    Cuba 144,612 47,580 7,047 16,678
    Haiti 9,364 1,504 472 536
    El Salvador 4,073 382 194 263
    Guatemala 2,033 809 294 387
    Nicaragua 22,486 631 169 137
South America 5,857 2,158 1,518 1,150
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Ofﬁce of Immigration Statistics. (2006).
2004 yearbook of immigration statistics. 
See also <http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm>.
Among those who voluntarily migrate to the U.S. are immigrants 
without the requisite papers, the undocumented population.  While there 
is no valid method of counting undocumented immigrants, estimates sug-
gest numbers as high 20 as million [See Figure 2 (Knickerbocker, 2006)]. 
These are people who are in the U.S. without governmental approval and 
are sometimes described as economic refugees, but are not so recognized by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  Although undocu-
mented immigrants lack the legal documentation to be residing in the U.S., 
they may have entered the country legally or illegally.  Despite perceptions 
of undocumented immigrants being those who slip across borders without 
appropriate documentation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
stated that a large proportion (about 41%) of all undocumented immigrants, 
particularly from Asian countries, are “overstays” who fail to return to their 
homelands when the period of their visas expires (INS, 2000).
Figure 2:  Undocumented Immigrant Numbers6
Refugees and asylees, unlike immigrants, are usually involuntary 
migrants. The U.S. has always been a refuge for those ﬂeeing from per-
secution and, traditionally, has the largest number of the world’s refugees 
(Mayadas & Segal, 2000). According to the deﬁnition presented in the
1951 convention and the 1967 protocol setting forth the mandate of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, refugees are persons 
who are outside their homelands and are unable to return because of fear 
of persecution. The U.S. President, in consultation with Congress, can 
establish annual numbers and allocations of refugees based on the cur-
rent political climate of the world.  In recent years, these annual numbers 
have been as high as 91,000 in 1999 and as low as 70,000 in 2005 and 
2006 (U.S. Department of State, 2005). Asylees differ from refugees in 
that they usually enter the U.S. on their own volition without prior ap-
proval.  Once within the U.S., they apply for asylum, which may or may 
not result in an admission under refugee status. They are detained until 
a determination is made, at which time, they are either legally admitted 
into the country as refugees or are repatriated to their homelands. Refu-
gees may apply to adjust their status to permanent resident after a year.
In throwback fashion to earlier migration periods of the early 20th 
century, the nation is beginning to see three additional groups of mi-
grants—victims of human smuggling, victims of human trafﬁcking,
and mail-order brides. Those smuggled into the country pay a sub-
6 Reproduced with permission from the May 16, 2006 issue of The Christian Science Monitor, (www.
csmonitor.com)
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stantial price to enter the country clandestinely, and once in the U.S., 
ﬁnd they are burdened with debt and have few employment opportuni-
ties.  Victims of human trafﬁcking, on the other hand, continue to be
exploited for illicit reasons and are practical slaves to those who bring 
them into the country (U.S. Department of State, 2004).  Finally, the 
mail-order bride market is burgeoning, with over 590,000 Web sites 
catering to a growing clientele (Sexuality Information and Education 
Council of the United States, 2004).  Mail-order brides are usually 
women from developing countries who register with a catalogue or 
Web site their intent to marry foreign men.  Usually there is no period 
of courtship, and marriages take place in absentia, with the man having 
“shopped” for the wife who ﬁts his needs. These women, then, enter
the country legally as the wives of U.S. citizens. 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 reﬂect, respectively, the origins of legal,
undocumented, and all immigrants who arrived in the U.S. between 
1991 and 2000 (Massey, 2005).
 Figure 3:  Legal Immigrants 1991-20007
7 Copyright of the American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC
Figure 4:  Undocumented immigrants 20003
Figure 5:  All immigrants 1991-20004
8 Copyright of the American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC
9 Copyright of the American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC
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Under much discussion in the Immigration Reform Bill is a guest 
worker program that will allow temporary workers to enter the country 
for a period of up to six years to assume jobs for which U.S. employers 
are unable to ﬁnd native employees. While this may appear to be a novel
idea, it has long been a part of the cross-border movement for Mexican 
workers who have entered the U.S. for seasonal work and returned home 
at the end of the season.  Known as circular migration, this pattern is 
evidenced regularly and increasingly both in the U.S. and internation-
ally (Hugo, 2003; Zuniga, 2006).  However, concurrently, a signiﬁcant
number of workers who had entered the country illegally, but tradition-
ally followed the pattern of circular migration, are now choosing to re-
main in the U.S., as moving across the U.S.–Mexico border is becoming 
dramatically more dangerous (Zuniga, 2006).  Migration researchers, 
further, are seeing two new phenomena, as immigrants choose to ei-
ther return permanently to their homelands (return migrants) several 
years, or decades, after leaving, or divide their time equally between 
their countries of origin and the U.S. (transnationals).  
Regardless of the process and reasons that immigrants enter the 
U.S., it is clear that for a large proportion, a primary impetus is economic 
opportunity. Furthermore, most rarely completely sever ties with their 
homelands, and a signiﬁcant number send remittances to support family
members, organizations, or communities in their country of origin.
Economic Impact of Immigration 
Many deliberations in the U.S. revolve around the economic im-
pact of migration.  The ongoing immigration debate juggles arguments 
regarding the assets newcomers bring to the country with those about 
the drains they place on the infrastructure, and the country is divided 
on the current net worth of immigration in the 21st century.
The Immigrant Workforce
The recent focus on immigration reform and the guest worker pro-
gram has drawn focus to undocumented workers.  One must bear in mind 
in all deliberations that of the 34 million documented immigrants in the 
U.S., over 27 million are between the ages of 16 and 65 years, the major-
ity of them are in the workforce (Table 4) and they are present across the 
occupational structure (Table 5). A signiﬁcant proportion of the legitimate
workforce, they have the appropriate documentation and are essential to the 
functioning of the country.  While immigrants in 2004 constituted 11% of 
the population, they made up 14% of the labor force and 20% of the low-
wage earners (Nightingale & Fix, 2004).  Ironically, immigrant unemploy-
ment rates fallen faster than those of natives, yet their wages have increased 
half as fast, therefore, while, in general, immigrants have a higher employ-
ment rate and are composed of two-parent families, they are more likely to 
live in poverty than are native born Americans (Nightingale & Fix, 2004).
Table 4: Employment Status of the Foreign-Born Civilian Population 16 Years 
and Over by Sex and World Region of Birth: 2004
(Numbers in thousands. 1/ 2/)
SEX AND EMPLOY-
MENT STATUS
FOREIGN 
BORN
WORLD REGION OF BIRTH
EUROPE ASIA LATIN AMERICA
OTHER 
AREAS
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total Civilian Labor 
Force 21,168 100.0 2,424 100.0 5,470 100.0 11,641 100.0 1,633 100.0
Employed 19,857 93.8 2,294 94.6 5,178 94.7 10,844 93.2 1,542 94.4
Unemployed 1,310 6.2 130 5.4 292 5.3 797 6.8 91 5.6
           
Total Male Civilian 
Labor Force 12,736 100.0 1,295 100.0 3,010 100.0 7,469 100.0 962 100.0
Employed 12,001 94.2 1,223 94.4 2,851 94.7 7,002 93.7 925 96.2
Unemployed 735 5.8 72 5.6 159 5.3 468 6.3 36 3.8
           
Total Female Civilian 
Labor Force 8,432 100.0 1,129 100.0 2,460 100.0 4,172 100.0 671 100.0
Employed 7,857 93.2 1,071 94.9 2,327 94.6 3,843 92.1 616 91.9
Unemployed 575 6.8 58 5.1 133 5.4 329 7.9 55 8.1
1/ The majority of those born in ‘Latin America’ are from Mexico. Those born in ‘Other 
Areas’ are from Africa, Oceania, and Northern America.
2/ Employment status refers to reference week of the survey.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau,. Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement, 2004.
Immigration Statistics Staff, Population Division,  
Internet Release Date:  February 22, 2005
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Table 5: Occupation of Employed Foreign-Born Civilian Workers 16 Years 
and Over by World Region of Birth: 2004
(Numbers in thousands. 1/ 2/)
SEX AND OCCUPA-
TION GROUP
FOREIGN 
BORN
WORLD REGION OF BIRTH
EUROPE ASIA LATIN AMERICA
OTHER 
AREAS
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total 19,857 100.0 2,294 100.0 5,178 100.0 10,844 100.0 1,542 100.0
Management, Profes-
sional, and Related 
Occupations
5,225 26.3 953 41.6 2,332 45.0 1,340 12.4 601 39.0
Management, business, 
and ﬁnancial 1,958 9.9 404 17.6 784 15.1 561 5.2 210 13.6
Professional and related 3,267 16.5 550 24.0 1,548 29.9 779 7.2 391 25.4
Service Occupations 4,631 23.3 315 13.7 830 16.0 3,175 29.3 311 20.2
Sales and Ofﬁce Oc-
cupations 3,737 18.8 556 24.2 1,221 23.6 1,666 15.4 294 19.1
Sales and related 1,870 9.4 240 10.5 687 13.3 784 7.2 160 10.3
Ofﬁce and administra-
tive 1,867 9.4 316 13.8 535 10.3 882 8.1 135 8.7
Farming, Fishing, and 
Forestry Occupations 309 1.6 1 0.1 15 0.3 289 2.7 4 0.3
Construction, Extrac-
tion, and Maintenance 
Occupations
2,556 12.9 214 9.3 173 3.4 2,047 18.9 122 7.9
Construction and 
extraction 1,925 9.7 156 6.8 61 1.2 1,625 15.0 83 5.4
Installation, mainte-
nance, and repair 632 3.2 58 2.5 112 2.2 423 3.9 38 2.5
Production, Transpor-
tation, and Material 
Moving 
3,398 17.1 254 11.1 606 11.7 2,327 21.5 210 13.6
Production 2,108 10.6 149 6.5 474 9.2 1,388 12.8 96 6.2
Transportation and 
material moving 1,290 6.5 105 4.6 132 2.5 939 8.7 114 7.4
- Represents zero or rounds to zero.
1/ The majority of those born in ‘Latin America’ are from Mexico. Those born in ‘Other Areas’ 
are from Africa, Oceania, and Northern America.
2/ Status refers to reference week of the survey.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement, 2004,
Immigration Statistics Staff, Population Division
Internet Release Date:  February 22, 2005
Several big businesses, construction companies, agriculture, and 
employers in many service industries contend that the absence of im-
migrant workers would cause a major catastrophe in the U.S. economy. 
These groups, speciﬁcally, refer to the absence of the unauthorized
workforce.  Caulﬁeld (2006) indicates that in his survey of approx-
imately 800 building contractors, half admitted to having some un-
documented workers, and several indicated that hiring all native-born 
workers makes the companies less competitive.  Others suggested that 
there were not enough legitimate workers available for the positions, 
and if the illegal immigrant workforce was reduced, their companies 
would not be able to maintain production as their current levels.  There 
continues to be a strong, steady demand for migrant workers in agri-
culture, construction, manufacturing, and hospitality (Kochhar, 2005). 
About 6.3 million undocumented workers are Mexican and estimated 
to ﬁll 25% of all agricultural, 17% of ofﬁce and house cleaning, 14% of
construction, and 12% of food preparation jobs.
It is estimated that about 850,000 unauthorized immigrants enter 
the U.S. annually, and have done so since 1990, for a total of close to 
12 million (Passel, 2006).  The majority (78%) is believed to be from 
Latin America, 56% from Mexico (about 7 million), and 22% from 
other countries of Central and South Americas.  The Pew Hispanic 
Center estimates that California and Texas have the largest numbers of 
unauthorized migrants at 2.7 million and 1.6 million respectively, while 
Florida and New York also have substantial numbers.  While there is a 
pervasive tendency to believe that all undocumented immigrants cross 
the border illegally, the Ofﬁce of Homeland Security (previously the
Immigration and Naturalization Service) revealed that approximately 
half the unauthorized immigrants are visa overstays (Grieco, 2005). 
These individuals enter the U.S. with appropriate documentation, but 
remain in the country after their visas expire.
Despite the recent bill passed by the Senate that focuses on unauthor-
ized immigrants in the U.S., despite concerns about illegal workers, and 
in spite of the fact that most speciﬁcally targeted are Mexican immigrants,
it is clear that the U.S. is severely divided about their presence.  The New 
York Times, in recent months, has featured numerous articles on undocu-
mented Mexican workers and reports that, although border enforcement 
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has been heightened since 1990, and although policy makers are aware 
that most migrants come to work, policing the workplace appears to 
have low priority.  In 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service devoted 9% (albeit a small number) of its personnel to scour-
ing the workplace; that percentage in 2006 has decreased to 4% (Portes 
2006). Although there were believed to be about 7 million undocu-
mented workers in the country in 2004, only three companies received 
penalty notices, down from 417 in 1999.  Experts suggest that illegal 
immigration has not declined because in reality it would harm the U.S. 
economy (Portes, 2006).  This is reinforced by Bernstein’s (2006) se-
ries of articles entitled “100 Years in the Back Door, Out the Front,” 
that portray the revolving door that entices Mexican migrants with la-
bor opportunities, with U.S. immigration policies making half-hearted 
efforts in occasional repatriation.  Many business leaders and immi-
gration advocates believe that the deportation of undocumented work-
ers would cause a collapse in the U.S. economy (Ohlemacher, 2006).
For under $50, unauthorized immigrants can buy a set of forged 
documents (social security card and permanent residency card) which 
protect employers from appearing to have violated the law (Portes, 
2006).   Interestingly, the country beneﬁts, as millions of illegal work-
ers who are listed in company books receive wages that appear to be 
legal, and, hence, they pay taxes.  Using Idaho to provide a context and 
show the effects of the Mexican labor force in the U.S., Wu [(2005), see 
Figure 4] indicates that because of the lack of legal status, Mexicans are 
likely to be engaged in low skill manual labor, often under hazardous 
conditions, and without health insurance.  Several experts agree that 
were wage exploitation less the norm and were a higher wage offered 
for some jobs ﬁlled by migrant workers, there is a greater likelihood
that U.S. citizens would apply for them.  Wu (2005) very succinctly 
summarizes a frequent observation that is evident around the country 
that “Despite (these) harsh living and working conditions, the undoc-
umented Mexican work force helps stabilize the (Idaho) economy in 
several ways, including ﬁlling jobs at the bottom of the occupational
spectrum, paying taxes, and displaying little dependence on govern-
ment beneﬁts.” (See http://www.boisestate.edu/history/issuesonline/
fall2005_issues/5f_numbers_mex.html)
Undocumented Mexican workers, on average, work about 20 hours 
a week longer (at about 58 hours) than legal immigrants from Mexi-
co, naturalized Mexicans, and U.S.-born Mexicans (Wu, 2005).   The 
former receives an average hourly wage of $4.94 (below the current 
minimum wage of $5.15), and less than documented Mexican workers, 
who receive $11.90.  Their poverty rate n Idaho is 34% (three times the 
national average), yet 92% are paid by check and are “on the books” 
of their employers, so they do pay taxes by deductions through pay-
roll.   Although they do pay taxes, Camarota (2001) found that because 
of their low levels of education, they join the labor pool of unskilled 
workers, and because of their undocumented status, they are unable 
to get credentialed in the U.S.  Their access to jobs and the possibility 
for advancement are rather limited (Passel, 2006).  They do compete 
with the 10 million natives who are less educated, and because of their 
willingness to work for low wages, they have also lowered the wages 
of natives without high school diplomas by 5 percent; thus, the group 
in the U.S. most affected by Mexican migration is the population that 
is already among the poorest (Camarota, 2001). 
Labor Market, Low-Wage, and Entry-Level Occupations
Ness (2006) writes of the immigrant workforce that, in New 
York, has been essential in ﬁlling low-wage, entry-level occupations
that most U.S.-born Americans seek to avoid but upon which  the 
nation has come to depend.  Furthermore, despite the tendency to 
believe that these occupations are ﬁlled only by unauthorized work-
ers, both formal and informal labor market intermediaries channel 
new immigrants to potential employers (Theodore & Mehta, 2001). 
These intermediaries may be educational institutions, employment 
agencies, and community organizations, for example.  They may 
also be day labor “temp” agencies that recruit and place individuals 
in temporary positions, many with low wages and little room for ad-
vancement.  In their study of immigrants in Chicago, Theodore and 
Mehta (2001) found that the majority of immigrant workers were 
concentrated in a limited number of occupations (Table 6)
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Table 6: Distribution of Immigrant Employment Across Occupational Segments
Occupation Percentage
Food Preparation and Service Occupations 12.5%
Cleaning and Building Service Occupations, except Household 8.0%
Freight, Stock and Material Handlers 7.0%
Miscellaneous and Not Speciﬁed Machine Operators 6.4%
Machine Operators, Metal and Assorted Materials, Except Precision 6.0%
Private Household Occupations  6.0%
Construction Trades, Except Supervisors 5.5%
Sales Workers, Retail and Personal Services 4.5%
Fabricators, Assemblers, and Hand Working Occupations 4.3%
Material Recording, Scheduling, and Distributing Clerks 3.3%
Total 63.5%
Interestingly, low wages for immigrants is not limited to blue-col-
lar occupations.  Miano (2005) reported that immigrants entering the 
U.S. on the H-1B visa, which is issued to “high-tech” foreign workers, 
the majority who come from India and China, usually are at the bottom 
of the pay scale for their positions.  On average, despite legal require-
ments that these workers be paid the prevailing wage, H-1B visa work-
ers were paid $13,000 less than their American counterparts.
A recent study, however, appears to contradict earlier research that 
immigrants are taking jobs that are not of interest to native workers. 
Sum, Harrington, and Khatiwada (2006), in an exploration of the ef-
fects of immigration on the workforce found that between the years of 
2000 and 2005, immigrant workers displaced young native workers, 
aged 16–34 years, and they estimated that 66% of the nation’s new im-
migrants are working illegally. Controversial authority George Borjas 
(2001) suggests that net gains to the U.S. economy are only $8 billion 
annually and because many immigrants work for lower wages, immi-
gration actually shifts several billions of dollars each year to employers 
and to users of services for immigrants. Further, he posits that because 
current immigrants are less educated and skilled than their predeces-
sors, they may be more dependent on public assistance and live in 
poverty and segregation.  More recently, Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 
(2006) have found that because low-skilled immigrants are displacing 
low-skilled African American workers, they are contributing not only 
to their unemployment but also to their incarceration rates.
Brain Gain Versus Brain Drain
Despite Emma Lazarus’ wonderfully touching poem etched upon 
the Statue of Liberty,
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I life my lamp beside the golden door
it is important to be aware that individuals that undertake the chal-
lenge of migrating to an alien land and culture are rarely those without 
substantial human capital.  While this capital may not be in the form 
of tangible assets, it often is found in psychological, intellectual, and 
physical capabilities.  As immigrants move to the U.S. to enhance their 
opportunities, most bring with them a variety of resources that can 
beneﬁt the U.S.  A signiﬁcant number of individuals come to the coun-
try to further their education and eventually adjust their visas to im-
migrant status.  This process has long been known as the “brain drain” 
as the educated, often of a developing nation, leave their homeland in 
search of greater opportunities.  What is more recently recognized is 
the “brain gain” to countries that draw such immigrants.  As one re-
views the list of Nobel Prize winners in recent years, a disproportion-
ate number are originally from countries outside the U.S. 
Highly-educated people who stay in developing countries are few, 
for this is a group that tends to migrate, particularly to the U.S., Canada, 
and Western Europe.  Researchers indicate that one in ten adults with 
some university education and who were born in the developing world 
are now in developed countries (Sriskandarajah, 2005).  Furthermore, 
legal immigration to the U.S. of people without at least an elementary 
education is small.  The largest group of immigrants is from other North 
American countries and the majority have a high school education.  The 
second largest group is from Asia, and its population is generally highly 
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educated.  Finally, immigration from South America and Africa is rela-
tively small, however, African immigrants are also highly educated (Car-
rington, & Detragiache, 1999).  Thus, the brain drain from developing 
countries results in a brain gain for countries such as the U.S., as the edu-
cated and talented make the U.S. their home.  One company in California 
has boldly named itself “Brain Gain Recruiting” (http://www.braingain-
recruiting.com/) and seeks to hire staff for high tech companies.
The recent phenomenon of the “reverse brain drain” is causing 
some concern with the outsourcing of production and of services, as 
not only do companies seek to have their products and services made 
in other countries, increasing numbers of both native-born Americans 
and ﬁrst-generation (immigrant) Americans are choosing to live out-
side the U.S., where they see better opportunities (Weber, 2004).
Conversely, however, the brain drain can be of beneﬁt to sending
countries in the form of remittances to the homeland.  The World Bank 
reports that although most expatriates send money to support family 
members, the receiving country’s economy beneﬁts from the ﬂow of
these additional monies.  Thus, the brain drain serves to provide income 
and help offset poverty for poorer or less-educated family members and, 
to some extent, counteracts the effects of the loss of educated individu-
als (Ozden & Schiff, 2006).  Thus, although the brain drain may not 
directly beneﬁt the sending country, indirect beneﬁts may help build ca-
pacity in the country of origin (Asian Development Bank, 2005).  These 
remittances, furthermore, can be quite substantial.  In one community, 
expatriate Mexicans in the U.S. sent 16% of their income back home 
(Drake, 2006) with remittances in 1999 being as high as $6.8 billion. 
Such remittance not only allows Mexico to develop its social capital, it 
also enables Mexican expatriates to ﬁrmly establish and maintain their
connections in their home communities (Mooney, 2004).   Thus, mi-
grants may send money to their family members, they may invest in 
business opportunities in their home communities, or they may spend 
savings on a range of activities when they return to Mexico for visits.  
Second Generation and Workforce Education
The immigrant and second generations are known as “New Ameri-
cans,” keeping the majority society aware that second-generation immi-
grants face unique challenges as they juggle their bi-cultural identities. 
As immigrants enter the U.S. to enhance their opportunities and those 
of their children, regardless of whether they are highly educated or not, 
most seem to value education as the route to success. Hence, overall, 
second-generation American adults have a higher level of education-
al attainment than do either the immigrant generation or native-born 
adults with native-born parents (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004).
While Chiswick & DebBurman’s (2004) study suggests the suc-
cess of the second generation, Portes (2006) states that the immigrant 
workforce looks like an hourglass, with the top half being composed 
of the successful professionals, entrepreneurs, and technical workers 
and the bottom  half composed  of the vast majority of Mexican im-
migrants and other low-wage workers, and it is difﬁcult for children of
the latter to move into success. While most children of highly-educated 
immigrants become high achievers, several children of immigrants in 
the lower half of the hourglass experience downward assimilation and 
join the under classes. 
Social Impact of Migration Policies
Immigrant Inﬂuences on the U.S. and the Native-Born
As immigrants enter the U.S. and adapt to life in their new home-
land, they bring with them a diversity of cultures and norms.  The U.S. 
prides itself at being a multicultural nation, a nation of immigrants, 
and, clearly, as the U.S. inﬂuences these New Americans, the country
is inﬂuenced by them.  The country is substantially impacted by the
multiplicity of languages that are spoken by immigrants, and from any 
cursory look at border towns in the Southwestern United States, or in 
Florida, New York, or California, it is apparent that the impact of the 
Spanish language is profound and permanent.  Immigrants inﬂuence the
U.S. culture and society through their social norms, family patterns, art, 
music, dance, cuisine, and businesses.  They expose native-born Ameri-
cans to alternative modes of behavior and social relationships, differ-
ences in perceptions and interpretations, and variations in experiences 
and observations.  They may challenge traditional American norms and 
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require that Americans reassess or defend them.  Orum (2005) suggests 
that it is essential that one evaluate the impact immigrants have on host 
nations.  Focusing only on the immigrants’ adaptation, which is what 
most theoreticians tend to do, will provide only a partial picture.  
With the opening of U.S. borders with the liberalized Immigration 
Act of 1965, came an unprecedented ﬂow of immigrants from Asian,
and to a somewhat smaller extent, South American countries.  While 
in the early years, these immigrants came as skilled workers, the ﬂow
continues through the family reuniﬁcation stream, and the numbers
continue to grow substantially.  The impact of observable Asian factors 
are evident across the U.S. from the large metropolitan areas to smaller, 
less populated and somewhat rural communities.  The effect of Mexi-
can migration continues to expand as Mexican migrants move to non-
traditional destinations (Donato, Stainback, & Bankston, 2005).
Impact on Health, Education, and Social Service Systems
Health Systems
U.S. health policy, which allows health coverage for many, but not 
for all, has particular implications for those in poverty, those who are 
near poverty, and those of low socioeconomic status and income that 
are self-employed.  The last group is the least likely to be able to af-
ford private insurance coverage, yet it is ineligible for means-tested 
coverage such as Medicaid.  In discussing those who are underinsured 
and uninsured, Karger and Stoesz  (1998) indicate that the non-cover-
age rate is higher for minorities.  Large segments of the immigrant 
population are self-employed and the exorbitant costs of private insur-
ance may well correlate with low insurance coverage.  Furthermore, 
new immigrants are likely to be poor and stay poor because they have 
higher levels of unemployment, less education, and larger families than 
do native-born groups (Haniffa, 1999).  
Implications of health policy for immigrants are not limited to is-
sues of coverage; several other cultural and educational concerns con-
found access to health care services.  Health policy ought not to focus 
only on who is covered but also on how services are utilized.  Cur-
rently, general access to health care services is fraught with problems 
for many immigrant groups, and the access problems are exacerbated 
by the implementation of the 1995 Federal Welfare Reform law (H.R. 
3734).  Even if immigrants do have good health care coverage, they 
may be less knowledgeable about the availability of programs and 
services.  They may also be more suspicious of different treatment 
methods, uncomfortable with interaction patterns with health care pro-
viders, and confused by governmental and other insurance programs 
and reimbursement procedures.  Any or all of these factors discourage 
them from utilizing the health services that are available to them.  A 
number of phenomena are prevalent in the immigrant experience of 
illness and treatment and must be understood within the cultural con-
text.  The most pervasive of these may be poor knowledge of preventa-
tive health care, the use of home remedies, and the underutilization 
of services. Even with good U.S. health programs, cultural, linguistic, 
and economic barriers can deny the immigrant opportunities for dis-
ease prevention, early diagnosis, prompt treatment, and participation 
in clinical trials (Tu, Taplin, Barlow, & Boyko, 1999). Immigrants who 
are educated, professional, and can function in the mainstream are bet-
ter equipped to meet their health needs.  On the other hand, those who 
have little education, few English-language skills, and remain within 
ethnic enclaves may be more likely to suffer from physical aliments 
and less likely to seek professional treatment.  Recent immigrants are 
much less likely than either native-born individuals or those who have 
been in the U.S. longer to access medical care or have contact with 
physicians.  Some, in fact, access care as infrequently as those who 
have no health insurance at all (Leclere, Jensen, & Biddlecom, 1994).
Thus, when a large segment of the immigrant population ﬁnally ac-
cesses health care services, it may be through the already overburdened 
emergency rooms or through practitioners who are unprepared to com-
municate with them, either because of language differences or cultural 
barriers.  Furthermore, medical practitioners may not be familiar with 
social norms (i.e., the tendency to indicate agreement to show respect) 
and believe that patients have understood and will be compliant with 
directions, when they may have not understood nor may plan on be-
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ing compliant.  Health care providers should, at the very least, become 
cognizant of differences in health practices and patterns of interaction, 
perhaps modifying their own to accommodate a changing patient pool.
Educational Systems
The national policy [20 USCS, Sec. 1221–1 (1999)] states:
Recognizing that the Nation’s economic, political, and social se-
curity require a well-educated citizenry, the Congress (1) reafﬁrms,
as a matter of high priority, the Nation’s goal of equal education op-
portunity, and (2) declares it to be the policy of the United States of 
America that every citizen is entitled to an education to meet his or her 
full potential without ﬁnancial barriers. (p. 10).
Referring to federal immigration policies, Congress speciﬁed in
20 USCS, Sec. 7402–1 (1999) that the collection of language-minor-
ity Americans in the U.S. speak almost all the world’s languages and 
that there are even greater numbers of children and young people of 
limited English proﬁciency.  These children face numerous challenges
in their efforts to received adequate education and become an integral 
part of U.S. society.  Several decades ago, Congress recommended that 
elementary and secondary school education be strengthened with bi-
lingual education, language-enhancement, and language-acquisition 
programs, however, recent immigrant backlash has resulted in “Eng-
lish only” resolutions in a number of states.  Congress also proposed 
an emergency immigrant education policy to help the large number 
of immigrant children who lack English language skills to make the 
transition.  Free public school education to the secondary school level, 
furthermore, is available to all residents in the U.S. regardless of visa 
status, and children under the age of 16 years are mandated to be en-
rolled in school.  Thus, this mandate (and access) applies to all immi-
grant children, whether they are documented or unauthorized.
In response to the awareness that limited English language capabil-
ities of adults also handicap their functioning in the U.S., several public 
educational institutions, libraries, and non-proﬁt organizations have be-
gun free language classes for adults.  Many of these do not ask immigra-
tion status.  Thus, not only have governmental policies been modiﬁed
to adapt to the educational needs of immigrants, other institutions are 
voluntarily assuming the responsibility of providing educational access 
for several immigrants who, otherwise, may not have had it.
Social Service Systems
Amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935 currently provide 
for: (1) a combination of old age and survivors’ insurance (OASI) and 
disability insurance (DI), known as (OASDI); (2) unemployment in-
surance; (3) federal assistance to the elderly, the visually impaired, and 
those with disabilities under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program; (4) public assistance to families under the new Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program; (5) federal health in-
surance for the elderly (Medicare); and (6) federal and state health as-
sistance for the poor (Medicaid).  While some immigrants beneﬁt from
the services delivered through the Social Security Act, their use often 
differs from that of the native-born population, both because of their 
socio-demographic characteristics and because of the changes in eli-
gibility requirements enacted by Congress in 1996.  Several of these 
changes that were implemented speciﬁcally limit immigrant access,
particularly to cash assistance and medical beneﬁts until they have
been in the country a certain length of time.   The Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of August 
22, 1996 (10 Statutes-at-Large 2105), lists the following restrictions for 
“qualiﬁed” immigrants who entered the U.S. after that date:
Barred from SSI and food stamps
Subject to a 5-year bar on non-emergency Medicaid, the Child 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and TANF.
After a 5-year bar, subject to deeming for the above program.  Ex-
emptions for one year for some battered spouses and children, 
those at risk for going hungry or becoming homeless.
After 5-year bar, states still retain option to determine immi-
grant eligibility for TANF, Medicaid, and social service block 
grants.  
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The changes mandated through PRWORA effectively bar qualiﬁed
needy families, the elderly, and women with dependent children from 
applying for assistance, and census ﬁgures suggest that the number of
needy families and elderly is sizable, and the laws have resulted in both 
economic and psychological difﬁculties for them (Clarke, 2004).
In general, social welfare services are minimally accessed by im-
migrants (Kretsedemas, 2003)  for a number of cultural reasons, among 
them shame in seeking assistance from outside the family and fear 
and distrust of governmental authority.  Thus, although there may be a 
need, this population may not seek assistance, even when it is qualiﬁed
or in need.   Consequently, the social services are frequently under the 
misconception that immigrants either have few social service needs 
or the family and/or immigrant community is able to address them. 
Results are that needs are not addressed, and immigrant families may 
struggle alone with dysfunction (Segal, 2002).  Although the increased 
attention to the experience of refugees in the U.S. is an important step 
made by the social services, outreach efforts to other immigrant groups 
may be effective in preventing future and greater difﬁculties for these
populations and the community at large.
Inter-Group Marriages and Families
Most societies of the world have traditionally frowned upon mar-
riages or intimate extramarital relationships between people of differ-
ent socio-economic backgrounds.  Prohibition against marriages and 
relationships between two people of different races or ethnic groups 
has been even more common.  Prejudice, lack of trust, fear, concern 
about contamination of bloodlines, and variety of other economic and 
psychosocial factors, endemic in U.S. history and transmitted through 
generations, have worked in concert to prevent intermarriage between 
different groups. Researchers and demographers, including census tak-
ers, agree that interracial marriage is on the rise, and they view such 
unions as an advance in race relations and a decline in racism. The 
U.S. Census reported 5.5 mixed race individuals in its 2005 American 
Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).  
Marriage between members of different groups is both a tran-
scendence of ethnic segregation and the forging of an American iden-
tity that is distinct from the ethnic American identity of subgroups 
(National Immigration Forum, 1999).  It not only attests to a newly-
formed American identity but also loosens ethnic and cultural ties 
with the parental generation, making an even stronger statement of 
adaptation and commitment to the U.S.  Both foreign-born Asians 
and foreign-born Latinos have higher rates of intermarriage than do 
U.S. European or African Americans, and intermarriage rates for 
second and third generations of the former two groups are extremely 
high (National Immigration Forum, 1999).  The native-born, second 
generation is more likely than immigrants to intermarry, but even for 
immigrants, the prevalence of intermarriage steadily increases with 
the length of time spent in the U.S.  It is apparent that while immi-
grants are being inﬂuenced by the host country, increasing intermar-
riage is modifying family relationships.
Theoreticians and researchers, thus, suggest that acculturation 
is not unidirectional.  In the process of adapting to the U.S., ethnic 
and immigrant groups introduce the U.S. to their own traditions, 
values, and styles of life.  With increases in global communication 
and international travel, both European and African Americans are 
beginning to value a variety of philosophies, religions, patterns of 
behavior, eating, and dress.  Increasing societal acceptance of di-
verse options lowers pressure for ethnic groups to assimilate to all 
European American norms.  Beyond the outward indices, trends 
show that assimilation by the White culture is also under way as it 
begins to embrace family values and philosophies that are basic to 
Asian, African, and Latino societies.
Development of Human Capital
U.S. society is increasingly aware of ethnic and cultural dif-
ferences among immigrants, particularly those of color and the na-
tive-born populations.  Interest in understanding attitudes, values, 
religions, and behaviors is reﬂected in the burgeoning literature on
immigrants and refugees.  Social service agencies have often had 
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to mediate between immigrants and U.S. institutions as newcomers 
learn to adapt to their new environments.  In the process, the environ-
ment itself is being sensitized to the diversity of the new arrivals.
Less focus has been placed on the systematic understanding of the 
socio-economic levels of these immigrant groups and their implications 
for adaptation and achievement.  Based on the allocation of immigration 
visas, there have been a variety of legal immigrant streams that have en-
tered the United States in the last few decades.  While earlier immigrants 
of the 1960s were, primarily of a professional stream, current streams 
are more likely to include large numbers entering through family re-
uniﬁcation processes.  These individuals and groups may not have the
human capital and skills that are readily transferable into the fast-paced 
technological society.  Consequently, the promised “land of milk and 
honey” may not be so for them.  Further, refugees and undocumented 
immigrants may frequently ﬁnd themselves on the fringes of society—
the former for a signiﬁcant portion of their lives, and the latter, almost
for their entire stay in the U.S.  Thus, a large segment of the immigrant 
group, particularly the newer immigrants of the last decade, is likely to 
be marginalized.  Without the requisite English language competencies, 
education, and usable job skills, many hover at poverty levels.
As one looks at the immigrant experience in the United States, 
one is struck by the realization that for some, this is the “land of op-
portunity,” but for others it is a “ﬁeld of dreams.”  Many immigrants in
the beginning of the 21st century have been highly successful, while 
others have continued to struggle.  With the bimodal distribution of the 
immigrant population’s level of achievement, and the rising numbers 
of unmet health, education, and welfare needs, this can be a social, if 
not an economic, drain on the country.  
In addition, it is important to differentiate between immigration 
policy, (the laws that determine who is eligible to enter the country) and 
immigrant policy (laws and programs that reﬂect how immigrants are
received once they are in the country).  The former are federally regu-
lated and apply across the nation, while the latter are highly dependent 
on state and local programs and local public perceptions and can show 
a great deal of variability.  Several immigrant policies are instrumental 
in determining how well human capital is nurtured and developed.
Transferable Human Capital
Closely linked with one’s status in the home country is the human 
capital that may be transferable across nations.  Education and vocation 
are the two primary factors that positively affect transition.  Literacy 
not only provides individuals with knowledge, but also opens a world 
of opportunity by equipping them with the tools to be lifelong learners. 
With the skills of literacy, they are able to read and better comprehend 
explanations of situations that are initially alien.  While knowledge of 
the language of the country into which individuals are entering greatly 
enhances the process of adjustment, being literate in one’s native lan-
guage reinforces self-efﬁcacy and strengthens prospects of pursuing
learning in other languages and environments.  Therefore, in general, 
the higher the level of education possessed by individuals, the greater 
is their ability to adjust outside the home country.
Along with education, a signiﬁcant element in the adjustment
process is occupation.  The extent to which professions are transport-
able certainly depends on whether they are useful to the economy of 
the country of adoption.  When individuals have spent their lives in 
agrarian communities, developing their competence in farming, tran-
sitions to fast-paced computerized and industrialized societies make 
their farming skills obsolete.  On the other hand, practice in computer 
software enhances the likelihood of ﬁnding a congruous niche in a
technological environment.
It behooves one to bear in mind that even under the most deplor-
able circumstances, it is not the most needy, weak, and oppressed who 
leave a country of origin but those who have, at the very least, physical, 
emotional, and psychological fortitude.  Without personal strengths, 
individuals are less likely to leave their homelands, and if they do, they 
are less likely to survive.  It is essential to view immigrants through 
Saleebey’s (2002) “strengths perspective,” identifying their human 
capital, namely their assets and capabilities, to understand their re-
sponses to the process of migration.
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Many new immigrants to a country arrive with little facility in 
the language of the host country, which is often the primary obstacle. 
Without language ability, seeking housing or employment, accessing 
health care or other services, or learning a vocation become impos-
sible.  Language competence increases ability to negotiate through a 
nation’s bureaucracies, and literacy, or the ability to read and write in 
the host language further improves opportunities.
The stresses on immigrants and refugees in translocation are enor-
mous and well documented10. Many are associated with the traumas of 
dramatic emigration–immigration processes. However, other stresses 
result from culture shock in an alien environment, where language, 
social structures, norms, expectations, and values substantially differ 
from those that have been elemental to the immigrants’ understand-
ing of themselves. Here, well understood role relationships change and 
established patterns of interaction are questioned. When immigrants 
have the psychological capability of coping, they are more likely to 
be able to control the direction of their lives. On the other hand, they 
may experience post-traumatic stress disorder, as do many refugees. 
Without sufﬁcient and appropriate social and emotional support, and
perhaps therapy, many fail to ﬁnd the immigration experience satis-
factory, remaining unhappy, resenting their lives in the new land, and 
pining for their homelands (Ahearn, 2000).
Readiness of Receiving Country for Immigrants—Social Capital
The readiness of a receiving country to accept immigrants in gen-
eral, or an immigrant group in particular is, itself, a complex matter. 
When immigration is viewed as inextricably bound to a nation’s politi-
cal, economic, and social well being as well as its future security in-
terests, it is likely to be welcomed. Nevertheless, immigration policies 
of many countries are temporal, reﬂecting what is believed to be of
beneﬁt at a particular moment.  Nations also fulﬁll international agree-
ments in the resettlement or provision of asylum to large numbers of 
refugees, to facilitate government action and for humanitarian reasons. 
10 See United Nationals High Commissioner for Refugees’ Web site: http://www.unhcr.org. (to be 
changed to www.unhcr.ch)
Policies that allow immigration are coupled with those that permit the 
expulsion or deportation of foreign nationals.  
Serageldin (1999) indicates that social capital, “the internal social 
and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern in-
teractions among people and the institutions in which they are embed-
ded” (p. i), is essential in ensuring that opportunities within a nation 
are strong and viable.  By deﬁnition, social capital requires some coop-
eration among individuals and groups and is a form of public “good” or 
beneﬁt (Grootaert, 1997).  Social capital is a necessity in the creation
of human capital (Coleman, 1988) and immigrants’ adjustment is often 
linked to the social capital available to them.
Japan’s Ministry of Education, the Monbusho (1997), for example, 
states that education constitutes the foundation of all social systems. 
Immigrants may, or may not, have come with an adequate education. 
The educational system and education policy of the host country must 
allow access to levels and types of education and institutions that are ap-
propriate to their needs. Adult education programs to improve literacy 
will ensure better adjustment to the new environment.  Furthermore, ap-
propriate education for immigrant children must take into account dif-
ﬁculties that can occur as they enter a school system without a working
knowledge of the medium of instruction.  Variations in cultural patterns 
and behavior ought to be accommodated by schools, with an awareness 
that emigration, even in the best of circumstances, is traumatic.
The nation’s welfare policies should guarantee that all immigrants 
have admittance to appropriate public welfare services and subsidies and 
are connected to private welfare programs as necessary.  Hence, public 
policy and law may need to be reviewed frequently to assess their adequa-
cy for all the nations’ residents and should be so modiﬁed as to remove
barriers to the administration and utilization of the services they govern.
The availability and accessibility to social capital is paramount in 
the successful settlement of immigrants in their country of adoption. The 
implementation of sustainable development projects ensuring that immi-
grants receive the social and economic tools to succeed in their new coun-
tries is essential.  In addition to providing new arrivals with economic sub-
sidies, housing and health care, community-based educational programs 
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and training ought to provide the components for new immigrants to move 
away from dependency on society’s support programs (Lobo & Mayadas, 
1997).  Hence, knowledge about prevention of disease, ability to function 
through society’s institutional structures, and earning capacity in the le-
gitimate economy of the country will enhance the likelihood of self-sufﬁ-
ciency.  Social and mental health services need to recognize the difﬁculties
associated with the immigration experience and assist immigrants in their 
adjustment to the receiving country.  This may include helping immigrants 
understand the norms and expectations of the country as well as implica-
tions for their own traditions and family and community relationships.
English Language Training, Job Training, and Training in 
Social/Cultural and Workplace Norms 
Immigrant children fairly rapidly learn the English language, even 
if they are denied a bilingual education, for despite laws in the mid-20th 
century that required the establishment of bilingual programs, in the last 
two and a half decades, increasing numbers of states are moving toward 
an “English only” policy in schools (see Web site: http://www.umich.
edu/~ac213/student_projects05/be/legislation.html ). However, of the 
1.2 million individuals in adult education classes, over half are there to 
learn English and another 3 million are awaiting English language edu-
cation (Murguia & Munoz, 2005). Although federally-funded programs 
expanded during the Clinton administration, these have been declining 
since.  Fix & Capps (2002), in their study of immigrants in New York 
City and Los Angeles County, where 20% of the immigrant population 
lived in 2000, found that immigrants with low English proﬁciency were
more likely to be poor (Figure 6) and lack sufﬁcient food (Figure 7).
Even the Refugee Resettlement Program that has as its primary 
goal “self-sufﬁciency in the shortest time possible,” provides English
language education for a period of about eight months, and within that 
time, refugees must ﬁnd a job that will sustain them. If their English
language competence is low, the likelihood is that they will get posi-
tions in low-paying entry level occupations with little room for ad-
vancement without English competence.  To support their families and 
themselves, they must often work at more than one job, leaving little 
time to gain functional literacy in English.  Consequently, development 
of human capital is severely curtailed.
Figure 6:  LEP & Poverty
Figure 7:  LEP & Food Insecurity
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Additionally, functional English is not always sufﬁcient for success
in the workplace. In addition to being able to utilize the English language 
with the requisite skills to complete a job, immigrants may have to acquire 
social and cultural training in workplace norms.  Thus, it is essential that 
these be integrated into job training and language classes.  The Center for 
Immigrant Education and Training, at the La Guardia Community Col-
lege in New York, seeks to provide a curriculum to prepare immigrants to 
enter the workforce with the necessary vocational and cultural skills (see 
http://www.lagcc.cuny.edu/ciet/jobtraining.htm). Other such programs 
around the country focus on job training for immigrants, recognizing that 
many may not have skills that are readily transferable to the U.S. econo-
my.  Job readiness enhances both employment options and outcomes for 
low-wage immigrants and allow them a route for advancement.
Training of Native-Born Employers and Service Providers
If 12% of the population is of the immigrant generation and another 
13% is second generation, most individuals will have the opportunity to 
work with, for, or along side these groups.  Learning about immigrants 
is increasingly imperative if employers and service providers are to ad-
equately utilize their resources or have their resources utilized. At the 
very least, both employers and service providers must: (a) be culturally 
aware; (b) avoid discrimination, intimidation, and exploitation; and (c) 
protect workplace rights.  Grey (2002) provides a practical and “cultur-
ally competent” guide for managers and supervisors in “welcoming” 
immigrants into Iowa.  This guide recommends, in addition to learning 
about immigrant populations and the immigrant experience: (1) bring-
ing on board the leadership of organizations before expecting changes 
in the organization; (2) undertaking an audit regarding the readiness 
of the organization to integrate these new groups into their function-
ing; (3) if the organization is not prepared, developing guidelines for 
becoming so and integrating communication and training programs 
for both long-term workers and new organizational recruits; and (4) 
making a commitment to maintaining a diverse workforce by making 
long-term cultural changes, focusing on similarities rather than differ-
ences, and generating a cross-cultural organizational attitude. 
Increasing Health Care Access
The Centers for Disease Control found that foreign-born adults 
were uninsured at higher rates (26%) than their U.S. -born counterparts 
(11%), and Hispanic adults were the most likely to be without insur-
ance [(37%) (Dey & Lucas, 2006)].  Immigrants were twice as likely as 
native-born adults to have no usual source of health care, less likely to 
have spoken to a health care practitioner in the past year, or ever, and 
yet they reported lower health risk factors and chronic disease than their 
U.S.-born counterparts.  Risk factors (i.e., obesity and hypertension) 
tended to increase with length of time in the U.S.  The study did not 
indicate whether immigrants see health care practitioners because there 
was no need, because preventive medicine may not be the norm, or be-
cause they lacked insurance coverage.  Other publications indicate that 
in their early years in the U.S., regardless of their immigration status, 
many fear deportation, lack of conﬁdentiality, and poor communication
and choose not to seek health care services.  Other issues that interfere 
with access for all citizens also affect immigrants, including long wait-
ing periods, appointments set far in the future, and limited physician ac-
cess.  Addressing health care needs is fundamental to ensuring a sense 
of well-being, which, in turn, allows individuals to engage in those ac-
tivities that will develop their personal resources or human capital.
Contact Skills With Immigrant and Refugee Clients
In practice with individuals not of the dominant society, several 
practice issues confound effective service provision and intervention re-
lated to the client system.  Resistance, communication barriers, personal 
and family background, and ethnic community identity (Lum, 2004) are 
exacerbated by the experience of many immigrants and refugees, who 
closely guard information because of fear (perhaps unfounded) of ex-
posure, past experience with oppression, and mistrust of authority.  A 
number of immigrants and most refugees arrive from nations in turmoil 
in which they do not have the freedom of speech or of choice.  Mistrust 
of authority, including the possibility of deportation from the U.S., can 
often erect formidable barriers as service providers probe into the lives, 
experiences, and feelings of new immigrants and refugees.  In addition 
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to alleviating these through the establishment of a good rapport and rela-
tionship, service providers must establish credibility and expert author-
ity, including the use of directiveness and appropriate self-disclosure to 
provide the foundation of role relationships with clients (Figure 8).  
There has long been discussion about the need to link theory and 
practice.  Much has been written about cultural diversity and sensitivi-
ty and the need to provide services consistent with client socio-cultural 
frameworks.  When practitioners recognize cultural variations, draw 
on client resources, and attempt to present options in a manner that is 
consistent with client norms, cultural dissonance can be reduced, and 
there may be greater likelihood of service utilization.  Practice mod-
els must be developed that provide guidelines for integrating cultural 
awareness with Western interventions to synthesize approaches that 
are of the greatest relevance for the client yet consistent with the guide-
lines of the practitioner’s profession.
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 Awareness of the mental health, familial, and job-related issues 
facing immigrants and refugees may allow service providers in the 
social services to include these populations in their outreach efforts. 
Essential in helping enhance human capital is assisting individuals 
to identify, develop, and access the skills they need to cope with 
their unique situations.  The social services focus on this area, and 
as service providers recognize that these populations tend not to 
turn to them, they may assume the responsibility to establish a con-
nection with them.
The Role of Social Capital
It is safe to say that the ﬂow of immigrants can strain the receiv-
ing country’s support service systems.  It behooves policy makers and 
service providers to be cognizant of the experience of immigrants so 
that they can appropriately meet their voiced, or unvoiced, needs and 
ensure that the nation’s social capital is available to this group in en-
hancing its human capital.  Receiving countries must recognize that 
migration across their borders will persist with improvements in trans-
portation and with further emerging reasons for relocating.
In admitting immigrants, countries make a commitment to them. 
Unless a country is willing to help them through the transitional pe-
riod of adjustment, their unmet economic, social, health, and mental 
health needs can, in both the short and the long term, drain a nation’s 
resources. On the other hand, early attention to these very immigrants 
may accelerate their entry as contributors to society. (Mayadas & El-
liott, 2003)   While some experiences are unique to a particular immi-
grant group and to a speciﬁc individual, much in the immigrant experi-
ence is shared—from emigration to immigration, including reactions 
to and by the receiving country.   The framework presented here can 
help develop an understanding of the immigration experience and may 
provide a foundation for the interpretation of the experience of par-
ticular groups within the context of the receiving country’s readiness 
to accept them.  As immigration accelerates, it will be imperative for 
policy makers and service providers to become more sensitive to the 
unique needs of new arrivals and assess the degree to which programs 
and services are inclusive and supportive or xenophobic and discrimi-
natory.  Such assessments may ensure that programs are modiﬁed to
manage a mutually satisfactory adjustment between both the immi-
grant group and the host country.
Closing Thoughts
This paper has tried to discuss issues facing immigrants and refu-
gees in the U.S.  While it is true that what they share is that they are new-
comers to this land of opportunity and that they have left behind much, 
both tangible and intangible, in their homelands, that is only a portion 
of what they share.  The 2005 Census data show the numbers of immi-
grants that enter the country on an annual basis.  A close inspection of 
the data, available on the government Web site www.census.gov, should 
be made by any practitioner interested in this population.  It is abun-
dantly clear that there is no single proﬁle of an immigrant or a refugee. 
They range in age from infancy to well into old age.  They may be single, 
married, divorced, or widowed; they may come with families, without 
families, or as part of an extended family.  They may be white, black, 
brown, yellow, red, or any other color under which the human species is 
categorized.  They may be living in the U.S. legally or illegally.  They 
may be highly professional and skilled, or they may be unprofessional 
with skills that cannot be transferred to the U.S. economy.  They may be 
extremely wealthy or very poor.  They may be ﬂuent in the English lan-
guage and speak several other languages, or they may speak only their 
mother tongue, which may not be English, and they may be illiterate 
even in their own language.  They may be from cultures that are highly 
hierarchical and autocratic, or they may be from cultures where there is 
greater equality.  Immigrants and refugees constitute a population that is 
so diverse that to attempt to truly understand them or to provide guide-
lines for working with them is highly presumptuous.  However, if we do 
not so attempt, most programs will continue to skirt this group.  
Underlying difﬁculties in working with immigrants and refugees is
a far reaching xenophobia—both of the immigrants and by them.  It is 
difﬁcult to assess who should be responsible for crossing this bridge—
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is it the host or is it the self-invited newcomer?  Should the host coun-
try accommodate immigrants and refugees or should immigrants and 
refugees adapt to the host country?  This host country has policies 
to allow 290,000 immigrants annually and, often, almost a third as 
many refugees and twice as many “exempt” family members for a total 
yearly entry rate of over one million. Therefore, should the country not 
attempt to accommodate them?  Immigrants (and even refugees who 
come to the U.S. as a third nation of resettlement) must make applica-
tion to enter the U.S.  Hence, they are here voluntarily.  Should they not 
make attempts to adjust?  With whom does the responsibility lie?
For immigrants, as for all people, much is dependent on the per-
sonal resources they possess. Even more than this, however, is the read-
iness of the receiving country to accept immigrants and their Ameri-
can-born descendents.  Immigration policies may reﬂect the interests
of the nation in allowing entry to certain groups of people, however, it 
is the opportunities and obstacles that immigrants and their offspring, 
particularly those of color, encounter on a daily basis that affect the 
ease of adjustment and mutual acceptance.  Immigrants and the host 
nation must make a conscious level to adapt to each other—it is neither 
the exclusive responsibility of the host nation nor of the immigrant.  
For any immigrant community, it is a long road from its country 
of origin.  The physical distance may be great, but the social, psycho-
logical, and emotional distance of immigrant travel is always greater. 
Nevertheless, the human condition and its similarities bind peoples to-
gether to a much greater extent than one tends to accept, regardless of 
social norms, culture, religion, or language.  As a land of immigrants, 
if the U.S. is to be truly multicultural, as it claims to be, it must also be 
pluralistic and recognize, accept, and laud the differences in peoples 
as a national asset. It does not have the corner on cultural diversity and 
immigration struggles, and in this increasingly interdependent world, 
it must allow effective policies, programs, and services from other na-
tions to inform its own practices.
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